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CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM AND THE RESEARCH
The facts of the election alone stamped Willkie
as the greatest personality the Republican party had
developed in a generation. Willkie's personal traits,
the same earnest and unflagging energy which drove him
through a campaign schedule that would have killed
{,'-----------;ma-:rry-a-n-o-th-e·r-ma11-,-ma-d-e~i-t-c-c-erta-:tn-t-ha-t-he~cottl-d-no-tJ--------~-===
and ~ould not stop fighting for the principles in which
he believes.l
In this rather apt description of Wendell Willkie, the
1940 Republican presidential nominee, two important characteristics of the man stand out: his personal traits and energy
and his strength of conviction in fighting for the principles
in which he believed.

Willkie cannot be regarded a politician

in the usual sensej he was a businessman who, because of his
convictions, waged a personal war against Franklin Roosevelt
and the New Deal--a war conducted outside the realm of partisan politics.

His successes in the fight with the administra-

tion brought \'lillkie a mea sure of recogniti-on and aroused the
interest of certain Republicans who held like opin:tons of the
New Deal; his personality and continued expression of his
beliefs deepened this interest, resulting ultimately in his
nomination.

It is the purpose of this study to analyze the

conditions which enabled Willkie to rise from comparative

111

History in the Making,
November 26, 1940.

11

Current Histor~, 52:7,

2

obscurity to become the 1940 G.O.P. standard bearer, presenting in the analysis the Republican campaigns for the nom:t.nation,
the G.O.P. convention, and the influence of Roosevelt's third
te1•m decision and the European vmr on the selection of the
party's nominee.

In the election of 1936 the Republican party's attempted
challenge of the New Deal and :l.ts chief architect, Franklin D.
Roosevelt, ended with a stunning defeat in which the G.O.P.
carried only two states.

The party's polj.cies and ideals had

been rejected by the American electorate.

During the next two

years the party leaders worked to rebuild both the organization
and the i.mage of the Republican party, and in the Congressional
elections of 1938 the G.O.P. gained sufficient strength to
become again an effective opposition party.

Fortified by

these victories, they looked forward to re-challenging the New
Deal in 1940; they were optimistic about their chances, and
the publ:i.c opinion polls gave them good rea son to be so.
The enthusiasm and assurance of victory which had
characterized the party during 1939 suffered a dramatic setback when 3 in September, war-broke out in Europe.

The exist-

ence of an international crisis, coupled with Roosevelt's
reluctance to announce his decision regarding a third term,
made the choi.ce of the G.O.P. nominee a crucial decision; for,

3
if the party selected the wrong candidate in such a situation,
they would face the prospect of another ignominious defeat at
the hands of the Democratic party and, as many believed,·
Franklin Roosevelt.
Faced with political survival in a critical election,
the Republican party chose as their 1940 standard bearer not a
politician, but a political amateur from the ranks of American
business.

The explanation Of this occurrence has been debated

for twenty-five years, during which time many answers have
been advanced; however, historical agreement as to the
of the nomination has not been reached.

ca~se

The present study is

important because it is essential to American political history
that the conditions which produced the pheriomenal nomination
be subjected to careful study and critical historical analysis
to achieve, for the first time, a complete and accurate explanation as to why the Republican party nominated Willkie to
represent the party in one of the most crucial elections in
which they had ever participated.

II. ORGANIZATION OF Trill STUDY
The basic organization of the study follows a chronological presentation of the historical events; and within this
framev·IOrk, certain significant events have been emphasized to
facilitate the understanding of both the presentation and the
conclusions of the study.

Chapter II presents an analysis of

the political climate of the country during the year 1939,
discussing the revival of the Republican party, the sectional
outlook of the country, the

popula~ity

of Roosevelt and his

third term decision, and the emergence of the Republican
candidates for the presidency.

Chapter III, presenting an

analysis of the first five months of 1940, discusses the
Republican pre-primary and primary campaigns, the Democratic
and Republican primary elections, and the popularity of the
President and the third term question.

Chapters II and III,

therefore, present an account of the nation's major
activity from January, 1939, through May, 1940.

polit~cal

The chrono-

logical analysis is interrupted to trace tbe political rise of
.f

~l<

, Wende 11 Willkie from a critic of the 'l enne ssee Valley Authority
1

and other policies of the New Deal to a presidential contender.
Chapter V fulfills the dual purpose of presenting information
relative to the G.O.P. campaigns during the first three weeks
of June, the period of time immediately preceding the convention, and of tying in Chapters II and III with Chapter IV; the
chapter reveals the impact of the Willkie campaign on the
other Republican presidential aspirants.

Chapter VI presents

the Republican convention, both the outward activity and the
behind the scenes nmneuvers; the comments of political leaders,
I

political

~riters,

and newspapers concerning the Willkie nomi-

nation; and a survey of the opinions which have been advanced
to explain the cause of the upset nomination. ·Chapters II

5
through VI present a factual analysis of the historical events
from January, 1939, through June, 19lfO, and serve as a basis
for the conclusions of the study presented in Chapter VII.
III.

HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM

A search through Dissertation .Abstracts, the

Book
the

Inde~.,

Ne~1

!_h~

yo_r_!

Readers Guide to Periodical

!.i.!~~~

Cumu~tiv~.

~iteE_atu~,

and

Index revealed that there exists nowherE) a

complete analysis of Willkie

1

S

nomination.

The research for

the study verified this contention and disclosed that the
election itself has been partially discussed in various works
in political science concerned with the history of the two
political partles, presidential elections, and general works
on American politics; and that the Republi.c.an candidates,
campaigns, and convention activities have been presented in
biographies of the candidates and in the magazines and newspapers of the period.
graph~cal

The information derived from the bio-

sources was valuable} but the authors of these

sources did not discuss the nomination in its entirety, but
only in relation to the subjects of their works.

Although

the magazines and newspapers covered the political events during these two significant years quite well, neither presented
a complete study of the aforementioned subject.

In addition,

no work which attempted to present the development of the
third term decision in light of its influence upon the Republi-

i.

6

can party could be found.

The present study represents not

only an examination and evaluation of the causes of Willkie 1 s
nomination, but also a complete picture of the Republican
campaigns and convention activities and the influence of the
war and Roosevelt on both.
1,L_--------------------------------Pl-.-.-~}lli~RE~~~RSH------------------------------~=====

The source material used in the study was derived from
articles published in the

~~w

York Times, the magazines and

political journals of the period, biographies of indiv1duals
discussed in the study, and various works on American polit1cal
history.
The source material for Chapters II and III was secured
from the New

~

Times, magazines, and political journals

published during the period January, 1939, to May, 1940.

Since

these chapters follow a chronological presentation, the majority of the information was obtained from the

~~

York Times,

allowing the writer to set down a week-by-week account of the
campaigns, the sectional outlook, and the popularity of the
President.

The magazines and political journals provided

information as to the background of the candidates and the
over-all political picture of the nation during this critical
period.

It might be noted that public opinion polls have been

utilized to trace the popularity of the Republican candidates,
the President, and the third term; the relative strengths of

7
the two political parties; and the popular reactions to
certain major domestic and foreign events occurring during the
period.

The two polls used were the

li'OJ!tun~

poll, conducted

by Elmo Roper, and the Gallup Poll, conducted by the American
Institute of Public Opinion; and the results of these two
I

polls represent an essential part of the foundation upon which
the conclusions of the study have been based.

The reliability

of these polls is demonstrated by the fact that of all the
public opinion surveys conducted during 1939 and 1940, only
these two polls proved to be verifiable when compared with the
results of the election.

Both polls traced the ups and downs

of public opinion during the months of the campaigns, and both
ar1.. ived at substantially the same concluslons in their final
.polls, conclusions which were very close to the actual results:
Roper came within one-half of one per cent; and Gallup, with
his four per cent error correlation factor, was equally close. 2
Based on this information the assumption has been made that
because both final polls were verifiably accurate, the sampling techniques utilized by Roper and Gallup throughout the preelection period were the same as those producing the final
polls.

In vie'vv of the evidence, the assumption is not unrea-

sonable.
2
"Why the Polls Failed," rrhe New Republic., 103:6lflJ.,
November 11, 1940.

-----·----

8
The information contained in Chapter IV, the discussion
of the political rise of Wendell Willkie, was derived from
newspaper sources, magazines and political journals, and books.
The majority of the information again came from the

New~

Times, with the presentation following the same structure as
that of Chapters II and III; however, much valuable information was .obtained from books containing biographical material
on Willkie and historical references indicating the part he
played in the growth of the Republican

part~.

For Chapter V, presenting an analysis of the effect of
the Willkie boom upon the other candidates,. an overwhelming
majority of the source material came from the Ne!.

yor~ Ti.E!.£.~,

which carried a great many articles on the pre-convention
.activities, especially on the Stimson-Know appointments and the
development of Willkie 1 s political career.

In addition, infor-

mation concerning the political situation in Philadelphia
immediately before the convention opened was obtained from
magazines and political journals; the topic was not developed
in the book sources.
The information for Chapter VI, discussing the convention, came from newspapers, magazines and political journals,
and books.

F1or the most part, the material pertaining to the

chronological presentation of events was derived from the newspaper and magazine sources; and the behind the scenes explanations of the events were taken from the biographies of Willkie

9
and works on American political history.

The discussion of

the platform has as its basis not only the fuil text of the
document reprinted in the New York Times; but also comments
taken from all available sources.

The .section presenting the

reactions to the nomination and the many theories as to its
cause was composed mainly from material found in magazines and
political, journalsJ although some was found in the New York
Times and in book sources.
Chapter VII contains the conclusions of the study, the
explanation and interpretation of the facts recorded in the
study.

Since this information has previously been substan--

tiated by citations, only the factual information not found
in the body of the study will be footnoted in this chapter.
V.

THE METHOD OF PROCEDURE

The first step in preparing the study was to gather all
of the available information concerning the problem under analysis and to arrange it into logical divisions corresponding to
the propose9 format of the study.

Once this had been done, a

draft of the study was prepared, presenting a chronological
listing of all events from January, 1939, to July, 1940.

Thls

general picture was then broken down into the lo$ical divisions
corresponding to the aforementioned format.

To this skeletal

outline was added information explaining the events, molding
each of the divisions into a stage in the development of the

10

problem under study.

These divisions were then set down so as

to form the basis from which the conclusions of the study would
be drawn.

The result of the research and this method of pro-

cedure is a comprehensive analysis of the nomination of
Wendell Lewis Willkie for the presidency of the United States.

CHAPTER II
THE BACKGROUND--1939
In American political history presidential campaigns
have traditionally, and quite logically, begun sometime after
the Congressional elections, two years before the presidential
election.

During this two year period the party in power

attempts to shore up the administration in preparation for the
impending attack; the opposition party starts mapping out
strategy and, more important, sounding out possible candidates
to spearhead the attack on the administration.

During this

early period trends in voting behavior, candidate popularity,
and party strength become important as the candidates and
issues emerge.
From January to September of 1939 the Republican party
was characterized by a growing spirit of optimism as a result
of their comeback in the 1938 Congresslo:r.al elections.

This

spirit of optimism, partially supported by the public opinion
polls, grew as the candidates began throwing their hats into
the ring and denouncing the New Deal.
During this same period the Democratic party suffered
from indecision and confusion; they had little reason to be
optimistic because the President had refused to reveal his
plans for 1940, and no one knew if he were planning to retire
after his second

~erm,

or to run for a third.

Such a situation

12
effectively stalled the campaigns of the potential Democratic
candidates and stifled the enthusiasm of the rank and file.
The existing political situation was significantly
altered in September when the Germans invaded Poland, forcing
Britain and France to declare war on the aggressor.

The

seriousness of the international situation was to affect not
only the issues of the political campaign, but also the popularity of the candidates and their programs.
I.

THE REBIRTH OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY

After the G.O.P. 's poor showing in the 1936 election,
it appeared that the party had lost its position as a major
political force in United States politics.

An integral part

of the background for 1940 is an analysis of the Repu.blican
party's rebuilding program which removed this stigma of
defeat and replaced it with a spirit of
In April, 1937,

Eort~~

op~imism.

released the results of a public

opinion survey concerning the future of the GoO.P.

Of those

polled, 21.7 per cent believed that the party would recover in
something like its old form; 40.0 per cent felt that it would
revive under new and more liberal leadership; 6.6 per cent
thought the party would be succeeded by another party; 8.9 per
cent stated that the G.O.P. was dead; and 22.8 per cent stated
that they had no opinion. 1
---~---

1

"The For· tune Quarterly Survey: VIII,"
April, 1937".

F'ort~~-' 15:112,

13
An interesting feature of this survey concerned the

40.0 per cent who believed that the party would revive under
new and more liberal leadership.

Of the various economic

groups sampled, the percentage given to this answer was the
g~ven:

highest

60.8 per cent of the salaried executives, 32.8

per cent o.f the .laborers and

farm~rs,

50.0 per cent of the

students, and 28.9 per cent of the unemployed.
The 40.0

2

per cent who believed that the party would

revive undel"' ne\'1 and more liberal leadership proved to be correct; and in the 1938 Congressional elections the Republicans
captured eleven Senate seats, 169 House seats, eighteen governorships3 and control of both houses in nineteen state legislatures. 3
The

Amei•ican Insitute of Public Opinion (Gallup Poll)

_reported that the results of the elections indicated a wide
swing from the New Deal, \'Ihich had sustained losses in
six of the forty-six states carried in 1936.

thirty~

4 Gallup, in his

interpretation of the election results, stated that so onesided a change in public opini.on (five percentage points or
better in twenty-seven states coast to coast) was not the
2

Ibid.

3 rr'The Republican Party: Up from the Grave," Fortun~, 20:
33, August, 1939.
4

N~

York

!~~~~~

February 5, 1939, p. 5.

14
result of

~tate

and local issues and situations, as reported by

the administration.

In the industrial states of New York,

Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Michigan--states representing
142 electoral votes--the Democrats lost an average of eight
percentage points.5
The victories of 1938 stimulated Republicans all over

1940.

Their optimism was clearly demonstrated in the Lincoln

Day oratory of February, 1939.

Former President Hoover3

in a speech before the National Republican Club in New York
City, declared that the 1938 victol,ies represented encouraging
signs of a Republican victory in 1940.

After criticizing the

New Deal as a mixture of coercion, collectivism, and lust for
per•sonal po%'1er :J Hoover declared that the American votex•s had
sent independent men to vlashington, men who would not be controlled by government. 6
Republican National Committee Chairman, John D. M.
Hamilton,. declared that the 1938 victories shmoJed conclusively
that the party was united and would be victorious in 1940.7
He also reported that twenty-one of the forty-eight states were
"unquestionably Republican" and that if the party carried New
------~---

5Eaitorial in the Ne~ ~ork Ti~, February 9, 1939, p. 20.

6!'!~ ~k Times, February 14, 1939, p. 1.
7New York Times, February 15, 1939, p. 11.

-~----·

15
York in 1940, they would put their nominee in the White House.

8

The Gallup Poll confirmed Chairman Hamilton's optimism
with the release of a report which revealed that of all voters
with opinions, fifty-one per cent had indicated that they
would like to see the Republican pa1•ty win the p:t•esidency in

1940.

9

One month later, in April of 1939, the Gallup Poll

indicateq that in a cross··section survey of the voting population in all states 52 per cent expected a Republ:i.can victol"Y
in 191JrO.

Dr. Gallup presented a statistical pictu.t'e of the

party's comeback which showed that the Republican party had
increased its percentage by

1937.

twenty~two

points since January,

He also stated that du-r>ing the months immediately aftel'

the party's defeat in 1936, politicians were seriously asking
.themselves if the Republican party were dead.

According to

Gallup, the gains occurred after the Supreme Cou.t>t fight, the
business slump of

1937·~38,

and the Democratic purge of 1938.

These three events brought considerable gains to the Republ1.cans, raising the percentage from 30 per cent in 1937 to 52
per cent by April, 1939. 10
One of the major reasons for the successful comeback of
the party was the work of the Republican National Committee
..

8

N~~

9Ne~

York

Time~,

February 27, 1939, p. 1.

York Times, March 29, 1939, p. 1.

lOEe~ yo~k Time~, April

30, 1939, p. 18.

16
Chairman, John D. M. Hamilton, who had begun rebtdlding the
G.O.P. soon after the 1936 campaigno

He made a study of minor-

ity party practices in the British House of Parliament and
established a research department under Glenn saxon to obtain
facts for speeches and bills, a publicity department under
n----------=F=--=r=-ca=-:_cn=k=l=-y,n Waltman to inform the country of Republ:l.can policy,
and a women's department under Miss Msrion Martin to coordinate
the efforts of the National Committee and the various women's
groups supporting the party.

Hamilton also sought to bring

the Republican party from a "ha t·e Roosevelt 11 stand to one. of
offering constructive opposition to the New Deal.

To this end

conferences with Republican legislators were held to map out
strategy by which the legislators could attack New Deal legislation.

The G.O.P. 's stand on the issues of the day were given

to the publicity department for distribution to the mass media
of the nation.

11.

II.

THE SECTIONAL OUTLOOK

The Republican party had come a long way in its attempt
to recover the reins of government; however, the su.rveys and
sectional analyses published during 1939 indicated that, while
the party standings were close, the G.O.P. was still the minority party.
11

Th~

gains made in New England, the Middle Atlantic

"The Republican Party:

20:97, August, 1939.

Up from the Grave,"

Fo,!'_!;un~,

17
and the Central States were not sufficient to offset

States~

the Democratic strongholds of the South, the West, and the
large Eastern cities.

This contention was borne out by three

separ.ate analyses, conducted by Fortune, The Nati_Q!2_, and the
Republ:tcan National Committee.
New~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~=====

In the 1938 elections the Republican vote gained over
its 1936 totals in all the states in this section, except
Maine.

12

The Republican National Committee asserted that the

entir,e reg:lon--Ma ine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode
Island, Vermont, and Connecticut--would vote Republican in

1940. 13

-Fortune
-- '

in its analysis of Ne\'1 England, declared that

Republican stock had risen considerably in the region.

The

party held six governorships, nine of the twelve Senate seats,
twenty-one of the twenty-eight Congressional seats, and legislative control in all the state:3, except Connecticut, \'lhere
they held only the House.

The magazine reported that the Demo-

era t:s had written off all of New England, except rlla ssa chusetts
and, possibly, Connecticut.

14

--·-~~------

12

~~. y~rk ~~me~, February 5, 1939, p. 5

13~ York T:tmes, February

-1 1~The Republican Party:
20:101, August, 1939·.

Up

27, 1939, p. 1.
f1•om the Grave," :E_oE~~'

18

-

--

Joseph F. Dinneen, analyzing the region for The Nation,
.....
arrived at approximately the same conclusions as did the FOl"tune
analysts.

He found that the New Deal bad become very unpopular

in New England because the people believed that they would end
up paying for the extravagances of the rest of the country.
1,L__~~~~_.._n~a_d_d_it_Lon_,_blls_ine_s_a_b_a_d____b_e_e_n_s_l9W

to recover from the

Recession of 1937-38, and this had served to dampen the enthusiasm for the administration's policies.
that

Main~,

crats in

Dinneen reported

Vermont, and New Hampshire were lost to the Demo-

19!~0;

but that Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and ·

Connecticut had been helped by the New Deal--roads, bridges,
and jobs--and were considered states which could go either way
in 194o.

15

There was, then, in New England a definite trend toward
conservatism, a move toward Republicanismo

The dissatisfaction

with the Ne\'1 Deal manifested itself in the. elect1.on of Republ:i.··
can candidates in 1938.

Maine, Ne\'1 Hampshil'•e, and Vermont were

safely within the hands of the Republican party; and
Connecticut and Rhode Island were generally conbeded to be
leaning toward the G.O.P. for 1940.
The Middle Atlantic States
In the presidential election of 1936 the Democrats
carried every state in this region; however, in the Congres-

15 Joseph F. Dinneen, "This Is America: VI.

The New
Yankee G.O.P.," 1'J:.le li.§_i?_ion, 149:168-71, August 12, 1.939.
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sional elections of 1938 the Republicans had staged a strong
comeback, gaining in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,

i

Delaware, and West Virginia and losing only in Maryland. 16

On

the basis of these gains the Republican National Committee
claimed New Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania for 1940.

They

also declared New York to be a borderline state, though lean-

.

ing toward the G.O.P. 1 7

In their study of the Middle Atlantic States,

~:£rt~

reported that the Republicans, in order to win in November,
had to carry New York; but the magazine also indicated that
';the party mach:lne in that state was weak.

In Penns:ylvania the

G.O.P. held the governorship, but Govex•nor .Arthur H. James'

labor policies had antagonized that politically influential
···group.

In New Jersey, the political control of the s tB te rested

in the hands of Boss Hague and the Hudson County machine,
and the Republicans were given no chance of capturing th:l.s
state in 1940. 18
In his analysis of the pol:l.tical situation in the Middle
Atlantic States, Kenneth G. Crav-Jford, writing in The

NaQ,~l'!_,

came to the conclusion that if Roosevelt were the Democratic
candidate, the entire section would vote Democratic in 1940;

- -16- - -

~~ ¥.9!'-~. !'ime~,

February 5, 1939, p. 5

17~ ~ ~~ February

27, 1939, p. 1.

18"The Republlcan Party: Up from the Grave," Eor.t::.I.?.£,
20:97-99, August, 1939.
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however 1 if a non-Roosevelt-supported reactionary became the
candidate, the party would lose the entire section to the
Republicans.

He contended that F.D.R. 's popularity was so

great in the section that there was no real evidence that the
voters would turn down the third term attempt_, if it developed.
According to Crawford 1 Dewey was the only Republican with a
following in the region; but his candidacy was opposed by the
Old Guard 1 who had lined up behind Vandenberg.

The only Demo-

crat other than Roosevelt who had Eastern support was VicePresident Garner.

Crawford's analysis of New Yorl<:, New Jersey,.,

and Pennsylvania generally agreed with that presented by
fi'_'E"'~~;

however 1 he declared that the Democratic leadership in

New York and Pennsylvania was not much better than that of the
G.O.P.

In \'lest Virginia John r,. Lewis' miners v1ere reported

to be content and still loyal to the New Deal, and in normally
Democratic Maryland the New Deal was still. populal,.

In

Delaware, the war industries of the duPont family had been
expanded and were figured to increase Republican popularity
19
materially and bring the state back to the fold :tn J.9lfo.
The Central
--

-...~--

States

___,_._

The Republican party lost this entire twelve state
·region in 1936; however, in the 1938 elections they gained in
every state: Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa,
19Kenneth G. Crawford, "This Is America: VII. Roosevelt
and the Vital East," f.E~~ !'Jatio~, 11~9:.237··1+0, September 2, 1939.
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Minnesota 1 Missouri 1 Kansas 1 Nebraska, North Dakota, and South
20
Dakota.
The Republican National Committee claimed every
state in this region for 19lW 1 except Illino:t.s and Missouri.
The former was considered to be a borderline state, though
leaning toward the Democratic party.
In the Central States,
dissatisfied with the New

Dea~

21

;EErtu~

.
repol'•ted, farmers wel..,e

farm program and had expressed

their feelings by giving over\vhelming support to the Republican
party in the Congressional elections of 1938.

The magazlne

reported that the Democrats had written off Ohio, Michigan,
Iowa, Minnesota, and \lfisconsin for 1940, but hoped to maintain
their hold on Illinois and MissOUl'i.

According to

~~,

Ind:l.ana was rated as borderline, though leaning toward the
.Democrats by virtue of the state's control by the Paul
McNutt machineG

v.

22

William L. White, writ:l.ng i.n !}l£

~~on,

indicated that

there was a definite trend toward conservatism throughout the
Middle West.
of warm

He stated that there existed a general feeling

af~ection

for the President, although the same could

not be said for his program.

If war were to break out prior

to the election, there would be, according to White, a strong
20Ne~ X9Fk Ti~~' February 5, 1939, p. 5.
21

22

,lliL~ ¥.2E.~ !J..Ef~, February 27, 1939, p. 1.
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movement in this section to dl"aft Roosevelt for a thlrd term;
however, if the President's interference in European affairs
brought the United States to the brink of war, then the Middle

;

West would oppose him and send a large contingent of isolationist Congressmen to Washington in 1940.
ll---~~~~~that____the

White also reported

Old Guard Democrats had lined up behind Garner,~~=-~--~~=====
while

the Nev1 Dealers had voiced a preference for James Farley, the
Democratic National Committee Chairman.'

In the Republican

camp many had expressed inte1•est in Dewey '·s candidacy, but
there existed some skepticism as tb his experience and
ability.

Arthur Vandenberg, no stranger to· the voters of the

Middle West, bad a considerable following. 23
Arville Schaleben, in his study of the North Central
-States, also reported that there existed a good deal of

dis~

satisfaction with the New Deal, as well as a trend toward conservatism, which could result in a Republican S\1eep of the
section in 1940.

He declared that the political situation in

Michigan and South Dakota pointed to almost certain defeat for
the Democratic party, even if the country were at war.

In

Minnesota, North Dakota, and Wisconsin the Democrats faced
probable defeat.

Schaleben attributed this reversal to the

fact that the people of the section \'l'ere tired of unemployment,
economic strife, and relief.

In addition, Roosevelt's foreign

----·-2

3william L. White, "'rhis Is America: I. rrhe fUddlE;J \'lest

Drifts to the Right,"

~ ~ati,2J..1_,

148:635-38, June 3, 1939.
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policy, with its involvement in European affairs, was not
popular in the North Central States; and, according to
Schaleben, the Democrats would find it difficult to popularize
the war issue in this section to divert attention from domestic difficulties unsolved since 1932.

He also reported that

Vandenberg and Dewey were the two leaders on the region's
. 2l~
G.O.P. presidential preference list.
The West
In the presidential election of 1936 the Republicans
failed to carry a single state in the West; however, in the
elections of 1938 the G.O.P. made gains in all eleven: Utah,
Colorado, \'ly'oming, Montana, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, Arizona,
California, Oregon, and Washington. 25 The Republican National
Committee, however, did not believe these gains to be significant to claim a majority of the region; f01., the Committee
declared that only Wyoming and Oregon were ·safely in the G.O.P.
camp for 1940.

Idaho was considered to be a borderline state,

but leaning toward their party; Montana was also considered
borderline, but found leaning toward the Democratic party. 26
Accord:l.ng to the

Fort~

study, nearly all the Pacific

24Arville Schaleben, "This Is America: II. The North
Central States," Th~ _Nation, 1!~8:690-92, June 17, 1939.
25~~~- york !!.1!1~~, F'ebruary 5, 1939, p. 5
26

N~ y~~ _!in~, February 27, 1939, p. 1.
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Coast region rested safely within the Democratic camp.

The

Democrats had control of both California and Washington, lost
to the Republicans for 1940 because of conflicting local
ideologies.

The magazine gave the G.O.P. only Oregon in this
section of the country. 2 7
In analyzing the political opinions of the Southwest

for

~ li~~i~£ 1

Charles Curtis Munz predicted that the region

would vote Democratic in 1940.

Arizona, New Mexico, Texas,

and Oklahoma were all figured to support the Democratic party;
however, there existed no concrete evidence that they would
support a third term, but the President did have many active
supporters :l.n these four states who v1ould back such an attempt.
If Roosevelt declined to run in 1940, Garner would receive the
whole-hearted support of the Southwest.

28 .

Howard G. Costigan, in his study of the political climate
of the Western States, declared that the West had traditionally
decided the outcome of close presidential elections and that
the election of 1940 would be such an election.

According to

Costigan, the typical Westerner went to the polls to express
his traditional protest aga:lnst the

stat~

gug,; however, even

against this background of protest, the West was figured to
line up behind the Democrats and the New Deal in 1940.

He also

27 "The Republican Party: Up from the Grave," !'....£!:.~~~

20:102, August, 1939.
28Charles Curtis Munz, ''This Is America: IV. The Garner
Country," The Nation_, 149:66-·68, July 15, 1939.
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reported that if the candidates in 1940 were Garner and Dewey,
the West would vote Republican because the Democrats would
split into three groups:

the Old Guard, \'Jbo would support

:-;

- - - -

Garner; the liberal faction, who would cross over and vote
for Dewey; and the New Dealers, who would form a third party,
at least in the West.

On the other band, if Roosevelt decided

to run for a third term, drafted or otherwise, he would be
. 29
impossible to defeat in the West. ·
'rhe South
In the South, Republican hopes \'/ere dim, as usual.

In

1936 the G.O.P. lost all thirteen Southern States, and in the
Congressional elections of 1938 the Republican party gained
:i.n only fou.r states: Tennessee, North Carolina, Alabama, and
30
The Republican National Committee did not claim any
Texas.
of the states in this region, conceding all thirteen to the
Democrats.3l
A discussion of the South bad not been included in the
Fortune analysis.

It was generally conceded that the Demo-

cratic party completely controlled the politics of this
section, and thel'e was not much danger of the Republican

part~'

making inroads into this Democratic stronghold in 1940.
2 9HO\Ilard G. Costigan, "This Is America: v,. 'J.lhe Maverlck
Far vie st, 11 The Na tl<?.n.' 149:123-26, July 29, 1939.
30:r-l~ Yor..!s_ :fime_~., February 5, 1939, p. 5. ·

3 1 !'1.~:-;r. York 'l'im~..E_, February 27, 1939, p. 1.
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John Temple Graves, II, writing in :J:'he Nation, declared
that \'lhomever the Democrats nominated for president in 191J.O,
the South would vote for him because the Democratic party still
owned the region; the party could count on its political support.

He

reported that the Southern ant:l.-New Dealers had

lined up behind Garner, but that the movement was not a large
one and did not seriously threaten the New Dealers' position
in the

According to Graves, there existed a gro\'ling

South~

belief that the only acceptable candidate to the South would
be one supported by the President, or the President himself.
With the virtual collapse of the Garner and Hull

~andidacies,

both lacking support from Southern political leaders, and the
ver~

-

weak Republican party, it was clear that Roosevelt needed

only to announce his candidacy for a third term and he would
be sure of receiving nearly every Southern delegation. 32
The three sources used in this sectional analysis did

not agree on every state's political leanings; however, they
agx~eed

on the

over~all

picture wi.thin each section.

The Gallup

sectional poll, published in August, 1939, did not entirely
agree with the

Fortun~

analysis.

The Gallup Poll reported

that the voters of Ohio, New York, Pennsylvania, and Illinois
favored a Republican victory in 191W by 52 to 51~ pe:t• cent. 33

32John Temple Gt•aves, II, 11 'l1his Is .America: III. The
South Still Loves Roo seve 1 t," Tb.~ Na ~~'?n., 149:11-13, July 1,
1939.
33 "lgl'O 11 Time 31' 16 A
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New York and Illinois had been placed in the Democratic
column in the Fortune survey.

This apparent conflict concern-

ing the political leanings of these two ·important states

sub~

stantiated the evidence that the Democrats held only a slim
lead in several states and that a reversal of the existing
situation could occur at any time.

According to the results

of the sectional analyses 1 the key to the pre-war political
situation appeared to be the popularity of the President and
his long-awaited third term decision.
III,

THE POPULARI'rY OF THE PRESIDENT

The popularity of the President became an important ·
factor in determining the presidential nominees of both parties
.because as the single most popular "candidate 1

"

he could

dictate the Democratic choice by virtue of his position of
leadership and could profoundly influence the selection of the
Republican nominee.

Concerning the Democratic nomination,

Roosevelt could either influence the selection of his successor
from the fi_eld of potential candidates, or he could attempt to
secure a th:l.rd term by not choosing a successor and
accepting a draft at the convention.

Roosevelt's ultimate

decision would also affect the Republ:l.can nomination;
for if F.D.R. decided to accept a third term draft,
the G.O.P. would be forced to nominate a colorful candidate in
an attempt to offset the President's great personal

appea~.

l'

28
If, on the other hand, he decided not to run, the Republicans
would be free to nominate a safe conservative or a moderately
liberal candidate, depending on the political currents of the
time.
Roosevelt's popularity, therefore, became a prime .consideration of the G.O.P. leadership because if they were able
to predict correctly the third term decision, their chances to
emerge victorious in November would be materially better.
Political writers and analysts, as well as the pollsters, were
also cognizant of this pqlitical situation and began to explore
the currents of public opinion, to analyze the chances of the
potential candidates in both parties, to attempt to secondguess the man in the White House.

These attempts began early

in 1939 and continued throughout the year.
In November, 1936, Roosevelt's popularity had reached
its peak; in the election month, 62.5 per ·cent of the nation's
voters had indicated that they approved of the President.
However, Roosevelt had not been able to generate a comparable
amount of popular support for the 1938 Congressional elections.
The percentage of voters approving of the President in
December, 1938, \'Ias 55.5 per cent, a drop of nearly "{ per cent
from the percentage received two years before.

By January, 1939,

58 per cent of the voters supported the President; this increase
possibly resulted from the Republican showing in the 1938
elections.

A sectional breakdown of this vote revealed that

:___:: ________ _
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Roosevelt had mai.ntained a clear majority in all sections of
the country: 51 per cent in New England 1 57 per cent i.n the
Middle Atlantic States 1 55 per cent in the East Central
States 1 56 per cent in the West Central States 1 68 per cent
in the South, and 64 per cent in the West.3 4
Even more important than Roosevelt's popularity index
\'las the public reaction to the possibility of the President's
running for a third

term~

In March of 1939

for~,l.P.!

asked a

cross section of the nation's-voters if they believed Roosevelt
would make such an attempt.

The poll indicated that 31.1 .per

cent thought that he would 1 45.1 per cent that he would not,
and 23o8 per cent that they did not know.3 5
The third term question became more and more of a news
item and a topic for political hypotheses as one New Dealer
after another publicly announced that he believed F.D.R. should
seek a third term.

Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner, in their

analysis of this situation, stated that no one knew whether
Roosevelt had come to share the belief set forth by the New
Dealers; hor.'<'ever 1 they reported that no other New Dealers had
a ghost of a chance to get the Democratic nomination because
they had a 11 been poli ti.ca lly mu-rdered by Democ:t•a tic party
leaders.

The article also indicated that reports of the

3 1+~~\'i Yorl:f_ T~~ January 8, 1939, p. 35 ..
35 11 'I'he Fortune Survey: XIX," F~~~~ 19:130, March, 1939.
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President's private talks seemed to reveal a shift in emphasis
from discussions of a happy retirement after 1940 to mentions
of a President's duty to break the third term tradition under
6
certain circumstances.3
Another political analyst interested in the third term
mystery was Arthur· Krock, a columnist for the

New York
-------

Times,

~==~------~====

who declared that the President's refusal to discuss his
future plans with any degree of finality until the end of the
Congressional session (for the announced fear' of losing or
seriously reducing his influence to conduct policy) might.have
been a sound maneuver at the start of the session; however,
the tense international crisis had altered the logic of this
position.

Roosevelt's silence, a cco:r.ding to Krocl{, had

resulted in a stiffening of the opposition to the administration's programs and had possibly endangered the nation's
national defense.37
Others interested in the third term decision were not
content to sit back and write about the cont1•oversy.

Many

reporters and political writers attempted to question the
President, his family, and high admin:i.stration sources in
order to smoke out the answer to the third term decision,

-----36Joseph Alsop and Robert Ki.ntner, " 1 President Must Run
Again Rises as Definite Cry of Nevi Dealers, 11 New York Times,
-------May 2, 1939, p. 1L
.
1

37Arthur Krock, "In the Nation: Fear of rrhird Term
Affects Grave Decisions," Ne~ ~ ~~' April 20, 1939, p. 22.
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James Farley, Chairman of the Democratic National Committee,
answered reporters' questions as to the party's presidential
campaigns by declaring that it was futile to talk about the
candidacies for 1940 until the President made knovm his·
intentions.

Farley, who had just returned from a 7500 mile

trip from coast to coast to sample public opinion, refused to
discuss the merits of any possible candidates, although he did
declare that the Democratic party would carry Oklahoma, Texas,
New Mexico, Arizona, California, Wyoming, Nevada, and Utah-all states included in his trip--in 1940.38

In contrast to the optimism expressed by the Democratic National Chairman, Fortune published a poll in May
which indicated that F.D.R. •s popularity had
stantial drop.

The

n~gazine

suffel~ed

a sub-

reported that ·in March, 63.5 per

cent of the nation's voters had indicated that they liked the
President$ and 36.5 per cent had replied that they did not;
however,

b-y

May only 58.8 per cent answered i.n the affirma-

tive.39
The reported decrease in Roosevelt's popularity was
partially substantiated by the May Gallup Poll, which reported
that in a hypothetical race between Senator Robert Taft and
the President, a cross section of the electorate came

38James A. Hagerty, "Ic'arley Says Trip Shm'ls Party Safe,"
New x_or~ Times_, May 26, 1939, p. 7.
39"rrhe FortLme Survey: XXI," Eort~, 19:87, May, 1939.
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up with a fifty-fifty split of those expressing an opinion.
In addition, it was related that in another hypothetical race
bet\'leen Thomas Dewey and Roosevelt, the President came out on
the losing end, 45 per cent to 55 per cent. 40
During the month of June, speculation over the third
term again made the headlines when Secretary of Interior
Harold Ickes commented in a national magazine that Roosevelt
should attempt a third term; Ickes, in hls endorsement, also
criticized Garner and other Democratic presidential aspirants.
When

repor-~ters

attempted to get Roosevelt to comment on the

Ickes' statements, the President refused to be drawn into a
.

1

discussion .of his plans for 19+0.

41

In another press con-

ference held two weeks later, Roosevelt refused to answer a
direct question as to the third term dec:l.sion and told the
questioner to go stand in a corner. 42
Some

political \•Iriters turned from questioning to pre-

dicting what would occur in 19!W.

!b..~.

New

~Jl....q_

reported

that Roosevelt would probably be glad to retire to Hyde Park
aftel' turning over the position to a Ne\'l Dealer VJho would
carry on the administration's programs.

The magazine stated

that the President would not allow an outsider who v.Iould undo
lW!Je~ ¥.2.~ rrime s, rVIa y 31, 1939, P. 8.

41~~~ York Tim~, June 7, 1939, p. 2.
!}

2 F·eli.x Belair, Jr., "Roosevelt .Asked if He Is Candidate

Replies viith a Quip,"

!"'.E::~ ~~

r.f·j_mes, June 21, 1939, p. 1.
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all which had been accomplished in the preceding eight years
gain control of the Democratic party.
Roosevelt would become

~

Without stating that

candidate, the magazine reported that

F.D.R. had shown no signs of endorsing Hull, Wallace, or
Farley. 43
lj-----------------B=r._.u=c--=e=--=B=--l=i=-v._.e~·
n,

a 1 so writing in

'J~h-~

N_evv He ~~b l i c , stated

~------------=====

in July that if the United States were to become involved in a
war prior to the election, Roosevelt would be re-elected.

If

this situation did not occur, according to Bl:Lven, the nation's
political future would be up in the a:tr.

4!~

In another issue,

published during the follovling month, the magazine px•esented
an analysis of the potential Democratic presidential possibilities and eliminated all of them by stressing the political
liabilities of each. 45

By implication Roosevelt was held up

as the only acceptable candidate for the Democratic nomination.
This one segment of the liberal press believed that if an
international crisis were to develop_before the election, the
result would be an increase in the President's popularity;
with no other Democratic possibility in sight, such a situation
could have a significant bearing on the third term decision.
43"washington Notes: The Third Tel~m," 112~. NeJI ~blic_,
99:187, June 21, 1939.
44Bruce Bliven, "Looking at 191W," ~ ~.!. !3~:::!1?11.£,
99:183, June 21, 1939.
45n'I'hose Charming Young !1en., 11 :£!~~~ !:le!~. Reeublic., 99.:320-21,
July 26, 1939.
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As the political guessing game

continued~

with

reporters drawing blanks at the press conferences and political writers attempting to predict the future, the President's
persbnal popularity again began to increase.
sUl~vey

A Gallup Poll

of voters of both parties on the hypothetical race

between Dewey and Roosevelt indicated that F.D.R. had gained
three percentage points over the May survey; the vote in June
was 52 per cent for Dewey and 48 per cent for Roosevelt.4 6
In July, Roosevelt himself stimulated more third term
questioning when he asserted in a press conference that there
were t\•Telve to fifteen "charming" young men in Feder•al service
who might have presidential aspirations.

Speculation around

Washington covered the interesting point of \'lhether Roosevelt
had included himself among the "charming" y·oung men he had
mentioned .. 47

At his next press conference Roosevelt tm.. ned

aside several questions as to whether he had informed anyone
that he would pos:ttively run fox• a third term and that he
wanted Paul McNutt as his running mate.48

Again, one week

later at another press conference, the President 1 when asked
if he could indicate when a statement on the third term could

be expected by the country, chuckled and said that he could

- ..-------·46New
York _____
Times ,
-- ---·-

June 23, 1939, p. 5.

47Ne!_:~ York Tim~, July 13, 1939, p. 1.

48NeJ.~ Y2rl.f T~!}_~§_, July 19, 1939J p. 6.
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not. 4 9

Several days later, on August 1, Roosevelt and the

:-

press assembled broke into laughter when a reporter asked the
President if he had a few words to say on the twelfth anniversary of Coolidge's statement, "I do not choose to run;"
Roosevelt did not answer the question.5°
While Roosevelt and the reporters were conducting their
battle of wits, the New Dealers continued to build up strength
fOl"

the third term draft.

Several members of the Cabinet

were outright or sligbtJ:y condi t:lonal advocates of a third
term for Roosevelt, as vvere many New Deal Congressmen and
governors and labor organizations all over the cotmtry.

A

national organization to draft Roosevelt for 1940 had been
established in Chicagoo51
The efforts of the New Dealel"S appeared to be mal{ing
some headway, as evidenced by the August Gallup Poll's
announcement that the nation's young Democrats favored a third
term.

A carefully selected cross section of several thousand

Democrats between the ages of twenty and twenty-nine were
polled, and 52 per cent declared themselves in favor of a
third term.

The survey also indicated that Democratic voters

as a whole opposed. a third term by the same margin--52 per cent

4~ Yo~ :r'1t!}2_~, July 29, 1939, p. 3.
50~~~

York

Time~,

August 2, 1939, p. 5.

51Turnel~ Catledge, "rl'hird Term Showdovm Expected to
Come Soon," New York 'J.li_!!Jes, July 30, 1939, IV, p. 7.

,,
------

to 48 per cent.

In addition, 38 per cent of those Democrats

expressing an opinion on a third term stated that they would
not vote for Roosevelt if he should run in 1940, while 62 per
cent declared that they would,5 2
In mid-September the Gallup Poll reported that the
President had become the leading choice of Democratic voters,
citing the results of a nationwide survey of that party.

The

poll also indicated that if the President did not run in 1940,
Garner would be the leading choice among Democratic voters.53
The results of the poll are significant in that the effect of
the outbreak of the European war had not been measu.-r>ed in the
survey.

In October, the Gallup Poll repor•ted that the

~1ar

in

Europe had trigge:r'ed a definite upturn in the pro-third term
sentiment.

In a cross section analysis of men and women in

every state, 43 per cent of those polled indicated they favored
a third term.

In May the percentage had been only 33 per cent;

in August it had risen to 40 per cent.

In a sectional analysis

the October poll showed that in New England 34 per cent favored
a third term, while 45 per cent in the Middle Atlantic States,
32 per cent in the East Central States, 37 per cent in the West
Central States, 61 per cent in the South, and 47 per cent in
the West expressed a like opinion.54

52li~~ Iork T~~~~' August 18, 1939, p. 20.
53!J.~~ ~
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Even though 57 per cent of the nation, according to the
Gallup Poll, opposed a third term for Roosevelt, the results
of the survey revealed a significant point.

Within the space

of a month the President had increased his lead over the other
possible Democratic presidential aspirants and had gained
considerable support for a third term.

The effect the war

would have on public opinion suddenly loomed as the single
most important factor in the third term decision, for national
attention had been focused on the foreign affairs issue: the
part the United States should play, if any, in the conduct of
the European war.
Alf Landon, the "nominal" head of the G.O.P., urged
Roosevelt to disavow the third term in the interest of national·
defense.

He called upon the President to take the proposed

repeal of the embargo on munitions out of politics by issuing
a definite declaration that he would not run in 19L10.

Landon

reasoned that Roosevelt's silence might have been justifiable
during normal times, but in the tense international situation
the Pres:I.dent•s stand had created resistence to the normal
cond1.1ct of affairs because many believed that the third term
issue \'las of greater importance than any change in the
Neutrality Act.

Roosevelt declined to comment on Landon's

statement, but .expressed hope that partisan politics could be
adjourned during the crisis.55

-----------------

55N~~ !ork. ~~~ September 13, 1939, p. 30.
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F.D.R. was destined not to get his wish, for one
month later Secretary of .Agriculture Henry Wallace stated
publicly that Roosevelt •s talents, train;l.ng, and experience in
foreign affairs were necessary to steer the country's domestic
and foreign policy through the international crisis.

.Adminis-

tration leaders refrained from comment on Wallace's reopening
of the third term controversy, but G.O.P. leaders took the
opportunity to declare that the statement represented a public
affirmation of the third term candidacy.56

White House Press

Secretary Stephen T. Early remarked that it \'lOuld have been
kind and polite for Wallace to have consulted his "victim"
before making the statement.

Early refused to dlscu.ss the

matter further when reporters sought to obtain an

elabol~ation

on the remark.57
Wallace's statement brought forth another round of
questioning by reporters and guessing by political analysts.
In a press conference held in late October, Roosevelt again
laughed at a reporter's question as to the third term decision,
but no answer was forthcoming.58

The President's wife was

also subjected to i.ntense questioning, as were members of his
family.

The First Lady, when asked of her husband's plans for

56~~ York Time~, October 26, 1939, p. 1.
~ew

5?Feli:x Belair, Jr., "Wallace Rebuked by White House,"
York T~mes, October 27, 1939, P•. 12.
5~ew ~or~ Time~, October 28, 1939, p. 6.
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1940, replied that she did not know for she had not asked
him.59

In mid-November, Roosevelt refused to comment on the

announcement by Garner supporters that they intended to canvass
the country to seek delegate strength on behalf of their man. 60
The President himself deepened the speculation when, speaking
at the ceremony for the laying of the cornerstone of the
Jefferson Memorial, he stated that he hoped he would be able
to come to the dedication in January, 1941.

This statement

was interpreted by some to mean that li'.D.R. wished to make the
dedicatory ceremonies one of the closing acts of his administration; others declared that the statement represented an
indication that the President was looking forward to a continuation in office after his second te;m had expired.61
The November Gallup Poll showed that four out of five
Democrats throughout the nation supported a third term.
The poll indica ted that the pre-war poli ti·cal situation,
characterized by the confidence of the Republican party
that the country would elect a G.O.P. candidate in 1940 and
that Roosevelt could not be elected if he chose to run, had
changed with the deepening of the European war. 62

59!'J..§!."~-i..

Y.2EJi Ti~, November

!~I

1939, p. 18.

60New. Yor!s_ 1'1~'2_, November 15, 1939, p. 15.
61N~-~ York }.imes, November 16, 1939, p. 1.
62New Yor.~. T:!~, November 5, 1939, p. 47.
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The international crisis had not only strengthened
F~D.R.

's control of his party, but also had elevated the Demo-

cratic part-y's chances for victory in 19'-J.O.

In .April, 1939,

the Gallup Poll had indicated that 52 per cent of the nation's
voters

f~vored

a Republican president

fo1~

1940; by November 1

the poll indicated that public opinion had shifted and that
54 per cent favored a Democratic president. 6 3 .A poll of fifty
Washington correspondents conducted in .April had predicted a
G.O.P. victory in 1940; ho\<Jever, by December the poll had
reversed itself, judging by a two to one margin victory for
the Democi•:ats. 64
The European war had substantially strengthened both
the pro-third term sentiment and the chances for a Democratic
victory in 1940, but the crisis had not induced the P:eesident
to make any statement concern:l.ng his future plans.

He had

carefully side-stepped reporters' ingenious inquiries and had
declared that he was too busy to discuss third terms, third
parties, or 1940 presidential cand1dates.65
IV.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE CANDIDATES

The Congressional victories of 1938, and the resulting
63we'! York 2;ime ~, November 19, 1939, p. 11~.
64Editoria1 in the !:f.£~ York rrime~, December 2, 1939, p. 16.

65N~ Yo~ Times, December 23, 1939, p. 6.
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spirit of optimism, prompted some Hepuhlicans to throw their
hats into the ring.

Throughout 1939, these candidates cam-

paigned for the nomination, seeking to o·btain support from the
party's rank and file and leaders with programs which indicated
the New Deal domestic policies; however, the outbreak of the war
in Europe and Roosevelt's silence on the third term decision
figured to change the complexion of both the issues of the
campaign and the popularity of the candidates.
In January of 1938, EQ?:'tUE.S:. conducted a survey in which
they asked the natiOn's voters whom they would prefer as
president if Roosevelt did not run in l940r

To

this question

the prosperous and the business executives expr,;:ssed a
prefel."'ence fo:t• Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg; the poor and the
.factory laborers indicated a preference for Senstor William E.
66
BOl"ah.
By February, 1939, Vandenberg had been replaced by
Thomas E. Dewey as the cho:Lce of the prosperous and bu.s:tness
group.

This survey, also conducted by Fortune

---~--'

asked voters,

regardless .of their party affiliation, which Republican they
would vote for in 1940.

Of those sampled, the largest per-

centage, 38 per cent, stated that they did not know for which
Republican they would vote.

The remaining 62 per cent lndi-

cated preferences for a wide variety of potential
6 6 "The Fortune Quarterly Survey: XI,
January 1 1938.

11

candidates~

For·tune 1? :9?,

-~---~-----

i

~

------
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In the poll Dewey received the highest percentage, 12.2 per
cent, with F:torello LaGuardia of New York, 11.5 per cent;
Arthur Vandenberg, 11.5 per cent; Alf Landon, 8.2 per cent;
Herbert Hoover, 5.1 per cent; Henry cabot Lodge,

11.6

per cent;

Senator Gerald P. Nye, L!.l per cent; and others, 4.8 per cent,
receiving lesser amounts of popular support.67
In the Gallup Poll, also published in February, a cross
section of Republican voters were asked to name the indiv:tdual
they would like to see as the party's candidate in 1940.
results showed De\'-ley leading with· 27 per cent, folloi'led
Vandenberg with 21 per cent, Borah with

L!

The
~Y

per cent, Hoover with

4 per cent, and LaGuardia w:t th ll per cent.. The poll also
indicated that nearly

one~half

of the RepLtbJ.icans interviewed

had no definite choice at that time.68
· In both of the February surveys, one sampling all voters
and the other concentrating on just the Republicans, the leading presidential contender for the G.O.P. was New York City's
District Attorney, Thomas De\>Jey.

A possible explanation for

his lead at this early stage in the fight for the nomination
was the national recognition he had received as a result of his
11

crime-busting 11 activities :1.n cleaning up Ne\'l York City.
67 11 The Fortune Survey: XVIII,

1939.

11

After

F_9~~une, 19:68, February,

68N~w York_ 'rimes, Febru.ary 17, 1939, p. 14.
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the resignation of Judge Martin T. Manton, several New Yorlc
Republican leaders, including Representative Joseph W. Marttn,
Jr., declared that Dewey had surged to the front in the l"ace
for the G.O.P. nomination.69
Dewey, preferring not to announce his candidacy, stated
that he was not a candidate for public office and formally
repudiated the "Dewey 1940 Popular Committee to Nominate IJ.'homa s
E. Dewey for President of the United States on the Republican
Ticket, 11 a group fOl"med to boom him for the p:t•esidency o 70
Another New Yorker mentioned in the February polls,
r-1ayor LaGuardia, a 1so took himself out of the

19~·0

px•esidentia 1

race when, at a press conference, he declared that he would not
even get a ticket to the gallery of either convention.7 1
'l•he !i.tY!. York

!!.~!!~~

reported that Vandenberg's close

friends had asserted that the Senator had taken himself out of
the 1940 presidential race because of the opposition to his
candidacy by the Landon faction and other powerful elements
within the Republican party.
Vandenberg had

gradu~lly

His friends believed that

withdrawn as developments took place

which appeared to be to his disadvantage, such as Dewey's rise
in the public opinion polls.

The papel' also l'eported that lf

69New York TJme~, January 31, 1939, p. g.
70~e~ J~~~ Time~, January 20, 1939, p.

3.

7l~ Yo.!k Tl.me~, February 21, 1939, p. 5.

Vandenberg were eliminated as a candidate, Dewey's boom would
attain greater strength.

Many Republican Senators, according

to the article, had conceded that Dewey wss the front running

i_ _ _ _ _

candidate, but felt that he would have to define his position
on major national questions before he would gain the party's
endorsement.7 2
With or without the support of the

G.o.~.

professionals,

Dev1ey continued to gain support among Republ1.can voters.

In

the March Gallup Poll, Dewey received 50 per cent of the vote,
while the majority of the other
ground.

p~esidential

aspirants lost

In the poll Vandenberg received 15 per cent, Taft

13 pe:r.• cent, Hoover 5 per cent, Landon 4 per cent, Lodge 2 per

cent, and Borah 2 per cent.

The poll pointed out that the

.De\'Iey gains came after the suo ce ssful prosecution of New York
Tammany leader James J. Hines. 73
In April, Dewey again disavowed his candidacy, repeating that he was only concerned with his present position of
District Attorney.

Politicians known to favor Dewey's candida-

cy refused .to comment on the statement, preferring to believe
that Dewey opposed being the object of an abortive boom.74
F'ormer President Herbert Hoover, in a speech before neHs-

72!'1 ew ~ TJ.:.~~..~'

Februa1~y

28, 1939, p. 2.

73~~~~~, March 2"(, 1939, p. 13.

7 1~~e~ ~!s. :£imes, April 22, 1939, p. 4.
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paper editors from Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin, also
stated that he was not a candidate for the 1940 nomination.
In the speech Hoover declared that Republican prospects for
victory in the election appeared to be very bright as a result
of the failure of the New Deal domestic policy to instill confidence among the nation's businessmen.75
While Dewey and Hoover were disclaiming their candidacies, the Gallup Poll reported that in a hypothetical race
between Taft and Roosevelt, a cross section of voters from both
parties rated the race even, with each ''candidate"

receiv~ng

50 per cent of the vote of those expressing an op1nion.7 6 The
results i.ndicated that Dewey was not the only Republican
presidential possibility with publ:tc support.
In mid-May Governor Luren D. Dickinson of Michigan issued
a press statement which declared that he and other Republicans
in the state had begun a campaign to draft·vandenberg for the
Republican nomlnation.

Dickinson added that the efforts were

being carried out without Vandenberg's knowledge or consent.77
Soon after Governor Dickinson's announcement the New
york

Ti~~

reported that a group of G.O.P. elder statesmen

had started a movement to control the balance of power at the

-------75!i_~
I

X2E.k Times, May 21, 1939, III, p. 5.

76~ ~~ T~yle~, May 31, 1939, p. 8.
77~~~ york !~m~-' May

19, 1939, p. 12.
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convention and turn it against Dewey.

The group reportedly

wanted a candidate who was familiar with economic issues and
trends; and, while they believed Dewey to be a dynamic personality, they felt that he had not demonstrated such a capacity.
The article also stated that the nomination would not be denied
Dewey were he to show himself to be seasoned and versed in
public questions.78
Raymond Moley, writing in Newsweek, also declared that
the Republican party needed a candidate with less glamor and
more experience and that the tactics used against the corruption in New York City would not be suitable for a national
campaign.

According to Maley, The G.O.P. candidate had to be

one with a deep understanding of the problems of business,
labor, and agriculture; and he beli.eved that Dewey \'las not
that man.79
Thus Dewey, by virtue of being the front running
candidate, became the target of his rivals.

Even though he had

repeatedly denied his candidacy, his position in the polls had
prompted his rivals to combine strategy to deflate his boom.
The anti-Dewey forces planned to run favorite son candidates in
the primaries and to attempt to get states to send uninstructed
delegations to the convention, thereby insuring themselves

78New Yor~ !it~~' May 20, 1939, p. 6.
79Raymond Moley, "Perspective: De\vey," Newsweek, lft: 48,
July 17, 1939.
---------
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control over the convention.80
The anti-Dewey movement did not deter

othel~

presidential

aspirants from entering the race for the nomination.

lc

In June,

Kenneth vJ. D. Douglas issued a press statement that a movement
had been started to secure the nomination for Henry Cabot
~:------------'L_o_d-'--'ge.

The group planned to establish

Lodg"-'e=--_:_f::_'o:_:r::_-_:P=-=.r::_e::_.~s~=-·d-'-'-e~·n..:. :_:_·t________

clubs throughout IVlassachusetts to win favor·i te son support for
their candidate.Bl
In early August, Taft publicly announced his candidacy
and presented his program.

The candidate stated that Roosevelt

would be the weakest candidate the Democrats could name because
the basic issue in the campaign would be ~he reversal of New

Deal

polici~s

involving continued deficits and excessive

business regulation; but he cautioned the nat16n to expect no
"overnight" miracles from the Republican party in their attempt
to balance the budget.

Taft also declared that the adm:l.nistra-·

tion's farm program was unsatisfactory and that the restriction
on production had to be abandoned; however, he did not indicate
alternative solutions.

He fux•ther stated that the National

Labor Relations Act should be amended to separate the prosecuting and judicial functions of the National Labor Relations
Board, a change needed to halt the prejudice directed against
employers and the American Federation of Labor.

--------

8~~ yor~ }imes, May 20, 1939, p. 6.

81New Y9Ek !J~~~~ June 15, 1939, p. 6.

Concerning

48
social security, Taft recommended a coordinated program which
would "make sense," providing for a reasonable non-contributory
pension granted by the states with Feder-al a1.d supplemented by
an optional pension plan, to which employer and employee would
contribute.

On foreign affairs the candidate declared himself

in favor of keeping out of European affairs; however, he did
state

th~t

he favored the repeal of the arms embargo because

he could not see how selling to all nations on a cash and
carry basis had anything to do with neutrality.82
Taft's managers announced that they had made no plans
to seek delegates from any other state than Ohio, although they
reported that the candidate had heard favorable comments on his
candidacy from G.O.P. leaders in various sections of the nation •
.Taft men were reported to have planned to campaign for delegates
in the Middle West and the Far West.83
Republican leaders in New York reported to the

Ne~ JoE~

T:l.mes that .Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts and Ohio Governor
John

w.

Bricker were the two leading dark horses in the field

of candidates.

According to the sources, the country's busi-

ness interests, formerly holding great influence in the G.O.P.,
were reported to be not wholly satisfied with any of the leading candidates--Dewey, Vandenberg, and Taft--and planned to
82!'Le!!. Yo.tif. Ti.ll}~, .August 4, 1939, pp. 1, !~~

831~·, p. !~.

1~9

keep the convention open so as to consider the candidate best
suited to run against the Democratic nominee. 84

I'

Governor Bricker had been frequently mentioned as a

I.

r __

possible G.O.P. presidential candidate; but if he had had any
chance for the nomination, it was dealt a severe blow when
Tart announced his candidacy.

Brickel", reportedly.J steQQed

~--------------

aside ror the state's Senator, declaring that he would not
attempt to secure the Ohio favorite son spot in the primary.
He

had no comment to make on Taft's de clara t:l.on of cand:l.dacy. 85
His chances were also somewhat lessened by an attack

launched
meeting

o·y
ii~

Senator Claude Pepper before a Young
Pittsburgh.

Democ:~.:•ats

In a speech delivered to this group

Pepper declared that Taft, Vandenberg, and Dewey had been
appraised b,y the duPont group and had been found to be unacceptable as candidates.

Pepper reported that Vandenberg had been

impolite t.o Pi.erre duPont during the Nye Munitions Inve stigations and$ therefore, had been eliminated from the race for
the nomination; that Dewey bad been judged unacceptable because
of his liberalism; and that Taft had been d:l.scardr:;d because of
his bull-beaded and self-righteous attitude.

According to

Pepper•, the duPont group wanted a man whom they could control,
and that ~IDtan was Govern01, Brlcker.86
8 1 t~·e\'J. Y~ ~~ August 20, 1939, p. 30.
-u~~lJ~\'JYor:Is. ,T_j.me.~, August 4, 1939, p. ~.•

86''W,a shington Notes: r<ir. duPont Presents' II f'he Ne_~
Republic, 100:130, Septembei' 6, 1939.
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Dewey and Bricker were not the only presidential
possibilities receiving criticism and political "pot-shots."
.
.
Oswald Garrison Villard, writing in ~Nation, stated that it
was almost effrontery for Taft to run for the presidency when
he had been in public life for so short a time.

He further

declared that Taft's dull speeches would not arouse the interest
or enthusiasm of the people; but Dewey, on the other hand,
would be a brilliant campaigner, if nominated.

Villard cUd

temper his praise of Dewey with the statement that there
existed no evidence that the candidate knew what was going on
in the world.87
Concurrent with the announcement of 'I'aft 1 s candidacy
came the report out of New York that Dewey had established a
"brain trust" of the type set up by Roosevelt prior to the
1932 campaign.

The report

\'Jas

denied by De\o;ey 1 s friends,

declaring that a research bureau had been organized to find
facts to aid the candidate, not a "brain trust" group to impose
their ideas·on him.88
The August Gallup Poll showed a gain for Vandenberg and
relatively little change in the popularity of the other
candidates.

In the survey Dewey received 45 per cent,

Vandenberg 25 per cent, Taft 14 per cent, Hoover 6 per cent,

87oswald Garrison Villard,
149:197, August 19, 1939.

11

IssL1es and Men," The Nation,

SSNew !ork Times, August 5, 1939, p. 3.
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Landon 3 per cent, Borah 2 per ceot, Bricker 2 per cent, and
others 3 per cent.

A significant fact pointed out in the poll

was that 44 per cent of those Republicans sampled had not yet
made up their minds on the candidate they would prefer for
194o. 8 9
ti------------'.IThe-G-a_lJu~P-E-o-1-1-Pnhlisbe_d_in_o_c_t_o_b_e_r_ind_i_c_a__t_e_d_a_c

tinuation of the trend established in the August poll.

o'-'-'n._-_______

Dewey

had fallen to 39 per cent, while Vandenberg gained to 27 per
cent and.Taft to 17 per cent.

Others receiving votes were

Hoover with 5 per cent, Landon 4 per cent, Borah 3 pel.. cent,
Lindbergh 1 per cent, Bricker 1 per cent, and others with 3
per cento

Charles Lindbergh made the poll on the basis of a

speech in which he advocated strict United States aloofness
from the European conflict.9°

The outbreak of the European

war had started to affect the popularity of the candidates
and potential candidates.
The war had triggered a sudden increase in Roosevelt's
popularity with both the Democratic rank and file and the nation
as a whole.

This reversal of the President's popularity could

have resulted from the Democrats' desire for an experienced
leader during the international crisis.

Cal.. rying this reason-·

ing one step further, it is logical to assume that the rank

89~ew York Times, August 13, 1939, p. 3.

9°New York Tim~~~ October 13, 1939, p. 14.
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and file of the Republican party also turned to the experienced
leaders within their party, which could partially explain
Vandenberg's sudden rise in the polls, as well as Dewey's

""

=---

sudden drop.
Taft viewed the war as beneficial to the G.O.P. because
he believed that the overwhelming majority of the American
people were determined to keep the nation out of war and that
they could not trust the Democratic party to do so.

He stated

that the Republican party was bound to become the peace party
in 1940.91
Representative Hamilton Fish, Jr., of New York, took a
more drastic isolationist stand on the war; in a nationwide
radio address, he declared that he would become an active can. didate for the nom:i.nation if the G.O.P. attempted to "soft pedal"
the importance of keeping the United States out of the war.

He

stated that his decision would depend on the views of the candidates and the wishes of the people.

Fish reported that thus

far in the campaign, the candidates had failed to present the
issue as paramount and unless they did so soon, he would take
the issue directly to the people in the primary contests.9 2
Frank Gannett, a Rochester, New York, publisher and
chairman of the National Committee to Uphold the Constitutional

91N~ Yor~ Time~,

October 13, 1939, p. 12.

92New X£!•k fi~~es, November 28, 1939, p. 18.

53
Government, leaked the report that he had been giving consideration to his possible candidacy.

He declared that he was

being pressured into taking the step, although he had never
been ambitious for political office.93
In November, with the election a year away, Turner
Catledge, writing in the New York Times, reported in his
assessment of the Republican campaigns that Dewey, Taft, and
Vandenberg possessed campaign organizations working in the
field to gather support for their candidates.

He stated that

Taft's organization, headed by David Ingalls ·(for mel.. .Assistant
Secretary of the Navy) and John H. Hollister (Congressman from
Cincinnati), was thus far the most active.

Taft men had spread

throughout the country to gather convention support, using a
more traditional ?pproach than any of the other candidates.
Catledge stated that Dewey's supporters had also moved out into
the field to gather delegate strength and had established a
letter-writing campaign to line up pre-convention support.

It

was also reported that Dewey planned to give a series of
speeches to answer the questions as to his stand on the domestic
and foreign affairs issues of the day.

Catledge also reported

that a cloak of mystery surrounded Vandenberg's activities and
intentions.

.An organization for the candidate had been estab-

lished; however, little had been accomplished outside Michigan,

93Ibid.

~

and Vandenberg himself had been casual toward questions as to
his candidacy.

The secondary candidates, according to

catledge, were Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts; Governors
John Bricker, Arthur H. James, Leverett Saltonstall
(Massachusetts), and George D. Aiken (Vermont); Senator H.
Styles Bridges (New Hampshire); Representatives Bruce Barton,
James W. Wadsworth, and Joseph Martin--all from New York;
former President Hoover; and former Governor and presidential
nominee Landon.94
While some political observers were analyzing the field
of candidates or assessing the political implications of the
war, a poll of fifty vlashington correspondents conducted in
December revealed that in their judgment, the Democratic
party would win in 1940.

In April, a poll of the same group

had resulted in the prediction that the G.O.P. would win.95
These and other signs of the changing polittcal scene
did not slow down the campaigns, nor did it dissuade others
from entering the race.

In early December, Frank Gannett

formally announced his candidacy and presented a seven-point
program on which he would run: keep the nation out of war;
barricade all paths of dictatorship in the country by repealing the President's blank check powers and by restoring
94Turner cat ledge' "Election Results Raise Republicans I
1940 Hopes, 1:1 New York_ Times, November 12, 1939, IV, p. 7.
95Edltorial in New Xork ~' December 2, 1939, P.· 16.
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constitutional balance; restore national confidence by worthy
policies and government by law, not by bureaucrats; restore
industrial peace by rewriting labor laws to protect the rights
of both workers and employers; fumigate the relief administration and place control with the communities; abandon the
exploded

spend~lend

policy; and wipe out conditions which

encourage dictatorships by restoring prosperity.96
Representative Fish, whose foreign policy concepts were
close to Gannett's, also jumped on the campaign trail in
December.

Speaking in Illinois and Wisconsin, Fish again·

threatened to enter the campaign if the existing candidates
continued to neglect what he believed was the most important
issue: keeping out of the war.

He declared that he had

received telegrams from World War Veterans offering to set up
Fish-for-President clubs on his behalr.97
Dark horse possibility Governor Bricker also appeared to
be launching a campaign, for in a speech before Nm-1 York G. 0. P.
leaders he stated that the administration's relief program had
become a polit:t.cal racket by the practice of padding the payrolls in election years and demanded the replacement of the
existing system with one administered locally and financed
jointly by local, state, and Federal participation.98

-96New York J'im€!..§_, December 10, 1939, p. 2.
97New

Yor~

Times, December' 13, 1939, p. 22.

98New ~ Times, December 17, 1939, p. 1.

It had

been reported that a gentlemen's agreement between Taft and
Bricker put Ohio's delegation behind Taft.

The delegation,

which was .figured to be headed by Bricker, reportedly \'lOUld
continue to support Taft as long as he had a chance to win;
a deadlock, it was further reported, Bricker's supporters
would go to work to line up the delegation for the Governor.
Although Bricker's close friends denied his candidacy, it was
rumored that he had important business support which could
swing delegations his way in a deadlocked convention.

Joseph

Pew of Pennsylvania· and Kenneth Simpson, National Committeeman from New York--both prominent political leaders in their
states--\'lere reported to have considered Bricker as a possj_ble
candidate .99
As of December the two leading candidates for the G,O,P.
nomlnation \'lere Dewey and Taft.

Time compared their political

struggle to the fabled race between the tortoise and the
hare.

In the article Taft was pictured as being prissy,

solemn~

and ponderous; Dewey was characterized as being a more

dynamic candidate.

The magazine also pointed to a number of

blunders committed in the Taft campaign during this early stage
of the political battle: in Iowa, Taft had denounced the corn
loans on the very day the Department of Agriculture had
released

N~

$70~000,000

in corn loans to the state; in Kansas City,

99VIiarl,er; Moscow, "Ohio Relief Issue Vita 1 to Bricker,"
York Tim~~' December 10, 1939, IV, p. 10.
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he had crossed a year-old A.F. of L. picket line for no
apparent reason; and in Texas, he had permitted himself to be
photographed as a hunter, dressed in a. business suit and a
starched collar, holding a dead turkey,lOO
The magazine also reported that Dewey's campaign had
started to

mak~

headway during December, but that the party

leaders had reportedly been considering him for the second
spot on the ticket, not the first.

The Time delegate analysis

gave Dewey only New York's ninety-two convention delegates,
one-fourth of which were not certain, while giving Taft three
hundred. 101
As the candidates and the country at large prepared for
the election year activities, the question uppermost in the
minds of all was the resolution of the third term·question.
Turner Catledge adequately summed up the problem facing the
Republican party when he reported that the G.O.P. was facing
one of the greatest political paradoxes of recent domestic
history.

Realistic members of the party had agreed that F.D.R.

would be the strongest candidate the Democrats could run in
1940; yet, they also realized, just as strongly, that his
renomination would give them the best issue they could possibly
have.

Roosevelt's declaration of his intentions would, accord-

-------100"Hare and Tortoise," Time, 34:13, December 18, 1939.
lOlrbid., p. 14.

ing to catledge, crystallize the situation in the Republican
party almost as much as in the Democl"'atic.

If the Democrats

-

renominated Roosevelt, the man with qualities most likely to
attract votes from the President would rise toward the top of
the G.O.P. presidential heap.

If a Democrat other than F.D.R.

were nominated, then a candidate with different qualifications
might be sought.

Therefore, the third term question was an

extremely important one for the Republicans; however, the
situation was such that the party could not wait until the
President resolved the mystery, the candidates were in the
field to gather support.l02
'
In his assessment of the Republican
campaigns as of

Decembel.. , catl,edge stated that the morale of the party was as
high as at any time since the outbreak of the war; before
September, the party's hopes had soared into a virtual

con~·

viction that they would win in 1940, but the war had S\llitched
the major issue from New Deal domestic policies to the
.President as an international figure and to his foreign policy.
The three major candidates, by concentrating on the administration's domestic failures, had not, according to catledge, provided Roosevelt with a streamlined vehicle on which his official
dependents expected him to ride over the third term tradition.
Dewey's speeches and statements indicting the New Deal had
102Turner catledge, "G.O.P. Race Affected by Roosevelt
Si.lence," ~!ork_ T:!~~~' December 24, 1939, IV, p. 7.

J --~

59
been designed to impress on Republican leaders that he \'ITas the
people's choice.

Taft's campaign, concentrating on the issues

of the administration's fiscal and spending policies and the
New Deal bureaucracy, had given the candidate the largest
bloc of pledged delegates.

Taft's managers had even gone into

the South to secure delegate votes.

Vandenberg's campaign was

still confined to Michigan, although the Senator had reportedly
written letters to friends in other states asking them to look
out for his interests.

Catledge stated that Vandenberg's

definite views for an isolationist wartime poiicy for the
nation placed the candidate at odds with some of the leading
f:i.gures of the party .103

As the candj.dates continued thelr

campaigns into 1940, the war issue figured to affect all the
.candidates involved in the race.

l03Ib:i.d _.

,---

t·

CHAPTER III
THE PRE-CONVENTION ACTIVITIES
The outbreak of the European war complicated the political situation to such a degree that few professionals would
hazard a guess as to what the nation could expect in .the cruc:l.al

that polit:l.cal sages could have predicted that Roosevelt would
remain silent on his third term decision through the primar:l.es
and emerge in complete control of his party, or that Dewey
·would come out of the primary contests as the leading G.O.P.
candidate, or even that Taft would rely on his political contacts with state and local leaders instead of challenging
Dewey in the primaries; but it is doubtful that anyone coL\ld
·have predicted the effect the violent change in the course of
the war woL\ld have on the national political scene.

In April

and May of 1940, the Nazi "blitzkrieg" was released on Northern
-

Europe; and the repercussions following this aggression
·resulted in mass insecurity, a condition which elevated
Roosevelt's chances for a third term and caused Republicans to
reassess their candidates in light of the altered international
situation.

I.

THE REPUBLICAN CAMPAIGNS

During the first five months of 1940, the candidacies of

!~
- -
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all G.O.P. aspirants, except Dewey and Taft, died quietly as
the two front running candidates amassed delegate strength,

;
,_

with Taft gaining his through conversations with political
~

- -

leaders and Dewey gaining his in the primaries.

Two signifi-

cant developments of the period, aside fr•om the intensification of the international crisis, were the creation of a
"Stop-Dewey" group and the sudden rise of

~/endell

Willkie

as a presidential contender. ·
The Pre-primary Period: January--February
In January, 1940, Time reported that Vandenberg was
honestly disinterested in the nomination and that it would take
a miracle for either Hoover or Willkie to capture the prize .1
It was the general consensus that the nominee would be either
~f

the two front runners, each representing a segment of the

party--Taft drawing his support from the conservatives and
Dewey ostensibly representing the liberal wing of the party.
The Gallup Poll of January reported that Dewey had substantially increased his lead as the favorite candidate of
those who intended to vote Republicanj however, the poll also
indica ted that 37 pel" cent had not made up their minds as to
whom they would like to see nominated.

In the survey Dewey

· had increased his vote to 60 per cent, followed by Vandenberg
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with 16 per cent, Taft with 11 per cent, Hoover with 5 per

1-

cent, and James, Lodge, Bricker, Borah, and Landon with 1 per
cent. All other candidates received only 3 per cent. 2

i:

In January, while Dewey, Taft, and Gannett were hitting
the campaign trail, Vandenberg and Bricker issued statements
which seemed to take them out of the race.

Senator Nye of

North Dak.ota declared to the pl,ess that he would not run for
the nomination and urged Republicans to back Vandenberg.

The

Michigan Senator stated that he would be willing to serve as
the G.O.P. candidate, but that he had no personal aspirations
for the position and that he would not personally participate
in any pre-convention campaign for delegates.3
Governor Bricker

de~lared

that the campaign headquarters

established in Chicago in his behalf was unauthorized and not
approved.

He also stated that he was not thinking of the

presidency and denied the suggestion that the Ohio delegation
would support his candidacy if it appeared that Taft could not
win the nomination.4
Gannett, an ardent campaigner, concentrated his campaign
on domestic issues.

He had been a one-time friend of the

President \'lhen the latter was governor, but had become a bitter

2New York Times, January 7, 1940, p. 14.

---

3~ Y~
4

Times, Janua1,y 10, 1940, p. 1.

~ y_~ Time~, January 30, 1940, p. 4.
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critic of the New Deal, especially after Roosevelt's Supreme
Court packing attempt. 5

In January, the Rochester• publisher

assailed the New Deal and most of its works and charged that
the New Dealers had ruined the "American System."

He also

promised to effect measures (which he did not define) which
would bring about recovery and ease unemployment.

Gannett

declared .that the nation's form of government and liberties
would be menaced until the New Deal theorists were replaced by
individuals who believed in private enterprise and knew how to
make it work. 6
It was reported that Gannett had the. unqualified support
of Representative James.

w. Wads1vorth of New York, as well as

the tacit backing of Republican leaders in the rural counties
.of Central and Western New York State.

His backers predicted

that their candidate would receive first ballot support from
at least thirty of New York's ninety-two delegates and fifty
votes from other states.?
While Gannett's campaign centered around domestic issues,
Taft was

t~king

a close look at the administration's foreign

policy.

In Milwaukee, Taft raised the question as to whether

Roosevelt had accepted the view that the United States must

5 11 Gannett for Gannett J

New

II

rrim.§_, 35:22 J January 22, 1940.

6John r.. Underhill, "Gannett Launches Presidential Race."
January 17, 191+0, p. 1.

yor~ Ti~,
,.(

Ibid., pp. 1,15.
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stay out of

war~

except a war of defense.

The Ohio Senator

denounced the argument that the United States would be overwhelmed by Germany and Russia if France and England were
defeated.

He also warned his listeners of the arbitrary

powers which would be given to the President in the event of
war.

In answer to Roosevelt's pleas for

non-partisanship~

Taft declared that the appeal itself was partisan because it
had attempted to put the G.O.P. in the position of being
partisan whenever they criticized New Deal policies.8
In late
England.

January~

Dewey took his campaign north to New

In the tour the candidate avoided Nev-1 Hampshire

because of Senator Bridge's regional
of its relative

remoteness~

proximity to New York.

control~

Vermont because

and Connecticut because of its

The idea of this brief campaign trip

was to allow the people to see and hear him and to give the
Republican leaders in the region a chance •to meet the candidate.
It was reported that while he did not receive any great
spontaneous

ovations~

and cordial welcome.

he did receive far more than a courteous
It was furthel' reported that none of the

politicians meeting Dewey avowed himself to be sold on the
candidate as a result of the tour.

Devtey

went back to New

York to prepare a long campaign trip to the Pacific Northwest.9

8~e~. Xoyk T~~~~ January 20, 1940~ p. 20.

9Lauriston Bulla1•d, "Dewey Liked in New England, but
G.O.P. Avoids Judgment," Ne'~ york Times, Januar•y 28, J.9!W, N,
p. 10.

:---

65
The purpose of Dewey's February trip to the Northwest
was to catch up with Taft in delegate strength.

To achieve

this goal the candidate traveled 7,500 miles in eleven and
one-half days, made forty-eight platform speeches and ten
formal addresses, held eleven large press conferences, and
attended ten receptions; but as his managers readily admitted,
the people turned out in great numbers to hear the racketbuster, not the oratory of the presidential candidate.lO

On

his wa:J to Portland, where he planned to deliver a Lincoln
Day address, Dewey conferred with par•ty leaders and gave
speeches in Chicago, Butte, Helena, and Spokane; on the return
trip the campaign was brought to Ogden, Salt Lake City, Boise,
Cheyenne, an~ Omaha. 11
During this western tour Dewey centered his campaign
around the New Deal's failure to put the unemployed back to
work, declaring that the energy of American enterprise could
create more jobs and relieve the unemployment problem and that
the

Ne~·J

Deal's failure to utilize th1.s energy had resulted in

an attitude of defeatism.l2

In Portland, Dewey charged the

New Deal with an erosion of capital, which had depleted the
country's productivity by seven billion dollars, causing

--------lOnup the
llNe~

Mountain,"~~

35:15-16, February 26,

191~0.

York Times, February 4, 1940, p. 3.

1 2 uup the Mountain," Time, 35:16, February 26, 1940.
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continuance of unemployment and dividing the nation.l3

On his

return from the tour Dewey stated that he had found widespread,
ser:lous interest in the immediate political future of the
country; and he commended the strong, intelligent, and
courageous men and women who were vigorously preparing to lead
the party to victory.l4
During February, Senator Taft also stressed domestic
issues as he campaigned in Florida, North Carolina, and
Pennsylvania.

In Florida the candidate warned his listeners

that unless the New Deal were defeated, the inevitable result
~wuld

be increased government regulation and the gradual

absorption of all industry into a collectivized state.
criticizt~d

He also

the Sec uri ties Exchange Commission for going beyond

its or1.ginal purpose of protecting investor's against fraud,
the National Labor Relations Board for the influence of "left
wing enthusiasts," the administration of relief, the Nevi Deal's
tai program, the Federal encroachment into business with the
Tennessee V:alley Authority, and the Wages-Hours Law for its
stifling of small businesses.

Taft advocated amendments to

the W.ages-Hou.rs Law to prevent oppression j amendments to ha 1 t
the Securities Exchange Commission from 1.ts attempts to pass
judment on the wisdom of investmentsj creation of a tax policy

------13NeY!_ York ~me~.' February 13, 1940, p. 1..

14Ne~ Yo1•k Times, .February 20, 1940, p. 12.
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to encourage investment instead of discouraging it; legislation to protect the farmer against foreign imports; and
abandonment of the reciprocal trade

tr•ea~ies .15

In Greensboro, North carolina, Taft declared that the
nation must choose between Lincoln's republic or New Deal
dictatorship. 16 Again, in his Pennsylvania campaign, Taft
stated that the nation needed constructive policies to replace
the "destructive" ones of the New Deal, especially in the areas
of business, agriculture, labor relations, national budget,
relief, public health, and national defense. 17 He advocated
the cutting of government expenses to balance the budget; continuing such humanitarian projects as relief, old age pensions,
unemployment insurance, and medical ai.d to the poor, but revising the administration so that it would be intelligent, economical, and fair; preparing adequately for defense, but keeping
out of war; and abandoning the limiting of agricultural production, but keeping a reasonable subsidy for soil conservation.l8
Senator Vandenberg, ·while still refusing to conduct a
pre-convention campaign, met with farm, labor, and party
leaders in St. Paul, Minnesota, to win support for his candi-

15New York rrimes, February 4, 1940, p. 4.

---

16New York Times, February 13, 1940, p. 1.
17New YorkTimes, February 19, 1940, p. 1.
18 rbid., pp. 1,3.
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dacy.

It was reported that he would have support from

vlisconsin 1 Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Missouri, Utah,
Wyoming, Idaho, Washington, Oregon, North and South Dakota,
and Iowa--199 delegate votes--on the early ballots.

It was

'

also reported that a victory over Dewey in the Wisconsin
primary was essential to Vandenberg's candidacy.

His experi-

ence in t.he Senate was figured to weigh heavily in the primary election; however, it was generally believed that it
would be a close race. 1 9
The three leaders in the fight for the nomination did
not have absolute cont1•o1 of the political limelight during
February.

Early in the month, General Hugh

s.

Johnson, in

a speech before the Automotive Trade Association, advanced
New York Representative Bruce Barton as the likeliest dark
horse candidate and declared that Roosevelt could be re-elected
in 1940 with only a loss of six states instead of two if the
Republican par·ty did not have something better to offer than
they had at that time.2°
In

L~ncoln

Day speeches across the country the New Deal

was roasted on the political grill.

In Omaha, Hoover declared

that the nation's number one problem, unemployment, could not
be solved until the country turned·away from "statism" and

l9Ja me s A. Hagerty, "Vandenberg Looks to the Northv;e st, 11
New York f.i~~~~ February 12, 1940, p. 18.
2°~ew Y<?_!_ls_ Times, February 7, 191to, p. 14.
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unshackled free enterprise.21

In New York, Hamilton told his

audience that the people of the United States were tired of
"drifting". and looked to the Republican par•ty for a return of
Lincoln-Americanism. 22 In Grand Rapids, Pennsylvania's
Governor James criticized the New Deal for failing to find a
cure for unemployment after a

seven-y~e~a~r~e~f~f~o~r~t~a~n~d~f~o~r____________________

~dvancing war as the only solution. 2 3

Governor Harold Stassen

of Minnesota, also speaking in Grand Rapids, called for legislation to cut out the overlapping and duplicating of functions
within the Federal government.

He also urged Federal legisla-

tion to provide for• a "cooling off" period in industrial disputes and criticized the National Labor Relations Board for
combining the functions of rules maker, investigator, prosecutor, and judge.24
The February Gallup Poll showed that Dewey still held
the lead among RepubJ.ican presidential candidates, but that
his lead had diminished somewhat.

In the survey Dewey received

56 per cent, a loss of four percentage points from January,

followed by Vandenberg and Taft with 17 per cent each, Hoover
with 3 per cent, Gannett with 1 per cent, and others with 6
21N~ York :f'_!..ll'!~~ February 13, 191+0~ p. 1.

22 Ibid.
23James A. Hagerty, "James Addresses Vandenberg Rally,"
New. ~k ~~~ February 13, 1940, p. 4.
2 4rbid.

70

per cent.

James, Lodge, Bricker,

knocked off the poll.

J~ndon,

and Borah had been

The poll also indicated that a majority

of G.O.P, voters throughout the nation had expressed themselves
in favor of a more liberal standard bearer--more liberal. than
Landon--for 1940; 59 per cent wanted a more liberal candidate,
while 17 per cent wanted a more conservative candidate, and
24 per cent wanted one neither more liberal nor more conservative ,25
In mid-February, the Republican National Committee
.announced that the Republican convention would be held in·
Philadelphia on June

21~,

thus endh1g a problem which had been

in existence fc.r severa 1 months.

In November, 1939, Roosevelt

had suggested that both parties hold their conventions a month
and a half later than usual to save both parties money and to
spare the country the boredom which usually accompanied such
fanfare.

The announcement had been

.

answer~d

by Hamilton to

the effect that the President had arrogated a great deal of
authority when he undertook to direct when the G.O.P. should
hold its convention,26

In December, the Republican National

Committee had gone on record favoring the middle of June as
the convention date, irrespective of when the Democrats met.
Waiting until the Democrats announced their date would work to

25~ Yo~ T~~

February 11, 1940, p. 9.

26~. ~ Ti~s, November 29, 1939, p. 1.
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the disadvantage of the G.O,P, because the opposition could
run on the record of the New Deal, while the Republicans would
have to have a longer campaign to organize the
such a campaign.27

part~

to oppose

In Januar~, the Republican National

Committee decided to meet in Washington, D.C.- to choose the
time and place of the convention; sentiment within

tb~

Committee was against waiting until the Democrats had fixed
their date.28
In his announcement of the convention date Hamilton
challenged the Democrats to renominate Roosevelt so that the
country would have a clean-cut issue, the New Deal.

He also

stated that the demoralized and embittered Democratic party
could not present a united front against the Republicans in
1940.

It \vas reported that

man~

members of the National

Committee assumed that F.D.R. would be renominated by the
Democrats.29
As a result of the pre-primary campaigns, most G.O.P.
professionals believed that the party's choice for 191W v1ould
be either Dewey or Taft; and

the~

looked to the primaries for

an indication of the trend of public opinion, the choice of
the rank and file.
---:;:.._

___

27!J~~ X9r.~ T!mes, December 7, 1939, p. 25.

28Ne\'I X~ Times, Januar~ 11, 19lW, p, 20.
29~ew Yo~ Time~, Februar~ 17, 191+0, p. 1.
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The Primarl Months: March--May
Dewey's percentage in the polls had fluctuated from 50
per cent in 1939 to 60 per cent in early· 1940 to 56 per cent
by the primaries.

His remarkable showing in these contests

was destined to trigger another such
~~--------~that

Dewe~

for it was apparent

the only Republican candidate to take the

primaries seriously.
\'lisconsin and

rise~

Dewey was to face Vandenberg·in

Nebraska~

and be had been challenged by Gannett

in the New York primary; but these were the only races in
which the leading candidates would face one another.30
was figured to enter the Ohio

but

race~

other contests had not been announced.

bis~entrance

In late

Taft

into

February~

his

managers stated that Taft would not enter the New Jersey
·primary because his Washington duties would prevent him from
conducting a campaign in that state.

Taft's managers did

indicate that there was a chance the Senator would enter the
West Virginia primary.31
Turner Catledge, writing in the

Ne~ 19£~ ~~

depreciated the value of the primaries as a barometer of
delegate strength.

To support his

contention~

Catledge

revealed that hardly more than one-third of the states,
representing only one-half of the nation's population, held-

30Turner Catledge, "Presidential Primaries a Doubtful
Yo!'k Times, February 18, 19LfO, IV~ p. 7.

Barometer~" Ne~

31New XE,r~ f'im~, February 24, 191+0, p. 2.
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primary contests and that since New York's delegates vJere
chosen without having to announce their preferencesJ the
percentage of population represented in the primaries amounted
to only forty per cent.

Catledge also stated that the prima-

ries were indecisive because of the apparent unwillingness of
the leading candidates to face one another in the contests.3 2
The question as to the actual value of the primaries
was one which could only be answered after the contests of
political strength had been fought and the results analyzed.
James A. Hagerty, writing in the Nev1 York

~:!_mes,

reported in an early analysis of the campaign in Illinois that
Dewey was regarded as certain to win over any other candidate
or candidates entering the primary against him.

Dewey's man-

agers believed that a victory in Illinois would greatly
increase their candidate's prestige throughout the country
and would bring him the backing of party leaders who had remained
cool to his candidacy.

Hagerty declared that if either Taft

or Vandenberg entered the primary, Dewey could lead either by
two or three to one; if both entered, Dewey would have a
greater vote than the combined vote of both.33
Arthur Krock reported in his early analysis of the
Wisconsin primary that the fate of Dewey's and Vandenberg's
32 Turner Catledge, "President::i.al Primaries a Doubtful
Barometer_," Ne~! York 'l'im~, February 18, 191W, IV, p. 7.
33James A. Hagerty, "Dewey Men· Count on Illinois Vote,"
New York !~.l!!..e~.' February 1, 1940, p. 13.
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candidacies could be decided in the April 2 primary.

In

assessing Vandenberg's chances, Krock stated that the Senator
had supported certain social and economic New Deal measures of
the type which had appealed to the Wisconsin voting majority
for many years.

Krock also pointed out that the isolationist

doctrine, associated with Vandenberg, was popular in the stateo,
In the assessment of Dewey's chances Krock stated that wh:l.le
the New York District Attorney was not well known in Wisconsin,
he had initiated a more frontal attack on the New Deal than
had Vandenberg.

It was also reported that Dewey's foreign

policy views had not been presented in as
his views on domestic matters.

g~eat

detail as bad

If Vandenberg were to win in

Wisconsin, according to Krock, Dewey's chances fo1• the nomination could be severely impaired; however, were the reverse
to happen, Dewey would be far ahead of the field of

candidates~

Vandenberg's managers reportedly were counting on support from
the state's Progressive party; however, it was revealed that
the Progressives would vote in the Democratic primary if a
third term slate were entered.

If such a move occurred,

Dewey's chances for victory would be materially better because
his supporters in the state were the "old-line Republicans,"
the traditional enemies of the Progressives.34

34Arthur F.rock, 11 In the Nat :ton: The Possibilities of
the Wisconsin Primaries," Nevi York Times, February 8, 1940,
p. 22.
-- ---
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During the month of February 1 Dewey's publicity easily
overshowed Taft's.

The former's tour to New England and to

the Pacific Northwest and the political analyses of the
Illinois and Wisconsin primary campaigns brought him almost
daily headline space.

In March 1 however 1 the situation was

reversed; Taft's speeches in Virginia 1 Kentucky 3 and
Pennsylvania were among the leading political stories of the
month.

In Virginia, Taft placed the

11

anti-war party'' label on

the G.O.P. and declared that if Roosevelt were re-elected, he
would not bet the country could stay out of the war.35

In

Kentucky, Taft took advantage of published reports that the
President had cited Farley's religion (Catholic) as a possible
handicap to the Democratic National Committee Chairman's
~residential

candidacy by denouncing religious bigotry and

declaring that such ideas sought to destroy the inalienable
rights guaranteed to every American citizen.36

In Philadelphia 1

Taft warned that four more years of the New Deal would lead to
a government of men, not people, which would control every step
of the nation's economic and political and individual life.
He also stated that a planned economy was socialism and
that socialism could not be carried out by deliberative legislative bodies. 37
35Ne~ YorkTimes., March 17, 1940, p. 4.
~~

36Turner Catledge, 11 Taft Denounces Rel:tgious Bigot~y,"
Y£Fk Ti~, March 23, 1940, p. 2.
37 New York Times, March 26, 1940, p. 9.
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Whil€ Taft was campaigning in the East, Dewey made a
trip to Chicago to confer with party leaders from Illinois
and Wisconsin.

Plans were worked out for"the candidate's

campaigns in the two states; the campaigning WOLl.ld consist
mai.nly of rear platform speeches from trains .38
Dewey hit the headlines in late March when the leaders
of the La Follette Progressives repudiated the "Progressive
Republican Club of vlisconsin. 11

The Progressives charged that

the misleading wording was a cunning deception, an attempt to
lea~

the people of Wisconsin into believing that the Progres-

sives had cast their support to Dewey.

When the news broke,

Vandenberg '.s supporters reportedly redoubled their efforts in
the state and made an open appeal for the support of the
Progres-sives. 39
In the New Hampshire primary, the first such contest of
1940, Senator Bridges led the field of eight running for the
four plac·e.s as delegates-at-large.

Of the eight delegates

elected, one had pledged himself for Dewey,40 and the other
seven, although unp1edged, had expressed leanings toward
Bridges as a favorite son candidate. 41
38New York Times, March 8, 1940, p. 11.
39Turner Catledge, "Dewey Men Draw \Hsconsi..n Rebuke,"
New York Times, March 28, 1940, p. 16.
ltO.James A. Hagerty, "Roosevelt Slate Carries Primary in
New Hampshire," New YoE.!5_ Times, r<Iarch 13, 1940, p. 18.
41N-ew York Times, Mar•ch 14, 1940, p. 18.
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The March Gallup Poll of Republican voters again placed
Dewey as the front runner; however, the trend which had begun
in February continued to manifest itself in the March poll:
Dewey dropped from 56 per cent to 53 per cent, and Vandenberg
gained from 17 per cent to 19 per cent; Taft again received

17 per cent.

Others receiving votes in the poll were Hoover

with 5 per cent, Gannett and James with 1 per cent, and others
with 4 per cent.

The poll also indicated that the number of

undecided voters had increased from 36 per cent in February
to 40 per cent in March.

In a survey of twelve Mid-West
_,. states

(Wiscons:tn, Nebraska, Iowa, Minnesota, Kansas, Mtssom"i, North
and South Dakota, Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, anc1 Ohio) the
poll asked G.O.P. voters to choose between Dewey and Vandenberg.
The results showed Dewey leading with 45 per cent; Vandenberg
received 33 per cent; and 22 per cent were undecided.

The poll

predicted that the vote in the Mid-West primaries would be
close. 1 ~2

The April 2 Wisconsin primary was eagerly anticipated
by Republicans all over the country.

It was generally be11.eved

that the election would eliminate either Dewey or Vandenberg
should one lose to the other by a decisive margin, while a
close vote could eliminate both.

Robert La Follette, the

leader of the State's Progressives, was believed to be more likely
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to support Vandenberg's candidacy than Dewey's.

In the prim-

ary campaign Dewey traveled through the state and conducted a
very vigorous campaign, while Vandenberg made no personal
appearance in the state and left the campaigning to his
supporters. ~-3

As a result of his intense efforts, Dewey won

an cinexpected and startling victory by sweeping the state's
twenty-four delegates.

Vandenberg's candidacy was believed to

be a dead issue after this

defeat~

and Dewey's candidacy began

to draw more attention.44
Although Vandenberg had made no effort to campaign.for
the nomination, many Republi.cans had picked him to sweep
through the primaries and attain suff:tcient delegate strength
to become the leading compromise candidate.
analyze the defeat, f\1ilton

s. Mayer, writing

In an attempt to
in~

Natio.E_,

explained that in foreign affairs Vandenberg had been difficult to pin down because he had vacillated'from an internationalist in the World War period to an isolationist in 1940,
and in domestic affairs he had stood squarely on both sides
of every issue for the preceding ten years.45
Senator Taft, when asked for his reaction to the results
of the primary, declared that nothing would surprise him in

43"Wisconsin Primar1es,
4 1 ~ 11 Dewey Gets Go:t.ng,

11

11

Time, 35:1.8, April 1, 191w.

'Tim~, 35:19, Api'il 8, 1940.

45Milton s. Mayer, "Men Who Would Be President: VI. Try
to Find Vandenberg," The. ~ation, 150:587-88, May 11, 1940.
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Wisconsin ana added that he would.have more votes on the first
ballot than any other candidate.46

Arthur Krock pointed to

Dewey's victory as proof of the candidate's vote-getting power
and predicted that his success would bring him a challenge
from his rivals for the nomination.47

Krock also reported

that Dewey's Wisconsin campaign had implied a belief in the
extreme principles of isolationism and that the candidate had
seemed to vie with Vandenberg for occupying the innermost
corner of the isolationist reservation.~ 8

James A. Hagerty

stated that Dewey's two-day personal campaign in the state had
been an important factor in his victory.

He also reported

that Vandenberg had declined to comment on the results of the
primary; ho,tlever, it was revealed that he had been surprised
by the resulta,49 that he had expected, at.worst, an even break
in the election.50
The New York primary election \'1as also held on April 2,
and the big question in the contest was the number of

46New York Times, April

4

li,

1940, p. J.L!.

.

7.Arthur Krock, "In the Nation: Mr. Dewey Goes to the
Head of the Clas.s," New York Times, April lJ, 19110, p. 22.
48Arthur Krocl<:, "Draft-Roosevelt Plan Meets a Double
Check," Hew York~imes, April 7, 191~0, IV, p. 3.
lt 9charles R. Michae 1, "Washington Sees Dewey's Chances
Enhanced by Vote," New York Times, April 4, 1940, p. 1.

50James . A. Hagerty, "De\-;ey Seizes Lead in Race,
York Times, April 7, 1940, IV, p. 6.
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delegates Gannett \'lould be able to capture from Dewey.
Newsweek reported that Dewey's diligent campaigning had again

,i

i~

paid off; he had captured eighty-two of the ninety-two dele·-----

gates.51

Since the New York delegates were not bound to

declare themselves for any candidate, the number allotted to
any presidential aspirant would necessarily have to be an
estimation.

Between the April primary and the June conven-

tion the speculation over the number of New York delegates who
would vote for Dewey would run high.
The next important primaries which captured the
nation's attention took place in Illinois and Nebraska on April

g.

After the April 2 Wisconsin primary, Senators Charles L.

l\lcNal'Y of Oregon and Arthur Clapper of Kansas sent mesEwges to
Nebraska Republican leaders endorsing Vandenberg as a champion
of agriculture; however, the two Senators disclaimed any participation in the primary campaign, but stated· that they had been
asked by the state's G.O.P. leaders for Vandenberg's voting
record on agricultural measures.

The Michigan Senator's

supporters in the state declared the race to be even; however,
they admitted that Dewey's Wisconsin primary victory and the
candidate's personal visits in the state represented handicaps
to the Senator's chances.5 2
5 1 "Primary Season Puts Roosevelt and Dewey Off to Good
Start," Newsweek, 15:15, April 15, 1940.
52Ne2'!_ York Times, April 6, 19lW, p. 18.
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In the Nebraska p1•imary, Dewey again emerged victorious
over Vandenberg, this time by a margin of nearly 28,000 votes
(99,905 to 72,108).

Not only did the results give Dewey the

state's :fourteen delegate votes, but it aJ.so marked the first
time since 1930 that the state's Republican primary vote topped the Democratic.53
In Illinois, Dewey ran unopposed

on

the Republican

ballot, receiving ninety per cent of the vote.

He also out-

ran the Roosevelt slate four to three throughout rural
Illinois, which seemed to indicate that the G.O.P. strength
in the state had grown considerably since 1936.

Even though

he received ninety per cent of the vote, the state's fiftyeight delegates were just "advised" to support him at the
convention.54
A:rter the Dewey victories in Nebraska and Illinois
Senator rrtcNary and Senator Hiram Johnson of

Califol~nia

stated

that Dewey would be the party's nominee;55 however, it was
reported that the party professionals still relegated him to
the second spot on the ticket.56
Not content to

r~st

on his successes, Dewey embarked on

---"---·
53ttcampaign: G.O.P. Trend," Time, 35:15, April 22, 1940.
5 1~Ibid.

55New York Times, April 11, l91W, p. 17 •
. 56' The Republicans," Time, 35:18, April 8, 191~0.
1
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a campaign tr:i.p which would take him through the vlestern and
Rocky Mountain States.

In Oklahoma City, in answer to a

question as to the opinion the national administration should
take in regard to the European war, Dewey declared that the
country would be safer in the hands of the Republicans.

In

.Amar.illo, Dewey attacked the administration's failure to solve
the unemployment problem, the New Deal .taxation policies, the
growing power of the Federal government's regulatory agencies,
and the growth of the national debt.

Concerning the latter

issue, the candidate declared, "Blessed are the young foJ.• they
shall inherit the national debt."57
As the Dewey campaign swung through California, the

candidate continued to stress domestic issues.

To 20,000 in

the Holly\iood BO\·'ll he declared that the bes·t way to keep out of
wal" w.as to give our primary attention to the na t1.on 's domestic
'

affairs and to refrain from attempting to intervene in the dispos::ttion of the affairs of the rest of the world.

Dewey did,

however, state that the nation needed to develop an adequate
national defense system.

He also pledged the G.O.P. to up-

hold and continue a permanent program of social security.58
On the trip from San Francisco to Denver, Dewey conferred

57 James c. Hagerty, "Dewey Twits Taft on Maryland Race,"
Times, April 19, 1940, p. 17.

Ne_::!:_ ¥ork
Ne~

58James c. Hagerty, "Nevada LeadE)rs Talk vdth Dewey,"
York Time~' April 22, · 1940, p. 7.

,~~----~---~~-----

83
with Republican leaders from Nevada, Wyoming, Utah, and
Colorado, in addition to giving several back platform speeches
along the route.59

In Colorado, the candidate was suddenly

struck with an "intestinal ailment," and the campaign train
headed eastward.

With the end of the tour James C. Hagerty,

covering the Dewey campa:l.gn for the

~

York Times, reported

that the large turnouts in Indiana, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas,
.New Mexico, cali.fornia, Nevada, Utah, Wyoming, and Colorado
indica ted that many Republican leaders and a large section of
the rank and file of the party regarded Dewey as almost a
"sure bet" to win the nomination.

Hagerty stated that whi.le

Dewey and hls managers had estimated their delegate strength
to be anywhere from 400 to 501, 358 could be claimed without
much aispute. 60
A week later, in early May, De\'-ley was in Kansas conferring with Landon ana making campaign speeches.

In Wichita,

the candidate assailed the doctrine that government was the
source of all "blessings" and declared that there existed a
need for "individual int~rgrity.rr61
Dewey's primary victories and his campaign tours
59James G. Hagerty, "Dewey Cheered on Way to Denver, 11
Ne~ York~, April 23, 1940, p. 12.
60James C. Hagerty, "De\'ley 'rour Brings 1 Bandwagon' Hints, 11
New York ~' April 28, 1940, p. 2.
61James C. Hagerty, "Dewey Asks Guard on Federal Power,"
New York Times, May L!, 1940, p. 18.
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to the West gave him a virtual monopoly on April's political
news; however, other politically significant events did occur.
In mid-April the Republican Nat:tonal Committee announced that
Governor Harold Stassen had been selected as the keynoter for
the convention.

At the selection meeting Dr •. Glenn Frank

reportedly had been eliminated from consideration for the post
because the Old Guard regarded him as too pro-New Deal.

Others

nominated v-1ere Governor Ralph Carr of Colorado, Governor Harlan
Bushfi.eld of South Dakota, and Wendell Willkie, President of
Commonwealth and Southern.

Willkie had been suggested by.

Kenneth Simpson, but t'he latter withdrew the suggestion when
1 t was po:l.nted out that \'Jillkie figured as a possible candidate
·and should, therefore, not be considered for the post.

The

meeting also produced several rules which would govern the
convention activity, among which were the limiting of the
nominating and seconding speeches and the banning of bands for
use in demonstrations within the convention hal1.6 2
Taft's headquarters announced in mid-April that the
Senator \'lOUld campa1gn in West Virgini.a, Vermont, New Jersey,
and Ohio during April and May, thus ind:t.cating that in Taft's
mind the race was still wide open.63

It was also reported

that Taft was cons:l.dering entering the r.'Iay 6 l'ilaryland primary
62 charles R. Michael, "Republicans Make Stassen Keynoter,"
New York Times, April 17, 1940, p. i.
6

~_e_~ Yor~ Tlmes, .Apri.l 13, 1940, p. 8.
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and that if he did so, it would be contrary to the advice
which he had received concerning the move.

His managers

reportedly wanted the candidate to continue making short campaign trips and avoid the primaries, leaving the collection of
delegates to his managers, who would continue to gather first
and second ballot votes from the party leaders in the various
states. 64
A rather curious situation occurred in the April West
Virginia primary.

Taft had campaigned in the state and had

.decided to enter the state's primary if another contender did.
Dewey also decided to enter the primary, but only in the event
another aspirant filed.

Both candidates sent the filing papers

to the state's National Committeeman, Walter Hallanan, on the
condition not to file unless someone else did.

The deadline

for filing passed, and Hallanan still had both sets of papers,
each set to be filed only if the other were filed first.65
In Florida, another strange situation arose when that
state chose two delegations, one "uninstructed," but pro-Dewey,
and the other "uninstructed," but anti-Dewey.

The Republi-

can state convention met in April and elected a slate of twelve;
however, the anti-Dewey forces stated that the state's National
Committeernan, J. Leonard Repogle had used "steam-roller"

New

64Turner Catledge, "Taft Weighs Entry in Maryland Race,"
'l':lmes, April 18, 191~0, p. 17.

y_~r.~

65Ibid.
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tactics in passing over Gannett and Taft supporters and
choosing pro-Dewey men to represent the Florida G.O.P.

In a

rump gathering the dissenters chose their own slate,
of which Gannett expected ten to twelve supporters and Taft
four.

It was also reported that both Vandenberg and Landon

had friends on the rump delegation.66
It the situation in Florida could be considered a move· ment to slow down Dewey's race for the nomination, it was not
the only one.

His leadership in the polls and victories in

the primaries made him a target for Republicans and Democrats
a like.

vli thin the Republican party there were many p:t•ofess:tona.].s,

a majority of whom were in the conservative wing of the party,
who did not want Dewey and who actively sought to stop him •
.The arguments advanced by these conservatives were that Dewey
might not stand up in the post-convention campaign and that
even if he should win, a leader with his youth and inexperience
during the critical international situation might not be good
for either the party or the country.

The "Stop-Dewey" group

reportedly rigured that both Taft and Dewey would go into the
convention with about 300 votes each, leaving about 300 to
favorite sons and "uninstructed" delegations.

The g-roup hoped

to use this latter bloc of uncommitted delegates to stop Dewey's
bid for the nomination and to put in whom they wished, using

Ne~

66Russell B. Porter, "Anti-De\'ley Slate Chosen in Fl.orida,"
.¥~ T:lm'!:._~, April 30, 1940, p. 11.
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the vice-presidency in trade to swing the necessary delegates.
There was a distinct possibility that the group would groom a
_dark horse for the nomination, but who it would be was pure
speculation.67
In late April, it was

repOl~ted

that the "Stop-Dewey"

forces had been thinking of drafting Justice H.oberts for the
nomination in the event of a deadlocked convention.
the report

con~inued,

The group,

had been able to build up only one dark

horse, Wendell Willkie.

Although the Commonwealth and Southern

_President had widespread support among businessmen and the
upper income groups, many within the "Stop-Dewey" movement
doubted that they could get an ex-Democrat and utilities executive the nomination or get him elected in November should he
get the nomination.

The report also indicated that the members

of the movement also doubted that Taft would be able to stop
Dewey, and so the search for a compromise ~andidate continued. 68
The other group taking political aim on Dewey's candidacy
were those Democrats seeking to draft Roosevelt for a third
term.

They had not hesitated to criticize those Democrats

who had sought public support because the drafters wanted no
one to be presented as an alternative to F.D.R.

Dewey's

apparent popularity and successes in the primaries prompted

67Turner Catledge, "Can Dewey Be Stopped? Is Enigma of
Campaign," New York Times, April 28, 19lfO, IV, p. 7.
68New York Ti_me~, April 28, 191+0, p. 8.
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the group to attack and ridicule Dewey's candidacy.

As early

as February they had attempted to reduce his popularity by
stressing the candidate's youth and inexperience.

(Harold

Ickes had declared that Dev1ey had thrown his diaper into the
ring.)

However., the whole rna tter was t;emporarD.y dropped

when DeweJ's campaign managers pointed out that he was the
same age as Roosevelt when the latter ran for the vice-presidency in 1920.69
As the month of April came to an end, it appeared that
Taft and Dewey were about equal in delegate strength., with
Dewey still holding a strong lead in the polls.

A serious

question not conclusively anm'iered during the month was the
fate of Vandenberg's candidacy--was he actually out of the
running?

Before the primaries George V. Denny, Jr., of radio's

"American Town Meeting of the Air," had conducted a poll of the
nation's newspaper editors.

Denny had reasoned that these

men could correctly ascertain the cu.t'rents of public opinion
within their geographical areas, and he used the information
obtained from the poll to compose a picture of the nation's
political climate.

The editors were asked to indicate whom the

Republicans would nom:l.na te and whom they should nominate.

In

answer to the first question, the editors gave Dewey the lead
with 37.08 per cent, followed by Taft with 25.42 per cent,

-------69Hamilton Basso, "Hats in the Ring: I. Young M.t·. De'<'ley,"
Th..§:.. New !_lepublic, 102:203, February 12, 191-W.
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Vandenberg with 24.58 per cent, Gannett with 1.67 per cent,
and Hoover with .63 per cent.

In response to the second

question--whom the G.O.P. should nominate--the editors gave
Vandenberg 44.79 per cent, Dewey 18.75 per cent, Taft 16.88
per cent, Hoover 8.13 per cent, Gannett 4.58 per cent,
BJ:•icker, 3.96 per cent, Martin 3.54 per cent., Willkie 1.88 per
cent., Ba~ton 1.67 per cent, and Landon 1.46 per cent.7°
If the results of this survey could be applied to a
group representing a cross section of all Republicans instead
of just to a relatively small group of editors, it could
indicate that Vandenberg's candidacy had great public support;
however, such an assumption is without foundation because such
a survey \vas not made during April.

The March poll showed

.Dewey far ahead in public support, with Vandenberg holding
down second place.

The

r~ay

poll revealed that the Senator

had dropped to third place, trailing both Dewey and Taft.
Even so, some political analysts continued to predict that
Vandenberg was not to be counted out of the race.
Flynn, writing in The New

!3_~ubliq_,

John T.

stated that he believed

the central issue in the campaign would be free enterprise;
and that issue, according to Flynn, would eliminate Dewey
because the party leaders did not know where he stood on the
issue and also Taft because he had been labeled a reactionary
70GeOl'fle v. Denny' Jr.' "What r s Your Opinion? II Current
!:!_is__tor~, 51: 4b-1~8, April, 1940.
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by Republican leaders in the Middle West.

Flynn stated that

the issue of free enterprise would benefit Vandenberg's
chances for the nomination and would

bo~ster

Justice Roberts

and Governors James and Brickel' as dark horse candidates.71
Democratic National Committee

Chairman~

James A. Farley,

declared in early May that Vandenberg was the man to beat in
the G.O.P. race.72
With over a month and one-half remainj.ng before the
convention anything could happen; the

entir~

complexion of the

race could change at any time because, according to the March
Gallup Poll, 40 pel" cent of the Republican ·yoters were still
undec:tded.

(The f.1ay Gallup Poll indicated that 32 per cent of

G.O.P. voters had not yet made up their minds as to the
.party's candidate.)73
Republican concern over the choice of a nominee rose
when the April Gallup Poll

reve~led

that if the election were

held at that time, the Democrats would lead 54 per cent to 46
per cent and that the two parties were more closely matched
than they had been in twenty-four years.

The poll gave the

G.O.P. the six New England States and the Democrats the

71John T. Flynn, "Other People's Money: The Republican
Campaign Huddle, 11 The ~ Repu~_!_ic, 102:472, April 8, 191~0.
72~Ul ton S. f.layer, "Men 'tfho Would Be President: VI. Try
to Find Vandenberg, 11 !-'.h~. ~' 150:589, May 11, 1940.

73Ne~ Yor~ ~ime:?_, May 31, 1940, p. 38.

(Inf_r_~, p •. 92.)
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twenty-four states below the Mason-Dixon Line and west of the
Rockies; the remaining eighteen states, according to the
~urvey,

were evehly divided.

The states leaning Republican

were Maine, South Dakota, Vermont, Kansas, New Hampshire"
North Dakota, Illinois, and Wisconsin; those leaning Republican, but borderline cases, were New Jersey, Iowa, Rhode Island,
Michigan, Massachusetts, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, arid
Nebraska.

Those states indicated as leaning Democratic were

South Carolina, Mississippi, Texas, Georgia, Louisiana, West
Virginia, Alabama, Arkansas, Flor:.tda, North Carolina, Utah,
Tennessee, Oklahoma, Arizona, Montana, Maryland, Kentucky,
V:l.r·glnia, Caltfornia, Missouri, New Mexico, Washington, and
Colorado.

The Democratic borderline states were Delaware,

Oregon, Indiana, Idaho, New York, Wyoming, and Minnesota.
The totals, if the results of the election were the above,
woul,d be 317 electoral votes f0l the Democrats and 2lll for
1

the Republicans. 7~·
Extremely interesting were the percentages for the
borderline states.

In New York, Minnesota, and Wyoming the

De moor a ts led by only two percentage poj.nts--51 per cent to

1~9

per cent; in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Connecticut, and Nebraska the
Repub1:tcan lead was the same.

In Indiana and Idaho the

Democ1'a tic lead was 52 per cent to 48 per cent.

In Oregon the
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Democratic lead was 53 per cent to 47 per cent; in Michigan
and Massachusetts the Republican lead was the same.75

It did

not take a political expert to analyze the situation; the
course of the war, the choice of the candidates, or some other
significant event could change the political picture overnight.
With a predicted close election such criteria as the political
sensibilities of the various geographical sections and the
sectional strengths of the eandidates would become increasingly
more important.

As the campaign moved into its final stage,

events were occurring which \'lould alter the existing trend; a
drastic change in the course of the European war would detract
from Dewey's delegate strength and evelate ·the chances of both
~aft

and Willkie.
In early May, Dewey was still the front running G.O.P.

candidate, even though many party leaders still opposed him.
The mid-May Gallup Poll, sampling a cross section of Republ:t.can
voters, gave Dewey 62 per cent, an increase probably resulting
from his primary victories and his campaigns to the West.

In

the survey Taft received 14 per cent, passing Vandenberg, who
received only 13 per cent.

Others with votes were Willkie

with 5 per cent, Hoover with 2 per cent, Gannett and Bridges
with 1 per cent, and others with 2 per cent.

Two significant

points in the poll were the fall of Vandenberg after his

75rbid.

!~
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defeats in the primaries and the surprising rise of Wendell
Willkie, the utilities executive.

In March Willkie had

received less than 1 per cent in the poll, but by the end of
April his vote had increased to 3 per cent,76

Willkie's pop-

ularity was growing, but he was still far behind Dewey.
The "Stop-Dewey" forces had failed to halt .the.,
popular swing to Dewey with their two-prOnged attack on the
candidate's youth and inexperience; however, in May they \'iere
able to bring a new argument into the attack.

They began to

stress the foreign policy stands Dewey had taken during his
primary campaigns.

They pointed out that he had not been con-

sistent in his foreign policy statements during these campaigns
and emphasized the fact that in the face of an international
crisis it was important to have a candidate· who was consistent.
Dewey's opponents reported that his stand in January had been
close to that of the President, but that in the Wisconsin campa:tgn in

r~larch

his foreign policy statements had taken on an

isolationist tone.

They stated that by May Dewey was declar-

ing that aid to Britain would bring the nation into the
European

\·Jar. 77

This indictment of Dewey did not seem to have much effect,
at least in Idaho and f.1aryland, because in early May he picked
76!:!_~~ York ~~." Flay 31, 1940, .p. 4.

77"campaign: Trend,
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rrime, 35:21, May 20, 1940.
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up Idaho's eight delegate votes and Maryland's sixteen.

The

former were obtained as a result of instructions given by the
state convention;78 the latter were granted the candidate as
a result of his eight to one victory over an "uninstructed"
slate in the state's primary.79
The new attack by the "Stop-Dev.Iey" g1•oup showed that at
least some Republicans realized the impol."'tance of the foreign
policy issue.

A Gallup poll published in early May attempted

to sample all voters on the question of whether the United
States should aid the Allies.

The results showed that the

voters of each party, by a two to one margin, favored a candidate who was willing to give all help to Britain and France, in
the event they needed it, short of actually.going to ·war.80
If this survey accurately meastwed public opinion on this
important issue, then an isolationist could, conceivably, have
a very difficult time in the November election defeating a
candidate who favored such aid.

The three leading Republican

candidates had expressed outright or modified isolationist
stands on the war and on aid to the Allies.

During the month

of May, Dewey and Vandenberg remained silent on the issue; Taft,
on the other hand, seemed to move contrary to public opinion by
78New York T=!:_~-~~ May 7, 1940, p. 14.
79~~ York Time~, May 8, 19lW, p. 19.

80New York Time~, May 10, 1940, p. 8.
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placing himself firmly in the isolationist camp.
Taft started out his r.1ay campaign with a bang by pick-

up Ohio's f'ifty-two convention votes in the state's primary.8l
He then traveled to Kansas to confer with Lan'don and other
Republican leaders in the Middle West.

In these conferences

Taft stated that the European war had compelled many to desert
Dewey's cause for his own because they felt the party needed a
man of more experience. 82

Taft also stated that he appr•oved

of Roosevelt's new defense program and agr•eed that the United
States needed an adequate defense system at once; however, he declared that even if the Allies lost to Germany, the
United States would not immediately be faced with the danger
of attack from that country.83

Even though virtually all the

Kansas Republican leaders informed the candidate that sympathy
for the Allies had been growing in the region, Taft cautioned
the countr:y to keep its mind on domesti.c issues lest the New
Deal use the European crisis to expand its powers at home.84
In St. Louis, Taft declared that he favored strict
financial and military neutrality and cautioned the nation to
stop

pla~ing

with the idea that the nation could enter the war

81~~~- York Times, May 15, 1940, p. 30.

821'urner Catledge, "Taft's Hopes Rise for Illinois
Votes," Ne~ York Ti,~, May 18, 1940, p. 34.
83!few York Times, ~Iay 18, 1940, p. 31~.
Ne\'l

84Turner Catledge, "rr•aft Asks Nation to Turn from War,"
!ork Timel;l, t•1ay 19, 1940, p. 4.

and concentrate on a genuine program of defense.

He again

took a position against aid to the Allies in the face of information he had received which indicated that in eight Middle
Western states sympathy for the Allies had grown since the
latest German offensive in April.

Taking a more definite stand,

Taft stated that if the United States were justified in spending
billions for the

All~es

and supporting their navies, then it

would be cowardice not to support. them also with men.85
Taft's managers labeled the Middle West tour a success
and predicted that their candidate was now the leading contender for the nomination.86
Gannett, campaigning in the South, predicted that his
strength at the convention would surprise everyone and that no
candidate would secure the nomination on the first ballot.

He

ilso stated that he would have a good chance for the nomination
in the later balloting.87

c.

Nelson Sparks, Gannett's campaign

manager, declared that his candidate would receive delegate
votes from Utah, Arizona, Georgia, Arkansas, and Alabama and
would pick up votes from other delegations after the first
ballot.88

85Turner Catledge, "Strict Neutrality Demanded by Taft,"
New Yorl~ :£1~~, May 21, 19lfQ, p. 16.
86Turner Catledge, "Taft Is Confident as His Tour Ends,"
New Jork Times, fiJa·y 22, 191W, p. 18.
87New York Times, r'lay 10, 1940, p. 18.
88New York Times, May 20, 1940, p. 18.
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From the declaration of wa:r• on September 3, 1939, until

,.
l_;

May 8, 1940, the date of the German breakthrough into Holland
and Belgium, there was practically no military action occurring on the Western Front; and many labeled the c.onfl ict as
"the phony war."

In April, the Germans seized Norway and

Denmark; in May, the Lowlands \'lere attacked without provocation.

This

t~~n

of events increased public sympathy for aid

to the Allies, as evidenced in the polls and verified by state
political leaders.

The passing of "the phony war" had a pro-

found effect on the Republican fight for the nomination.
Turner Catledge, in assessing the G.O.P. campaigns
after the new German offensive, reported that the race was
still wide open.

Dewey was presented as the strongest "pop-

ular choic,e," however, it was revealed that Taft's chances had
been improving in relation to both Dewey's and Vandenber•g 's.
Catledge stated that the latter's rigid stand for complete
"insulation" of the United States from European affairs was of
questionable value under the circumstances.

Catledge also

reported that Willkie's stock had risen precipitously in certain regions; but the great question, still unanswered, was
whether the Willkie forces could translate the public support
into delegate votes at such a late date.

It was revealed

that the Republican pre-convention campaign had been slowed up
by the feeling that there was not much sense worrying about
nominating a candidate because if the war were to keep going

,-

-

as it had$ Roosevelt would be re-elected.

Catledge's summa-

I

tion of the situation indicated that Dewey's popularity had
declined as a result of concern over his youth and inexperience and that Taft's had risen because of his cool, stable
approach to the problems of the day.

Willkie 's chances to get

the nomination in the event of a deadlock were reported as
being remote .. 89
The end of May Gallup Poll verified the fact that Dewey
was losing strength to both Taft and Willkie.

In the survey,

sampling a cross section of Republican voters, Dewey still led
with 56 per cent, followed by Taft with 16 per cent, Vandenberg
with 12 per cent, Willkie with 10 per cent, Hoover with 2 per
cent, Gann-ett and James with 1 per cent, and others w:Lth 2 pt:Jr
cent.

Most amazing was Willkie's increase trom 3 per cent in

earl~

May to 5 per cent in mid-May to 10 per cent in late May.

The poll reported that \<lillkie 's strength was largely confined
in the East, although his boom appeared to be grow1ng.90
During the month of June, the focal point of Republican
activity centered in Philadelphia, even though there
several weeks of campaigning left.

wer~

still

As the delegates and the

candidates converged on the city, the four most discussed
topics were the delegate strengths of the candidates, the

---·-89Turner Catledge, "vlar 's Turn Upsets Republicans'
Yoyk J:im~~-' May 26, 1940, IV, p. 10.
·

Race,"!!_~·~.

9~~ YOJzk Tim~, May 31, 19!W, p. 38.

;~

----

--

"---------------··---··

99
course of the European war and the fate of France and Britain,
the rise of Wendell Willkie as a serious contender for the
nomination, and the President's third term decision.

By June,

it was apparent that the events in Europe had greatly increased
Roosevelt's popularity and had elevated him to the position of
undisputed leadership of his party.

It was equally apparent

that the President's ultimate decision on the third term would
have considerable influence on the G.O,P. nomination.
II.

THE POPULARITY OF THE PRESIDENT

During the period January through May, 1940, Roosevelt
maintatned his silence on the th:i.rd term dec:i.sion, surv:i.ving
a continuous barrage of questioning from reporters and
theorizing from political vlriters.

The international crisis

had elevated F.D.R. 's popularity among both Democratic voters
and the electorate of the nation as a whole during the final
months of 1939, and in 1940 the deterioration of the European
situation resulted in fm'ther support for a third term for
the President.

The New Dealers entered his name in eleven

primary contests; however, Roosevelt, refusing to commit himself, neither expressed himself for or against the movement-the Democratic party and the nation as a whole were kept in
the dark as to the President's intentions.

By June, the con-

vention month for the G.O.P., the polls had indicated that the
nation preferred a Democratic president in 1940, that a major-

-
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ity of the electorate expected F.D.R. to run for a third term
and believed that he would win, and that the opposition to the
third term had become a minority opinion.

This powerful posi-

tion attained by the President resulted from two developments
occurring during the primary months: fJr s t, the President, as
a result of the campaigns of the New Dealers, swept through the
contests and obtained sufficient pledged delegate strength to
be re-nominated on the flrst ballot; and second, the German
advances into Norway, Denmark, and the Lowlands during April
and Ivlay--the end of the so-called "phony war"--removed the
effective opposition to the third term.

By June, F.D.R. was

in a position to control the Democratic nomination by either
accepting it or by naming his successor.
The Pre-PrJ._mary Period: January--Februa!'l,
During the last months of 1939, the popularity of the
President rose sharply.

The

~evi

Republic reported that :B' .D.R.

had become the overwhelming choice of the Democrats, possessing
over seven times the support of Garner and three times the
support of all the Democratic aspirants combined.

The magazine

also declared that Roosevelt could secure a third term without
a single Republican vote and could even lose all the votes
pledged to Garner, Hull, McNutt, and all other Democratic
presidential possibilities.91

The pre-primary polls also

9l"The President People ·,rant,
January 1, 1940.

11

~!:!~Republic_, 102:9,

i
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.indicated that F.D.R. commanded a substantial lead wihin his
own party.

L --

showed a preference for Roosevelt, while 13 per cent were
for Garner, 4 per cent for McNutt, 2 per cent for Hull, 1 per
cent; for l\1urphy and Farley, and 1 per cent for others.

The

poll also asserted that a majority of voters, of all parties,
still opposed the third term.92
In October, 1939, Secretary of .Agriculture Wallace
'· had made the front pages of the nation's newspapers when

ne

declared that Roosevelt's experience and training made it
essential that he seek a third term during. the intel.,national
The statement had evoked some irritation from the

White House, arid the Press Secretary, Stephen Early, publicly
rebuked vla lla ce for the untimely remark.

In early January,

1940, Wallace and .Attorney--General Jackson· made the same appeal
before Jackson Day dinner audiences.

\-Jhen Early was asked if

the two would be criticized for their statements, the answer
given was, "Of cou't'se not."

Early, ·when subjected to further·

questioning as to why the situation had changed, refused to
comment.

~

'

In January, the Gallup Poll revealed that in a

nationwide survey of Democrats with opinions, 78 per cent

crisis.

I

Roosevelt also declined to comment on the two state-

ments, stating that he had not read them.93

92Nev; York Time.§_, January 3, 1-940, p. 2.
93New York

Tim_~_E_,

January 10, 1940, p.

J.l~.
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Throughout January and February reporters continued
their attempts to "trap" F.D.R. into revealing his plans.

In

late January, he turned aside requests for comment on John L.
Lewis' prediction of an "ignominious defeat" for the President
were he to seek a third term by asking the reporters to give
him one good reason why he should answer a question of that
kind.

Another reporter asked the President whether he had told

Senator Donahey of Ohio that there would be no need for him to
run as a favorite son for ·the Democratic nomination.

Roosevelt

stated that he had merely told the Senator the previous spring
that he had hoped that Donahey would run again for the
Senate.94
Several days later Roosevelt had to dodge three more
.veiled inquiries.

One reporter asked the President what name

he planned to apply to the next year's March--of-Dimes dances in
celebration of his birthday anniversary (ten days after his
second term expired); the President laughed and declared that
the questioner must have stayed up all night thinking up
the question.

Another reporter took a more direct approach by

asking Roosevelt if he would comment on a newspaper dispatch
which stated that he would seek a third term and that Farley
would retire to a lucrative business post; F.D.R. answered ·
that it was a fine, new question.95
94New Yor~ Times,· January 27, J.91J.O, p. 11.
95New York ~imes, February 1, 1940, p. 13.
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In early February, Roosevelt gave his first unsmiling
reaction to the inquiries on his future plans with the statement that the country was probably tired of all the third term
speculation and that further• efforts to draw him out on the
subject were silly and henceforth would be considered out of
order.96
During this pre-primary period, Roosevelt's silence did
not deter his rise in the public opinion polls, nor did it
appear to hinder his chances for re-election were he to decide
to run.

In February, the Gallup Poll indicated that 52 per

cent of those sampled in a cross section survey of the voting
population in all states believed that Roosevelt would seek a

., ,

third term and that 60 per· cent belleved he would be re-elected.
'
..
-

Before the outbreak of the European war only 48 per cent were
of the opinion he would run in 1940, and only 45 per cent
thought that he would be re-elected.

A partisan breakdown of

opinion showed that 57 per cent of the Democrats with opinions
expected a third term race, while 47 per cent of the G.O,P.
were of that opinion,97

Dr. George Gallup, addressing the Advertising Club in
Baltimore, stated that the key to the third term was the course
of events in Europe.

He remarked that Roosevelt"s popularity

96Ne\~ York:_ Times, February 6, J.91W, p. 1.

9?~e\v Jol~k Ti~.' February 18, 1940, p. 2.
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had risen sharply since the advent of war and that if the
attention of the American public were to return to domestic

!.

problems, the sentiment c~mld revert to what it had been before
the war.98 This was to be quite an "if" because two months
after this statement, Germany would begin her march to conquer the world; and the headlines carrying the war dispatches
to the people of the United States would focus attention on the
foreign situation and keep it there for years to come.

·In early February, the Democratic

N~tional

Committee met

and selected Chicago as the site for their 1940 convention.

It

\'las reported that ninety per cent of the leaders present at the
meeting either favored

Ol"

were not opposed to a third term;

however, a resolution to draft Roosevelt was not cUscussed or
adopted.99
.Arthur Krock declared that Roosevelt's silence indicated
that the President had shown a willingness to let the third
term proJect be used for political purposes.
that Garner, Farley,

Wh~eler,

He also stated

and McNutt resented the evasive

method \'lhich denied them the1.r fair chance before the voting
public and that if Roosevelt r.vere to run, Garner would probably
be the onl:y Democrat with the courage to carry on the contest
for the nomination.

Krock repor'ted that the Nev1 Dealers had

98tJe"'!_ York Times, February l~, 191W, p. 22.

99char1es R. t'lichael, "Democrats Select Chicago, Postpone Choice of a Date," ~Iew York Tlm~, February 6, 191W, p. J..
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entered Roosevelt slates in the Illinois and Wisconsin primries, evidence that they had accepted F.D.R. 's silence. as a
consent for a draft.l 0 0
In late February, it was reported that the New Dealers
were elated by the fact that the deadline for withdrawing from
the Illinois pr 1 mary had c ome~an_d~p_a_s_s_e_d_w_LtJ:io_ut_any_vLor_d_fr_o_m.~--- ===
the President.

The failure to withdraw was generally accepted

in Washington as practically a green light for the movement
seeking to draft Roosevelt.

The New Dealers planned to stop

Garner's candidacy in New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Illinois;
and they would seek to stop Wheeler in Oregon and California.
The draft movement also figured to broaden "the plan so that
the President could choose the nominee if he should decline
to run.lOl
During the primary months, Roosevelt continued his
refusal to discuss the third term decision .or to promote the
candidacy of any other Democrat; he became the only possible
Democratic candidate.
The Pr.im!3r:y_ Months: March--May
Du:r'ing the months of March, April, and May, the New
Dealers campaigned to give Roosevelt the nomination on the first
ballot, if he should want it.

In February, the polls had shown that

lOOArthur Krock, "Democrats' Dilemma Deepens as Days
Pass," :!':!!::.~York T~m~, Februm•y 11, 1940, IV, p. 3.
lOliJ.,urner Catledge, "New Dealers Hold ~~ay Now Clear to·
3rd 'l,erm Draft," New York Times, February 26, 1940, p. 1.
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the nation's voters believed that the President would attempt
to secure a· third tei•m and that he would be successful; h0\'1ever, the March Gallup Poll revealed that a majority of voters
in all states still opposed a third term.

In tracing F.D.R.'s

rise in popularity the poll reported that in August, 1939,
Roosevelt had received 56.6 per cent of the nation's support;
however, the percentage had increased to
the outbl..eak of the European war.

61~.9

per cent after

His percentage had dropped

someWhat after the initial shock of the war had 1-10rn off (62.7
per cent in November, 1939); by

Febl~uary

had again moved back up to 64 per cent.

of 1911.0 his support
The pro-third term

sentiment, it was reported, had followed a similar trend: 40
per cent in August, 1939; 48 per cent in September; 43 per
cent in November; and 46 per cent in Februa-ry, 191W .1°2
In another March Gallup Poll it was revealed that the
Democratic party, in a nationwide poll of all voters, led the
Republican party in popularity by 55 per cent to
with one voter in six still undecided.

~-5

per cent,

The survey still placed

New England in the G.O.P. camp by a wide margin; the South and
the West were again allotted to the Democrats.

The poll showed

the East and West Central States still about even, with the
Republicans still holding on to the former by a 51 per cent-49 per cent margin and the Democrats holding on to the latter

l02New York Times, :r.1arch 1, 1940, p. llt.

;-
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by the same percentage.

The Mid-Atlantic States were put into

the Democratic column by a 53 per cent--47 per cent margin.l03
Out of the maze of statistics on6 fact stood out quite

-

'

clearly: the President controlled his party, and the party was
favored to win in 1940.
Jr-~~~~~t~h~~e~=opposition

ot whether

The only dissension appeared to be

of the voters to the third term.

Roosev~lt

Regardless

·~~------------~====

had made up his mind to run or whether

the "Draft-Roosevelt" group had planned and worked independently of the White House, F.D.R.

'~

name had been entered in

eleven primary contests with the avowed purpose of ascertaining the strength of the resistance to the ccncept of a third
term.
In mid-March, it was reported that the President had
·let it be known that he desired delegate strength in order to
be prepared to nominate himself or dictate his successor and
the platform; however, the report was not confirmed.l04
In the New Hampshire primary, Garner and Farley went
down to defeat as the Roosevelt slate swept the state's twelve
delegates; however, the Republicans polled twice as many votes
as the Democrats. 10 5 The G.O.P. votes plus those given to

103New York Times, March 3, 191~0, p. 4.
10 1-l-charles R. Michael, "Roosevelt Is Reported Seeking
Delegates So as to Hold Control," Nevt York Times, ~Iarch 12,
1
.
------19~0, p. 17.
Start,''

105"Prirnary Season Puts Roosevelt and Dewey Off to.Good
~.ews\vee k, 15:15, April 15, 1940.
·
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Farley and Garner indicated that there existed a good deal of
sentiment against the third term in that state.
Catledge reported that

Farle~

Turner

and Garner polled about one-

fourth of the Democratic vote and that those votes had to be
accepted as

anti~third

term votes.

He also stated that Garner's

campaign managers had been elated over the results and had
begun to.work hard in Wisconsin, Illinois, California, and
Oregon.l06
After the New Hampshire primary, the Gallup Poll
released a survey which showed that as of

~id-March,

47 per

cent of all voters favored a third term, art increase of 1 per
cent over the previous month.107
In the Wisconsin primary, Roosevelt's slate again
·defeated Garner, but not by the five or six to one predicted
by the F.D.R.'s supporters; in fact, Garner's capture of 30 per
cent of the primary vote represented a blow to the third term
drafters.

Arthur Krock declared that if the Republican vote

were added to the percentage of the Democratic vote received
by Garner and applied to the nation as a whole, Roosevelt
would be defeated were he to attempt a third term contest.l 0 8

106Turner Catledge, "Early Pl'imar:i.es Serve as Guide ·to
'40 'Trends," New_ York :I;imes, ~1arch 17, ·19ltO, IV, p. 7.
lO'lNe\~ york Time~, J.VIarch 13, J.9lta, p. 15.

108Arthur Krock, "Draft-Roosevelt Plan Meets a Double
Check, " ~~ Yor ~ Times_, Apr i 1 7, IV, p • 3 •
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The Illinois primary, held one week after Wisconsin's,
did not alter the trend.

The drafters had predicted a six-

teen to one margin for F.D.R., but the results showed only
a six to one margin.

The Dewey vote, when added to Garner's,

represented a fifty-fifty split in opinion over the third
term. 10 9
In the Nebraska primary, Roosevelt ran unopposed on
the Democratic ticket;

howev~r, D~wey

and Vandenberg's vote

topped the President's, representing the first time in ten
years the Republican primary vote had surpassed that of the
Democratic.llO
In April, F.D.R. broke his silence to blast the G.O.P.
and

it~

i"

presidential candidates.

In the address the President

declared that the three issues advanced by the Republican candidates had been first, that the administration was leading the

.

nation into the war; second, that the New Deal measures could
be handled more efficiently by the G.O.P.; and third, that the
Republican party could provide jobs for all, maintain relief
rolls at adequate levels, meet national defense requirements,
reduce taxes, and reduce the cost of government by repealing
the "horrid 11 re striations on private business.

To the fix•st

issue, concerning the war, Roosevelt told his audience that

109"campaign: G.O.P. Trend," 'I'ime, 35:15, April 22, 1940.
110 Ibid.
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they knew better than that; to the second, he recalled the
scandals occurrit)g under Republican administrations; and to the
third~

he declared that he did not have to comment.

Although

he gave no hint as to his future plans, he did warn the Democratic party that they could win in November only by nominating
a liberal pair of candidates and a for\'lard-looking platform. 111
Dewey's victories in the primaries and standing in
the public opinion polls perhaps brought about the President's
attack.

Arthur Krock revealed that there exj.sted strong impli-

cations that the Senate would investigate the use of campaign
funds in Dewey's behalf during the primaries and that the New
Dealers had begun a new tactic by declaring that Roosevelt had
to run if Dewey were chosen as the Republican nominee.

Krock

also repor•ted that grapevine messages from the White House
stated both that F.D.R. would not run and that he would.112
In the f.-lay primaries, the struggle between the "Draft-

Roosevelt" group and the anti-third term Democrats continued.
Roosevelt's slate swept the California primary; and the third
term

foes~

Maryland.

led by Senator Millard E. Tydings, clinched
By mid-r1Iay, the President had amassed a convention

majority of pledged and semi-pledged delegates.l 1 3

There was

lllFelix Belair, Jr., "Roosevelt Scores Dei'Tey's Critic:tsm of Foreign Pol icy," Ne111 York Time~' April 21, 191.~0, p. 1.
'

112Arthur Krock, 11 fv1any Signs Ncrw Point to a Roosevelt
'Draft'," Nev>l YorkTi~, Apri12l, 19l.f0, IV, p. 3.
113~r.e_::: Yor~ Time~, May 22~, 1940, p. 16.
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no longer any contest between the two opposing forces within
the Democratic party; and the

probabl~

reason for this situa-

tion was·the German offensive which began during the April-May
primary period.
The June Gallup Poll reported that since the Nazi invasion of the Lowlands and France in mid-May, the pro-third term
sentiment had risen sharply; it had reached a majority for the
first time.

Before the invasion, 47 per cent of the nation's

voters had favored a third term; two weeks after the change in
the course of the war the percentage had increased to 57 per
cent.

The poll showed that the increase had resulted from

s~li tches

in the Democratic party; 8 per cent of the Republicans

sampled favored a third term, while 91 per cent of the Demo9rats had cast support for the President.114
The primary elections, which had increased Dewey's
chances for the nomination and had prompted a split within the
Democratic party, needed to be re--evaluated in light of the
international crisis.

The Gerrr.an offensive had united the

Democratic party behind Roosevelt; the President had the convention votes to nominate himself or name his successor, with
either choice resulting in a Democratic victory.

Still, the

drastic change of events did not dissuade Roosevelt from his
policy of silence; speculati.on over his future plans continued
114New York Tim~, June 5, 1940, p, 18.
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to occupy the minds of the political leaders of both parties.
The sudden change in the international situation was
also to have a dramatic reaction in the Republican race for
the nomination.

The German offensive forced Republican

leaders to re-appraise the stock of the potential nominees.
The foreign policy stands of the leading contenders--Dewey,
Taft, and. Vandenberg--pointed to a very perplexing problem:
could an isolationist candidate defeat F.D.R. or any other
internationalist candidate during the Cl"isis?

The problem

was further complicated by the fact that Dewey and Taft
possessed nearly equal delegate strength, which raised the
possibility of a deadlocked convention and the choice of a
compromise or dark horse candidate.

Out of this distressing

situation ·a dark horse was to enter the race, overtake the
two leading candidates on the far turn, and win the nomination
going away in the home stretch.
Willkie.

This dark horse was Wendell

, CHAPTER IV
THE RISE OF WENDELL L. WILLKIE
Throughout 1939, as the natiori's political parties and
their candidates vied with one another for public recognition
and acceptance, Wendell Willkie achieved national popularity
as an outstanding critic of the New Deal; however, he was not
a political candidate, but i

spok~sman

from the ranks of

American business who was attacking the administration's
domestic policies.

19~·0,

From January to April,

Wj.llkie was

still not a candidate, although he had become a more popular
critic; for his articles and speeches had attracted a good deal
of attention.

In April, a nationwide movement to secure the

nomination for Willkie was started; however, it was being conducted without his consent, and he refused to campaign for the
nomination.

.

By May, Willkie had become an announced candidate;

and the movement, which was only one month old, had picked up
considerable momentum.

As the boom grew, Willkie's popularity,

as measured in the polls, increased correspondingly.

By June,

he had become the most-discussed candidate in the race.

I. BEFORE 1940
Willkie's debut on to the political stage took place
during the first years of the New Deal.

Willkie, a Democrat,

took issue with the Roosevelt ideology and became a critic of

114

the administration's attitude and policies toward business.
During the controversy over the concept, purpose, and legality
of the Tennessee Valley Authority,

Will~ie,

President of

Commonwealth and Southern Company--the nation's largest producer of electricity--argued that it was wrong for the Federal
government to establish public power plants for the benefit of
a few people when all America had to foot the bill.

In his

fight with the New Deal \1illkie had championed the cause of
private enterprise over government-owned power plants; and, as
a result of his efforts, he achieved recognition as a leading
critic of the New Deal.
In the fight which ensued, Willkie fought the government on every possible issue; and, in a losing cause, he still
managed to obtain his price for the company's holdings located
within the Tennessee Valley Authority's jurisdictional area.
This victory boosted him into the limelight as a stout
defender of private enterprise, as well as an effective campaigner against the administration.
In 1938, columnist Jennings Perry reported to his readers
that Willkie should run for the presidency;l and his statement
marked the beginning of what was to become a movement of
amateur politicians to put Willkie in the White House.
In February, 1939,

Th~

Saturday ·Even1.nJ'?. gost carried an

2Joseph Barnes, Willkie: The Events He Was a Part of-The Ideas He Fou~!_ For~-p:-!57. ---·
- · - - - - ~--
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article by Alva Johnston which described Willkie's fight with
the New Deal over public power; however, the article gave no
hint of his possible poli tica 1 future. 2 ·
In May of the same year, David Lav-1rence discussed
Willkie•s chances as a Republican presidential possibility,
drawing from the utilities executive the statement that be had
no political ambitions, but that be was not indifferent to the
suggestion.3
In June, 1939, \'lillkie's article "Brace Up America"
appeared in

Tb~

Atlantic Montb_11L.·

I11 the article Willkie

·expressed his views on the status of the American economy and
criticized the Nev1 Deal's failure to cope \'lith the nation's
economic problems.

He declared that in order to solve these

.problems, American industry had to be expanded; the government, according to Willkie, could not retard industry with
strict regulation and taxation and expect economic recovery in
return.

W:l.llkie also presented an indictment of the New Deal

theory that a government could spend its way into prosperity,
stating that such an economic theory had two evil consequences:
an unbaJ.anced budget and the creation of a deficit spending
policy with higher taxes.

He stated that government spending

drove private capital out of :l.ndustry, thereby inhibiting

2 lb i d • ' p • 15 8 •

3.fl?J:2.• '

p. 157 •
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industrial expansion and contributing significantly to the
continuance of unemployment •. ltJillkie also declared that the
government harassment of industry also jeopardized the position of labor; for the small profits of industry stopped any
chance for higher wages, which would result from industrial
expansion.

He also called for a revision of the nation's tax

structure to encourage the investment of domestic capital into
the nation's industries instead of into tax-exempt securities,
as the existing tax structures had been channeling investment;
new enterprises could absorb the country's idle money and ·idle
men.4
In the same month another of Willkie's articles, "Idle
Money, Idle Men," appeared in The

~aturdail., Ev_£~

Post.

Willkie again stated his program for economic recovery,
declaring that industrial expansion would create jobs, solve
the unemployment problem, and bolster the entire economy.
Again he stressed the importance of revising the nation's tax
laws to stimulate investment in the country's industrial
future.5
In late July, 1939, Willkie received additional recognition by having his picture appear on the cover of

Ti~;

how-

4v.Jendell Willkie, "Brace Up, Amer :I.e a," The Atlantic
MonthJ]I_, 163:749-56, June, 1939.
--~
~

5Irving Stone, They Also Ran: ~~ St9~~ of !~he Men Who
Defe_a ted [_<E.:, tr~ f:=-re ~J.cfe~.c.i/ -;-p. :;--r:-:;.
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ever, the rna ga zine reported that his cand:l.da cy was "mildly
fantastic. 11 6
Arthur Krock, a long-t:l.me Willkie booster, stated that
nothing would come of the suggestions that Willkie could be a
prime dark horse candidate, despite his national fame and
qua J.ifica tions.

According to Krock, the fact that \'Jillkie had

been a Democrat would not necessarily disqualify him; but the
fact that party leaders reportedly did not want a businessman as a candidate would.

He also stated that Willkie

possessed no organization or delegate strength, two essentials
needed to secure the nomination.

Krock declal"'ed that Willkie

had gained a victory over Roosevelt and the. Tennessee Valley
Author-ity by refusing to keep st:1.ll, to lie down and tremble,
by presenting a devastating set of facts which had influenced
both public opinion and Congress; and, because of this, if
Willkie were to become the G.O.P. nominee,·the President would
attempt to stop him.

According to the columnist, this situa-

tion represented a strong argument against nominating Willkie
in the eyes of many Republicans.

Another of Willkie's political

liabilities stressed in the article was the utilities executive's low opinion of professional politicians; he did not
think much of their capacity or character.

These politicians

would not nominate a man who knew their shortcomings and would

p. 4
5.)

6Barnes, on. cit., p. 158. (See also 'l'irne, July 31, 1939,
..:.J;;..__
---
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receive support from Wall Street, a political liability in the
aftermath of the Depression.?
The possibility of Willkie's candidacy was again raised
in November, 1939.
New

Yo~k

In a speech before the Bond Club in

City, General Hugh S. Johnson described Vandenberg

and Taft as good, average politicians and stated that
Dewey would face some difficulty in selling himself beyond
the Alleghanies, where he was little known.

In the question

and ans\'ler period which follO\'led the speech t.Tohnson declm•ed
that Willkie would be a very strong candidate.B

The statement

drew from Willkie the following quip: "In view of the speed
with which the Federal Government is taking over my business,
shortly I'll probably have to be looking around for a new job.
General Johnson's is the best offal' I've had thus far. "9
Arthur Krock reported in late November that a group of
businessmen and private citizens had been discussing the
possibility of putting Willkie up for the nomination, but that
the talk had indicated nothing but a fine disregard of the
realities of politics in that the potential candidate would
need a national organization, a large amount of financial
support, and assistance from powerful political leaders.

?Arthur Krock, "In the Nation: Something the Republicans
Probably \von 't Do," New York Times, .August 16, 1939, p, 22.

·~e.!!_ ~~ Times, November 22, 1939, p. 13.
9rbid.
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Krock stated that Willkie possessed none of these essential
requirements.l 0
With the approach of the election year, Willkie was still
a spokesman for business and not a candidate.

In December, in

a speech before the Congress of American Industry, he warned
his audience against the power of the government commissions
and the dangers of excessive Federal control over the economic
life of the nation.

Willkie declared that an increase in

individual opportuni.ty would x•estore the functioning of free
enterprise and that unemployment, the major economic problem,
would be solved by American business if the government would
11
get "off their backs."
II.

THE WILLKIE MOVEMEWr-,..JANUARY~r·1AY, 1940

Throughout the first four months of 1940, \\fillkie was
not an announced

c~ndidate;

but in May, he dropped the business-

man-critic attack on the New Deal to become an active candidate
for the nomination,

Although the boom did not get started

until after the major primary contests, i.t gained amazing
str•ength during the month of May; in March Hillkie had not been
mentioned as a candidate in the polls, but by May he was in
fourth place with 10 per cent of the vote in the Gallup Poll.

------lOArthur Krock, "In the Nation: Mr. McNutt and His Old
Frat Brother, M:r. Wi.llkie," ~ York Time_~.' November 29, 1939,
p. 22.

llNew Yor1~. Times, December 9, 1939, p. 1.
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During the first two months of 1940, Willkie continued
to present his economic program through speeches to civic,
social, and business groups.

In January; he declared that

whenever a government assumed autocratic control over industry,
it must, in order to maintain that control, gradually suppress
freedom and civil liberties and that those who advocated more
and more Federal power were the same people who maintained that
the great pioneering days of America were finished.

He stated

that the apparent philosophy of an absolute government was a
defeatist philosophy, with the government controlling a11.12
In Fe b1.,uary, he asserted that he had opposed the domination of
the people by big business as he now opposed the domination by
big government.l3
Willkie reported that he had received thousands of
letters from individuals urging him to run for the presidency.
He added that he did not believe the nomination would be given
to him, but if it were offered without any strings attached, he
would have to accept.

Still, Willkie did not announce his can-

didacy; in fact, he stated that he could not go out and seek
delegates and make two-sided statements because he valued his
independence.14

--12New York Times, January 30, 1940, p. l~.
13Nev-7 York Times, February 17, 19!f0, p. 7.
14!_-Jew York ~imes, January 31, 1940, p. 5.
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Arthur Krock, discussing
Willkie's statement, declared

that a candidate must, or g,enerally did, surrender some of his
independence when running for office in order to build up convention votes and that most candidates made two-sided speeches.
Krock surmised that since Willkie could not surrender some
independence and make two-sided statements, he could not
seek delegates.

The columnist reasoned that a long deadlock

could produce a candidacy such as Willkie's, but the

possi~

bility of that occurrence was slim because politicians disliked candidates without "strings." 1 5
In April, Willkie again declared that he was not a candidate ~nd that he had not the slightest delusion about being
nominated; however, he again stated that in order to preserve
his intellectual well-being, he would accept the nomination if
it were bffered.

Also presented in the speech was his

reiteration of his solution to the

nation~s

economic problems:

curbing the authority of the various boards and commissions
created by the Nevi Deal, modifying the tax laws to encourage
and stimulate investment, and changing the attitude of government toward business. 16
In another April speech, Willkie declared that the
current economic ills facing the country were primarily the
1 5Arthur K't'ock, "In the Nation: The Care and Feeding of
Very Dark Horses," Nev'l X~ Tim~, February 1, 1940, p. 20.

16~~~ York Time~, April 5, 1940, p. 1.

r
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fault of government, not the system itself.

By making it

impossible for American business to obtain the capital it
needed for enterprises, the government had created a s1.tuation
whereby the nation's businesses could not

pl~ovide

jobs for the

unemployed, new expanding industries, nor new products for the
consumers.

Willkie charged that the New Deal took the term

"businessman," which the country had honored for more than a
century, and turned it into an epithet.

17

Willk:I.e's early criticism brought him publicity; the
publicity brought requests from interested groups for.speeches
and elaboratloJ."l on his principles, ideals, and arguments; the
speeches brought Willkie increased publicity--this was the
actual start of the Willkie boom.
Bj' early :April, it appeared that \{illkie 's critic ism of
the New Deal had been hitting the

mark~

for it was reported

that the Federal government had begun an investigation of
Willkie's business activities and that certain government
officials had declared that they we1,e out to "get" him.
Roosevelt, when questioned about the ~lleged threats, stated
that nobody took things like that seriously.

18

Investigation or not, Willkie continued his attack.

In

April, hls article "VIe the People" appeared in 11'ortune; ancl in

-------

l ..fNew York Times, April 6, 191~0, p. 1.
1 ~e~

York Time~, April 6, 1940, p. 1.

·
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the article he declared that the United States should not be
a laboratory for social experimentation and condemned the New
Deal for failing to solve the economic problems facing the
nation since 1932. 1 9 The arguments presented in this article
were not new; they were the same points of criticism Willkie
had been emphasing since his struggle against Roosevelt and
the New Deal began; however, the effect of the message
was significant.

Accompanying the article in Fortune was an

endoresement of Willkie by the Luce editorial board, an
indication that his message had made a few converts. 20 After
the publication of "We the People" Willk:te ·r·eceived 2000
requests for speeches. 21
Perhaps the single most important individual in the
.Willkie movement, aside from the man himself, was Oren Root,
Jr., the grandnepher,v of Elihu Root and an attorney associated
with the New York firm of Davis, Park, Wardwell Gardiner and
Reed.

Without consulting Willkie (Root had not even met him),

Root mailed out a li.ttle more than a thousand "declarations"
throughout.the country in order to get signatures in support
of Willkie's candidacy.

Root stated that the idea was his own

and that he had financed the printing of the forms because he

19stone, op. 21t., p. 351.
2°Barnes,
2 1rbid.

Opo £1!o' p. 161.

believed that there was a great demand among thinking people
ror the nomination and election of Willkie as President. 22
Root aJ.so reproduced copies of "We the People" and mailed them
with the "declarations" to inform the addressees of the argu-,·
ments and principles of his candidate. 2 3
Less than a week after he had sent out the "declarations"
Root reported that they had been well received and that the
printer·s had received orders for 20,000 more forms.

Root also

revealed that Willkie had contacted him and had explained that
he ne:tther approved or disapproved of Root's activities and
that he would not part:l.cipate in any organized effort to get
the nomination.24
Late in April, Root reported that he had rented an office
on Madison Avenue to administer• the Willkie dr•ive and had
received r·equests for 35,000

11

declarations. 11

He also stated

that contributions had enabled him to opetl the headquarters and
that Willkie had told him that he was more interested in getting
popular support for certain ideas thah in obtaining support for
personal advancement.

It was also reported that the "Stop-

Dewey'' forces had been discussing the possibility of putting
a halt to Dewey's aspirations by throwing their support to
2

2Nm<~ Yor~ Time~, April 11, 191~0, p. 20.

23stone, OP.· cit., p. 352.
24
~~ Yor_~ Time~, April 15, 1940, p. 7.

,,
L
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Willkie, if they failed to stop him with Taft or Vandenberg. 25
The Willkie movement continued to gain momentum through
the month of April, demonstrated by the fact that the Root
headquarters had received 200,000 signed "declarations" by the
end of the month.

Root stated that he planned to show them

to the delegates to inform them of the widespread support for
Willlcie. 26
Arthur Krock, continuing to provide the Willkie supporters with helpful hints in candidate building, declared that the
movement was still only a wish and a hope, not a reality.

He

reasoned that in order to be a candidate Willkie would need a
small reservoir of delegates in his pocket when the convention
opened and that since Willkie had no pledged delegate strength
and had made no attempt to gain support, his slim chance to
capture the nomination had grown smaller.

Krock reported that

the Willkie men would have some difficulty convincing G.O.P
leaders that Willkie was the best candidate in light of his
announced support of the reciproca 1 trade treaties (Only five
Republican members of Congress had voted to extend them.) and
aid to the Allies.

Krock suggested that Willkie's supporters,

in order to secure delegate votes for their candidate, set up
a political organization in his home state of Indiana.27
25New Y~ Times, April 22, 1940,
26Nei'I York !Lim.~~" April 30, 1940,
2 7Arthur Krock, "In the Nation: A
Political System," New York Times, April

p. 7.
p. 12.
Dilemma Evoked by Our
16, 1940, p. 22.
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The lack of delegate votes did represent a handicap
to Willkie's chances; the movement appeared to be concentrating
on winning nationwide public support instead of delegates.
Root's headquarters, aside from distributing "declarations,"
also started handing out buttons an<;] urging citizens to form
"Willkie-For-President" clubs.

Root distributed 25,000 cam-

paign but.tons as an experiment, and soon the Will.kie Clubs
were dispensing over 80,000 buttons a day.

In response to

Root's suggestion that interested citizens establish local
clubs to work for Willkie 's candidacy, thou.sands of political
amateurs began contributing their time, mon~y, and energies
to the cause. 28 The Willkie boom was a reality, even though
it was promoted by groups from the organized public and not
political leaders and delegates.
In addition to his magazine articles and speeches,
Willkie was afforded the opportunity of presenting his program
to several million people when he appeared on an April
cast of the radio show "Information Please."

broad~

The panel of pro-

fessional wits would have been delighted to slaughter Willkie
before the large radio audience; however, he turned the tables
and stole the show.29

After his appearance and the start of

his boom, Willkie moved up in the polls, but the professional

28stone, op. cit., p. 352.
29Bar•nes, .212..· cit., pp. 161-62.
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politicians still did not give him a second thought.30
During the month of May, the Willkie boom slowly gained
momentum.

His advance in the polls had been gradual, but it

represented a clear indication of his rising popularity.
Arter Root had begun his initial program to unite
Willkie sentiment throughout the country, other important
figures jumped on the bandwagon.

Russell Davenport resigned

his position as managing editor of Fortune to work for Willkie's
nomination by organizing Willkie clubs.

John Cowles, publisher

of the Minnesota Publisher; Gardner Cowles, Jr., publ:tsher of
Look and the Des Moines Register
Ogden Reid of the New

~Tribune;

~ Hera~q T~ibun~

who supported the Willkie movement.

Henry Luce; and

were other publishers

Other converts included

John W. Hanes, a former New Deal office hoider; Henry
Breckenricje, Assistant Secretary of War under Wilson; Samuel
F.

Pryor~

Republican National Committeeman from Connecticut;

and Fred Smith, a prominent public relations specialist.3 1
While Willkie's active supporters were engaged in promoting his candidacy, he remained aloof from the activities.
Willkie had stated that he would not seek de1egates nor
actively campaign for the nomination; hov1ever, during the
month of May he made several speeches in which he expressed

·---·-Par~,

30Malcolm Moos, 212~ Re.E.'-lbl~~c_§lns: A £!.i~toril._ gf Their
p. 410.

31Barnes,' ££·

91~·,

pp. 162-63.
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his views on both domestic and foreign policy.

In a speech

before the American Newspaper Publishers Association Willkie
stated that he opposed the New Deal's domestic policy and
believed, as did millions, that Roosevelt had done a pretty
good job in the adminstration of the nation's foreign policy.
He expressed apprehension that since many of those who opposed
the New Deal thought it would be a wise political move to be
against all its policies, the voters might be forced to make a
choice between two half-rotten apples in November.

Willkie

also presented a clear stand on aid to the Allies when he
declared that possibly the most effective way of keeping the
country out of the war would be by helping the democracies
in every way possible, within the limits of international law,
because if the totalitarian powers won, the odds could be
substantial that the United States would have to meet them in
armed conflict.32
!n m:l.d-May, Willkie was invited to Minnesota to confer
with Governor Stassen and state Republican Leaders.

In a

speech del:i.vered during his stay he characterized the New Deal
period as a "decade of decade~ce," charging that free enterprise
had been abandoned and a highly centralized government

~tibsti

tuted in its place, a government which controlled the enterprises
of the people by non-elected commissioners.

3 2 ~ew Xork T~~' May 5, 1940, p. 3.

Willkie called for
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a freely publicized foreign policy and

tu~ged

extension of

I_; __

every aid short of war to the democracies of Europe.33
Continuing his Mid-West speaking ·tour, Willkie declared

- - -

::

in Indianapolis that Roosevelt had conducted a deliberate campaign to destroy the people's confidence in their enterprises
-n--~~~~-·and-ho_p_e_of_tbe_f_u_t_ur_e_un_d_e_r_a_s_ystem of free en·terprise .34

-~~~---------------~====

In Des Moines, he asserted that the New Deal's blundering
domestic policy had "hamstrung" industry and left it without
sufficient skilled labor or plant equipment to build defenses
the President now wanted.

Willkie also warned Republicans not

to attempt to wipe out the existing farm program until it had
a better one to offer.35
In New Jersey, he charged that the New Deal had created
. chaos in government and industry and lacked the ability and
confidence to carry out the task of coordinating the nation's
national resources in the drive to strenghten national defenses.
In this political speech Willkie also dealt with his utilities
connection, which had been presented as a handicap to his candidacy, by.declaring that he was very proud to be in the
utilities business; he asked his audience to ·recall when in the
nation's history had American businessmen been barred from

33New York Times, May 12, 1940, p. 3.
34New York Times, May 16, 191~0, p. 48.
~

35James C. Hagerty, "Willkie Pictures Defense Hand.icap, 11
Yor~ Times, May 18, 1940, p. 9.
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running or holding office.3 6

Willkie may have stated that he

was not a candidate, but he began to sound as if he were.
In late May, Willkie warned that if the totalitarian
countries won the war, they would control world trade on their
own terms and the only way the United States could trade would
be to set up a similar type of government here, thus abrogating
at least some of the traditional American liberties.

He also

asserted that anyone who believed that the results of the
European war would be of no consequence to him would be blind,
foolish, and silly.

The only way to avoid war, according to

Willkie, was to build up

OW1

strength.37

Willkie's energetic supporters and the ''candidate's"
speeches had gotten the boom off to a good start.

A Gallup

Poll survey published early in May indicated that Willkie's
stock had increased during the short period the boom had been
in existence.

The poll showed Willkie in·fourth place, moving

ahead of Hoover, Landon, Gannett, Bridges, and Martin; however,
the poll also indicated that he had a long way to go to catch
Dewey, Vandenberg, and Taft.38
By mid-May, Root declared that the popular support for
Willkie was increasing rapidly; he asserted that it was an
36New ~·k f.~~es, May 21, 1940, p. 17.
37New York :£imes, May 22, 1940, p. 16.
38New York ~~-' May 8, 1940, p. 18.
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independent, spontaneous movement and that there was no stop. ping it.

Root also reported that Willkie Clubs had been estab-

lished in twenty-three cities.39
confirmed by James

c.

Root's enthusiasm was somewhat

Hagerty,_ who reported that if the conven-

tion were· deadlocked, Willkie 's supporters believed they would
gain delegate strength from Massachusetts, Connecticut, Indiana,
Rhode Island, New Jersey, Iowa, Minnesota, and Missouri.

He

also stated that Willkie had scored heavily in the Mid-West
with his statements on both the foreign situation and the
farm problem.-40
Confirmation of Willkie's growing strength came in the
New Jersey primary, held in late May.

The utilities executive's

supportez•s haa conducted a spontaneous, eleventh-hour write-in
campaign, and the results sho\'ied that vlillkie had surprising
strength in the state.

The write-in vote was figured to be of

both practical and psychological value to his candidacy.41
The end of May Gallup Poll showed that Willkie was sti.ll
in fourth place, but that he had increased his percentage
matet"lally.

In the March poll he had received less than 1 per

cent, and by April he had only 1 per cent; however, by early
May he had moved ahead to 3 per cent.

As the boom expanded

39N~ York Times, May 16, 1940, p. 48.

·

40James C. Hagerty, "Willkie Shedding 'Dark Horse' Role,"

New York Tim~-~' May 19, 1940, p. 2~.
41New York Time~, May 23, 19L10, p. 21.
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and as the candidate began his Mid-West speaking tour, his
percentage be:g.an to climb.

By Mid-May, Willkie had 5 per cent;
by the end of May, this had increased to 10 per cent. 42
Indic.ative of the expansion of the boom was the report
in the first \'leek of June that five hundred Willkie Clubs had
been established, growing at the rate of twelve per day, and
that a volunteer "Women's Committee for Willkie" had been
organized and was sending out 5,000 letters a day in behalf
of their eandidate.43

In the face of this overwhelming evidence that Willkie
commanded a large and growing public following, political
analysts cDntinued to point out to the

Amer~can

people the

reasons why he could not possibly gain the nomination.
McAlister Coleman, writing in The Nation, reported that it was
unfortunate that Willkie had been so closely associated with
the holdin;g companies because "old-fashj_oned American liberalism \'JOuld have had in him a doughty champion.rr44

Raymond Moley,

writing in Newsweelc, stated that the G.O.P. professionals would
refuse to support Willkie's candidacy because he was not a
political administrator, a dispenser of jobs and favors to the

42 New ~ ~m~, May 31, 1940, p. 38.
43"vlillkie Boom Is Republican Sensation as Philadelphia
Convention Nears," Li£~, 8:25, June 24, 1940.

4 11 Mc.Alister Coleman, "Men Who \'lould Be President: IV.
Wendell \iillkie's Hat Is on His Head," The Nation, 150:1}72,
.April 13, 1940.
~-
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loyal party workers. 45

~ Christian penturil_ recognized the

widespread interest in Willkie's candidacy, but indicated that·
the American people would not turn Roosevelt out of office for
a public utilities man who had agreed. with F.D.R. 's foreign
policy and disagreed with his domestic policy.46
White, reporting in The

~ ~epublic,

William Allen

asserted that there were

handicaps to Willkie's nomination: first, he had been a regular
Democrat until 1935; second, he had been too candid and decent
during the growth of his boom; and third, he had alienated the
isolationist wing of the G.O.P. by supporting Roosevelt's
foreign policy and Hull's reciprocal trade treaties. 47
The political experts within the Democratic party
apparently held similar opinions of Willkie's chances.

Ickes

revealed that F.D.R. had stated that he did not believe that
Willkie had much of a chance to get the nomination; Ickes also
recorded that Farley had considered Willkfe the strongest candidate the Republicans could name. 48
Willkie 1 who had been a spokesman for business in 1939,

45Raymond Moley, "Perspective: Willkie--A Study in Irony,"
15:72 1 May 20, 1940.

Newsw~~'

46 11 The Phenomenon of Wendell Willkie," The Chri.stian
~tur:l, 57:725, June 5, 1940.
-·. ---

47vlilliam Allen White, "Wendell Wiilkie," The New
Republic, 102:818, June 17, 1940.
-----48Harold Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. f?kes,
Vol 1II 1 The Lowerin[ ClOUds, 1~:39-19~1,-p.-201.
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emerged during the Spring of 1940 as a candidate.

As the pre-

convention campaign moved into the final weeks, Willkie
became the main topic of conversation.

No one actually knew

how much support he held, nor did anyone know if his dramatic
rise in the polls would alter the existing situation.

Dewey

was reasonable to assume that one of the two would be chosen
the 1940 G.O.P. standard bearer at the convention.

~----

'

CHAPTER V
TVffiNTY-THREE .DAYS IN JUNE:

WILLKIE AGAINST THE FIELD

As the pre-convention campaigns went into their final
days, the political situation became more and more muddled,
at least for the G.O.P.

For the Democrats it was certain that

Roosevelt bad full control of the destiny of the party; however,
no one knew exactly what that destiny would be, possibly not
even the President.

In the Republican rade Dewey, Taft, and

Willkie continued their respective campaigns; however, the
leading candidate, Dewey, seemed to be losing strength to
Willkie, who appeared to be heading toward the convention on
the crest of a nationwide boom.

To further complicate matter•s

for the G.O.P. strategists, and the delegates as \'lell, v-1as the
growing significance of the foreign policy issue in light of
the deterioration of the international situation, Roosevelt's
appointment of two Republican interventionists to the Cabinet,
and the respective stands the various G.O.P. candidates were
taking on the issue.

Opinion as to who should receive the

nomln3tion was far from being crystallized; neither the rank
and file nor the professional politicians seemed satisfied
with the existing situation.
I.

THE BOOM THAT GREH

The momentum of the Willkie boom carried the candidate
into the month of June as the most active Republican candidate.

Dewey and Taft, possessing vast delegate strength by compari-

I

1~

son, continued to confer with delegates and political leaders
!_

throughout the nation; however, Willkie conducted a strong
personal campaign in the West and another in New England and
reportedly gained considerable support.

It was also rumored

that a "Stop-\villkie 11 ·movement had begun.
Although much attention had been given to the Willkie
boom, the practical politicians of the party could not help
but relegate Willkie to a dark horse category because he
possessed little delegate strength, the votes bestowing the
nomination.

The three leading candidates had amassed a con-

siderable number of such votes, bot'h pledged and promised, by
June.

With 992 delegates chosen as of June 1, Dewey led the

field with 150 pledged votes.

Others possissing pledged

support were Taft, with fifty-six; Vandenberg, with thirtyeight; Hanford Ma cNider, with two; Senator Capper, v-li th eighteen; and Senator McNary, with ten.

The remaining delegates

were not pledged; these "uninstructed" delegates numbered over
700. 1

A majority of the latter delegates had promised, both

publicly and privately, to support various candidates; however,
the actual delegate strength of each of the contenders was
unknovm.

Dewey was estimated to have slightly less than 300

first ballot votes, although his managers had predicted 450 on
lNe~ X?rk Times# May 30, 1940, p. 15.
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the first ballot; Taft's strength was estimated to be 275J but
his managers had not made specific predictions, declaring only
that Taft would win the nomination. 2 As the campaign entered
its final wSeks, it was little wonder that the professionals
believed that

ei~ber

Dewey or Taft would win the nomination.

Willkie 1 finally acting as if he were a candidateJ
took his prog1•am to the West during the first weeks of June.
In Denver, he declared that unless the wheels of industry
were started, the cost of the defense program would come out
of the standard of living of the ordinary person; it would be
paid by the poor instead of the rich.

He also stated that the

removal of Roosevelt was the only way the United States could
present a united front against the threats of totalitarian
powers and added that he \'rould "love to go to the people against
that fellow. "3

One point \Villkie stressed time and time again

on this tour was that since the overwhelming sentiment throughout the nation favored aid, short of war, to the Allies, the
party must not adopt an isolationist foreign policy plank.

He

predicted that if the G.O.P. presented a united front with a
platform with a "realistic outlook" on the European situation
and leveled the principal attack on the domestic policy of the

2J·ames A. Haf.erty, "F:!.rst-Vote Choice of DevJey Is Found
Unlikely in Survey,' ~~York Time~J June 3, 1940, p. 1.
3New York Time..E_J June 1 1 191~0. p. 7.
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.New Deal and its

~proven

in6ompetence" to build an adequate

defense system, the party \'JOUld win in November. 4
The success of the boom, including the enthusiastic
reception of Willkie's program and speeches, prompted Root to
predict that if the nomination were not won by the second
ballot, the delegates would give the nomination to Willkie.
Root declared that he was confident that the delegates would
feel "the subconscious desire of the American people. rr5
.Additional evidence that the boom had grown during
the first weeks of June came from Russell Davenport, who
reported that Willkie-For-President clubs had been established
throughout the nation and numbered almost 500.

He also

revealed that 350,000 buttons had been distributed in June and
.that 150,000 copies of a pamphlet listing Willkie's principles
had been distributed by his headquarters. 6
During early June, Taft, continuing his methodical
delegate collecting, took his campaign to
and Alabama.

Tenn~ssee,

Georgia,

During this tour he continued to criticize the

administration for its failure to prepa1.,e the country's
defense system.

On the same issue he declared that the United

States had to take in its belt by cutting expenditures and

4New York Times, June 9, 1940, p. 3.
5New York Times, June 4, 19!~0, p. 18.
6New York ~fmes, June 12, 1940, p. 23.
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revising tax structures in order to pay for the rising defense
costs.

Taft also declared that Roosevelt should renounce· the

third term because he had failed to prepare the nation for
attack by foreign powers.7
Dewey's forces were also active during this period.

In

early June, Dewey's Philadelphia headquarters were opened in
the Hotel Walton, and the candidate's managers announced that
Dewey would conduct a personal campaign in Vermont, Rhode
Island and Massachusetts before the convention opened. 8
With the pre-convention campaign rapidly coming to a
close, it appeared that the Taft and Dewey campaigns had
slowed down considerably from their earlier pace, while that of
the newcomer, Willkie, appeared to be speeding up.

The Mid-

June Gallup Poll indicated that the latter's boom had indeed
been growing.

The results of the.survey of Republican voters

showed Dewey still leading, with 52 per

c~nt,

but Willkie

advancing into second place with 17 per cent, Hoover 2
per cent, Landon and Gannett 1 per cent, and others 2 per cent.
The survey indicated that Willkie's rise had been at Dewey's
expense, wl.th Taft's and Vandenberg's totals remaining rather
steady.

After labeling the Willkie boom as phenomenal, the
7Ne\'I Yor:~ ~imes, June 8, 19!W, p. 16.

~ew yor~ Ti~es, June 15, 1940, p. 34.
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poll remarked that it was a dramatic challenge to the validity
of the old political theory that voters tend to climb on the
bandwagon of the candidate shown to be in the lead. 9
Soon after the publication of this poll, Willkie
announced that Representative Charles A. Halleck or Indiana
would place his name in nomination and that Representative
Bruce Barton of New York would deliver one of the seconding
sp.eeches.

The candidate also predicted that the nomination

would be made on the sixth or seventh ballot and that he would
have approximately seventy first ballot votes. 10 After making
this announcement, Willkie left for a three-day campaign tour
in NeN England.
In Boston, Willkie again preserited his arguments in
favor of aid to the Allies and again assailed the New Deal's
defense program.

When asked if he would lead the country into

war if elected, Willkie declared that no president should take
the nation into war unless and until the people demanded such
action; in a democracy, he maintained, it was the right of the
people to decide upon war. 11 It was reported that Willkie was
well received in the region and had gained valuable support.
In Rhode Island, Governor Vanderbilt formally endorsed Willkie
9New York Time~' June 12, 1940, p. 23.
10~ York Times, June 13, 1940, p. 10.

11 New Jor~ Ti~, June 15, 1940,

P· 11.

---------

at a Republican rally, and the latter was assured that he
would receive six of the state's eight votes.

In Connecticut,

Willkie was informed that the state's sixteen votes would be
his no later than the second ballot; and in Massachusetts,
Republican leaders indicated that he would get twenty-two of
the state's thirty-four votes early in the balloting.

It was

also reported that if Bridges withdrew from the race, Willkie
could receive support from Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont. 12
Dewey, also speaking in New England, made no claims concerning his support in the region.

In a Vermont speech he also

criticized the administration for its lack of preparedness and
declared that the first step which needed to be taken was to
remove the national defense system from political control and
to replace incompetent cabinet officers with qualified men.
Dewey implored the people to take "realistic" steps to protect
the nation instead of leaving the job to Roosevelt and his
"crew of fuzzy-minded theorists."

Commenting on the inter-

national situation he remarked that Marshal Petain's offer of
surrender was the saddest statement that he had ever reaa.l3
Before Dewey had departed on his New England tour, his
managers announced that Willkie was the man they had to beat
for the nomination.

Dewey's strategists had planned a campaign

12New York Times, June 17, 1940, p. 17.
13James C. Hagerty, "De\lley Demands Strong War Steps, 11
New York !imes, June 18, 1940, p. 27.
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to convince the delegates that their candidate would get more
votes than any other candidate, especially more than Willkie,
who they declared would be hurt by his corporate and banlcing
connections.

The Dewey forces had also stated that letters

stressing Dewey's vote-gett'ing power and indicating the
results of a Qrivate QOll, showing Dewey far ahead of the
field would be sent to the delegates. 14
Further evidence that the other candidates were concerned over the Willkie boom was the report that an effort had
been started to block Willkie's attempt

fo~

the nomination.

It

was also reported that G.O.P. leaders from·Oklahoma, Texas,
Missouri, and other farm states opposed his candidacy and in a
deadlock might combine to give the nomination to Dewey or Taft
. to stop Willkie.

The opposition reportedly stemmed from the

fact that Willkie was an ex-Democrat and an utilities executive,
two drawbacks which would be emphasized if he continued to gain
strength.l5
In the face of growing opposition the Willkie boom continued to expand.

Root revealed in mid-June that an estimated

4,500,000 Americans had. signed petitions calling for Willkie's
nomination.

The boom received another boost on June 20, when

the Scripps-Howard papers came out for Willkie's nomination,

14New York Times, June 17, 1940, p. 17.
15James A. Hagerty, "Effort Is Started to Block V.Iillkie,"
New York Times, June 20, 1940, p. 20.
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declaring that he stood out like an oak in a thicket and that
he was the only Republican candidate with whom the party could
win.l6

II.

THE PRESIDENTIAL

BOMBSP~LL--THE

PLAN THAT FAILED?

Several days before the opening of the Republican convention Roosevelt exploded a political bombshell with the
anriouncement that Colonel Henry L. Stimson and Colonel Frank
Knox had been appointed Secretary of \var and Secretary of the
Navy, respectively.

The announcement aroused a great deal of

exc:t.tement in the Republj_can party because .both men were G.O.P.
'leaders with avowed interventionist beliefs with regard to the
existing international crisis.

The President declared that he

.had made the appointments in the interest of national defense,
and he indicated that there existed overwhelming support
throughout the nation for aid to the Allies.

Both of the

appointees had been identified by the press as sympathizers
with Roosevelt's pro-Ally foreign policy stando G.O.P. leaders
•
condemned tbe appointments; ho·wever, the significance
of the maneuver rested with the Presidential motivation: were
the appointments actually made in the interests of national
defense,_or did they represent the President's attempt to induce
the G.O.P. to adopt a strict isolationist platform and to nomi- ·
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nate a candidate adhering to that foreign policy stand?

The

Stimson-Knox appointments, regardless of their intent, did
produce a violent reaction within the G.O.P.
One of the first reactions was a new round of questioning on the third term decision because Landon and previously
stated that no Republican should enter the cabinet until F.D.R.
foreswore any third term aspirations.

Reporters were unable to

pursue the subject further because White House Press Secretary
Early refused to comment on the question. 17
The importance of the appointments rested with the · · ·
effect they would have on the G.O.P. convention, which was to
begin on June 24.

'!~he

repercussions among. those assembling in

Philadelphia were great.

Aside from virtually reading Knox and

Stimson out of the party, Republican leaders and delegates
denounced the appointments as "petty politics," a move toward
dictatorship, and preparation toward placing the nation into
the European war.

It was reported that it was almost certain

that the Reptlblican platform 'tJOUld go mnch further in declaring
for a policy of non-intervention and that those who supported
all possible aid to the Allies were concerned lest the move
toward isolattonism ended their chance for such a plank.

Many

Republican leaders believed that Roosevelt had given the G.O.P.
the cue to become strictly a "peace party."

It was also

17Felix Belair, Jr., "capital Surprised," N~ York. T!_~~'
June 21, 1940, p. 1.
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reported that since Willkie had been closely identified as an
interventionist, the party was not likely to nominate him
and that the candidacies of Taft and Dewey would probably be
enhanced by the furor following the announcement.18
Isolationists in the platform committee took the position that it was virtually mandatory that the conventj.on adopt
a non-interventionist plank; they began to work in that direction.19
The comments issued by Republican leaders pointed out
the fact that opinion of the appointments varied--they had not
been universally condemned--and that several G.O.P. leaders
used the controversy as a propanganda vehicle directed to the
rank and file of both parties, as well as to the delegates
assembling at the convention:
sorr~

Mac Nider declared that he was

to hear of Knox and Stimson's departure from the G.O.P.

to the war party; former Senator David Reed of Pennsylvania
stated that he wished Roosevelt had filled all the other positions with Republicans and then resigned himself; Halleck
asserted that the appointments made

~iillkie

the logical candi-

date; former Senator Walter E. Edge of New Jersey stated that
the President got a couple of good men to strengthen his
Cabinet; and David Ingalls stated that since they had not

Party,"

18James A. Hagerty, "Stimson and Knox Dismvned by
~e..:~ York Times, June .21, 1940, p. 1.
19rbld.
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consulted any Republican leaders before accepting the positions, they could no longer be considered Republicans. 20
The candidates, and potential candidates, were more
careful in their comments.

Hoover declared that the appoint-

ments were of no par•ticuiar importance to the race for .the
nomination or to the election.

Dewey stated that the appoint-

ments held the gravest implications for the nation's
future, for the taking of two interventionists into the
Cabinet could only be interpreted as a direct step toward war;
and, according to Dewey, Roosevelt took the step in order to
..

protect himself from the political consequences of failing to
prepare the nation's defenses. 21 Taft declared that the
appointments improved the Cabinet .. and surmised that Knox and
. Stimson had been apparently selected because of their interventionist sympathies.22

In answer to a question on the Knox-

Stimson acceptances .. Hillkie remarked that each conscientious
individual had to determine such things according to the
dictates of his own conscience. 2 3 Upon being informed of the
appointments Bridges stated that he was incapable of comment;
however, McNary stated that the appointees should make able
executives. 24
20 Ibid.
21 New ~ Times, June 21, 1940, p. 4.
23rbid.
2 2 rbid.
2 4Ibid.
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The President's bombshell had the immediate reaction in
a resurgence of isolationism; the platform makers were determined to make the G.O.P. the "peace party" in 1940.

This

resurgence, if it remained the dominant philosophy, would
practically eliminate Willkie as a candidate, or at least stop
his boom; however, the day after the announcement of the
Cabinet changes it was reported that Republican sentiment
favoring aid to the Allies had re.bounded and that the Willkie
boom had gathered nev1 strength. 2 5 It was also reported that
i

-

500 members of the Willkie-For-President clubs had arrived in

\

Philadelphia to convince the delegates that Wendell Willkie
was the only logical choice for the nomination and that the
delegates had been deluged by thousands of telegrams, letters,
and postal cards urging them a vote for lHillkie.

The growing

strength of the boom was evident even to those Republican

.

leaders who opposed his candidacy; they agpeed that he had
great "secondary strength," especially in New England, Ohio,
New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Indiana,
Minnesota, Colorado, Michigan, and even some in the South. 2 6
If the purpose of the President's appointments had been
to ha 1 t the vJilllc:i.e boom, it failed; hm•rever J if the purpose
had been to persuade the Republicans to entrench themselves
2 5New York Times, June 22, 191~0, p. 1
26 James A Hagerty, "Confusion Is Fading," New Jork
June 22, 1940, pp. 1,20. ·
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firmly in the isolationist camp, a position seemingly contrary
to public opinion, it appeared to have been partially successful.

It was reported that the individuals within the platform

committees favoring aid to the Allies were meeting rather stiff
resistance from groups planning to draft a definite declaration
against any American intervention in the European war.
committe~

The sub-

on national defense and foreign policy had postponed

consideration of these two important planks; however, it was
apparent that the showdown between the two groups would have to
occur sometime before the convention started.27
At the height of the controversy surrounding the appointments

th~

final Gallup Poll of Republican candidate popularity

was published, indicating several important developments.

The

.survey of G.O.P. voters shoHed that Dewey, while still in the
lead, had again lost ground to ltlillkie.

Of those Republicans

with opinions, 47 per cent favored Dewey, while 29 per cent now
supported Willkie.

Taft and Vandenberg received only 8 per

cent, a substantial decrease in popular support; and Hoover
gained to 6 per cent.

The poll also reported that 34 per cent

of G.O.P. voters had not yet made up the:l.r minds on the candidates; if this were true, then the race was far from settled.28
As the Vlillkle boom moved into the last days of the ·pre-

---------

2 7Turner Catledge, "War Planks Shift on Cabinet Change,"
New Yor~ Tim~~' June 21, 1940, p. 17.
28Nevi York 'I'imes, June 21, 19lJ.O, p. 17.
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convention maneuvering, enthusiasm for the utilities executive increased amoung the rank and file of the party and began
to infiltrate the ranks of the delegations; the boom would
soon challenge the politics of the convention.

III.

CONVENTION EVE

The arrival of the candidates in Philadelphia marked an
ihcrease in political activity, both outwardly and behind the
scenes.

While the

c~ndidates

gave speeches, held press con-

ferences, and made predictions, their supporters practice·d the
art of persuasion.
American political conventions

have~

throughout their

history, carried the stigma of "dirty politics" and political
"deals"--conventions of little people controlled by professional
politicians, the kingmakers of the parties.
leaders, candidates, and delegates

.

advance~

As the Republican
on Philadelphia,

no one actually knew what was going to happen.

Rumors of plots,

deals, svdtches, and combinations filled the conversations, but
there appeared to be no machine organization, group, or kingmaker pulling the strings or making the decisions.

In report-

ing the absence of leaders or groups of leade:r's, the Nevi
Times predicted a hotly

Yor~

fight both for the nomination
and the foreign policy plank of the platform. 2 9 There was to
~ontested

29James A•. Hagerty, "Convention Unbossed," New York
Times, June 23, 1940, p. 1.
-- ---

1-0
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be a battle for the nomination, and it began in earnest when
Dewey,

Willkie~

and Taft arrived on June 22.

As the three candidates arrived, they were met by their
enthusiastic supporters and members of the press.

All three

stated that they were in the race to stay, that they were not
engaged in any trades, and that they had no interest in any
job but the presidency.3°
In his press conference Dewey declared that he favored
sending "surplus" rna teria ls to the Allies and disapproved of
"exporting" warships since the United States only had one-half
of what they needed.

On the Stimson-Knox appointments Dev-tey

now stated he would, if he could, vote for the confirmation of
the appointments; he declared that the Republican party was big
enough for all viev-ts.

Commenting on the Willkie boom, Dewey

expressed admiration for the technical skill by which the boom
was started and perpetuated and asserted that he doubted that
the popular support had expressed itself into delegate votese3l
It was reported that Dewey's managers claimed from
400 to 450 first ballot votes, although other sources estimated
his strength to be about 350, and admitted that Dewey's chances
would be lessened if the balloting went beyond the third.3 2 It

3°warren Moscow, "Crowds Welcome 'Big Three' of Race,"
New York Times, June 23, 19!~0, p. 2.
31 Ibid.
32James A Hagerty, "Convention Unbossed," !:lew York
Times, June 23, 19!~0, p. 1.
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was also reported that Dewey's chances were jeopardized by two

\-

serious handicaps: he had begun his campaign very early and had
committed himself to a foreign policy
i~

w~ich

had been defensible

1939, but one which had become less so and less popular as

the European war progressed; and he had, by announcing his candidacy too early, made himself a target for coalition rivals.33
Regardless of his handicaps, Dewey was still the front runner,
both in popularity and in delegate strength, and generally
regarded as the man to beat.
Taft arrived late in the evening, too late to make the
headlines along with De\'Iey and Willkie; how.ever, it was
reported that Taft had made no formal declaration of his
strength, though it was beiieved that he had approximately 300
first ballot votes.

It was also reported that Taft's chance

for the nomination would come if and when he moved ahead of
Dewey on an early ballot; if Taft then failed, the dark horse
candidates would have a chance.

It was revealed that Dewey's

and Taft's managers realized the situation, but had formed no
combination or deal to prevent Willkie or any other dark horse
from securing the top spot on the ticket _3!1
Willkie's arrival was characterized by tremendous demon33nenis W. Brogan, The Era of Franklin D. Roosevelt: A
Chronicle of th~ New Deal and Globil War_, p. 293.
34James A. Hagerty, "Convention Unbossed," New York
------Times, June 23, 1940, p. 1.
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strations of public support.

He was mobbed by supporters upon

his arrival at the Bellevue-Stratford Hotel, and his remarks
were loudly applauded.

It was reported-that Willkie expected

no more than fifty to seventy first ballot votes; however, it
was generally believed that he held a great deal of support in
reserve, delegates who would come to his side after the early
ballots •. The delegates figures to switch were mainly from New
England, the Middle West, and some from the south.35
After his "press conference" Willkie visited two of the
four Willkfe headquarters which had been established in the
convention area.

As he walked through the-streets, he was

attended by a large crowd of his supporters and the curious;
again he held no formal press conference, but gave his views to
. reporters and to anyone who asked him.

ToW. L. Tooze, chair-

man of the Oregon delegation, Willkie declared that he favored
the principle of the reciprocal trade treaties because they had
been first advocated by G.O.P. statesmen, Presidents McKinley
and Taft.

He also declared that he favored all possible aid to

the Allies. without getting into the war.36
During this early period there was also some speculation
over the fate of certain favorite son candidates and the delegate strength they controlled. One such favorite son was

35rbid.
36warren Moscow, "Crowds ~'ielcome 'Big Three' of Ra.ce,"
New Y?rk Times, June 23, 1940, p. 2.
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Governor Arthur James of Pennsylvania, whose delegates were
controlled by oilman Joseph Pew.
and

admire~

Pew reportedly opposed Dewey

Willkie; however, it was·also reported that Pew

was concerned with Willkie 1 s vote-getting power in view of
his statements favoring aid to the Allies and the reciprocal
trade treaties.37
Another favorite son candidate with a great deal of support was Vandenberg, who had been mentioned as a presidential
possibility, but had not campaigned for the nomination.

He

stated in his diary that Willkie had come to him and had asked
ro'r his support; and, according to the Sena.tor, the tvw parted
good friends, but made no deal.

He also recorded that he had

been contacted by Dewey and had been offered the second position on the ticket for his support of Dewey's candidacy.
Vandenberg revealed that he had suggested that the two men flip
for the top place on the ticket and that De\lrey had not
replied _38

If the convention became deadlocked, the votes of the
favorite son delegations could be a determining factor in choosing the nominee.

Willkie 1 s supporters moved in on these dele-

gates, as well as the delegates committed to other candidates,
in or•der to persuade them to switch to \'llllkie.

To convince

them the vlillkie men stressed the candidate 1 s rapidly ri.sing

N~

37 Charles R. Michael, "James Candidacy called Important'"
York :!:imes, June 23, 191~0, p. 2.
38sarnes, 2£· cit., p. 175.
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percentage in the polls, the establishment of over 700 Willkie
Clubs and over 200 Willkie-For-President clubs, ana the efforts
of the 50,000 Volunteer Willkie Workers--all demonstrative of
their man's great public appea1.39

Another talking point

developed was that the men of wealth and influence who controlled the finances of the party actually preferred Willkie
and Hoover over Taft and Dewey and that Willkie had the greater
appeal of the two, especially with the non-professionals of the
party. ~0
Combating this surge for delegates, those seeking to
stop Willkie's drive for the nomination exhumed the arguments
used agalnst the candidate when his boom began.

They declared

that Willkie did not have sufficient delegate strength or
political machine, that he was a big businessman and utilities
executive, that he was an ex-Democrat, that he was a man with
Wall Street connections, and that he was in favor of aid to the
Allies and the reciprocal trade treaties--all of which, they
·maintained, guaranteed that he would be a poor candidate if
nomlnated.

They also pointed out that the course of the war

had made the third term attempt virtually certain and that no

39"campaigns: The Story of \tlendell Willkie, 11 Time,
36:16, June 24, 1940.
·
.. - - 40charles Malcolmson, "Rites for the G.O.P.," The £la~_2£,
150:748, June 22, 1940.

,-
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businessman could match Roosevelt's appeal and glamour.41

In

addition, some party professionals reportedly opposed Willkie
because the amateurs running his campaign did not know or
recognize them and treated them in an offhanded manner. 42
Others opposed him because he was not an organization man, but
a political amateur.43
Willkie was a political novice, but he had reportedly
reached several delegations through "non-political" devices.
His headquarters imported pre tty young so cia lites to ansvfer
telephones

~nd

send messages, while other Willkie supporters

placed campaign literature into the delegates' laundry packages.44

Probably nowhere were Willkie's disarmingly non-

professional tactics more effective than in his statements to
the press and to the delegates whom he met.

On his arrival in

Philadelphia he told reporters, "Ask me any damn thing in the
world, and I'll answer it.

Nothing is off the record."45

During the tour of his headquarters, Willkie told reporters,
11

My campaign headquarters are in my hat.

Be sure to put it

4l"campaigns: The Story of Wendell Willkie," Time: 36:
16, June 24, 1940.
42 "The Sun Also Rises," Tim~, 36:12, July 8, 1940.
43Jonathan Mitchell, "How They Won with \Hllkie, 11 The
New ~epublic, 103:49, July 8, 1940.
44Mary Earhart Dillon, Wendell Willkie: 1~-191~~, p. 153.
45
.
Ibid_. , p • 13 9 •
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down that I'm having a swell time."46

To those who.asked about

his being an ex-Democrat and supporter of the New Deal in 1932,.
Willkie declared that if there were one thing he had done, it
was to fight the New Deal.47 To those who questioned his lack
of political experience in public office and his business
association, Willkie replied that he was proud of both his lack
of political experience and his business background. -8
The New York Times reported on June 24 that Governor
Raymond Baldwin of Connecticut had withdrawn from the race,
pledging the state's sixteen votes to Willkie; and it was also
r~vealed

that a bloc of New York delegates, led by Syracuse's

Mayor Rolland B. Marvin, had indicated they would support
Willkie.49

Despite these important gains, Willkie still needed

a lesson in practical politics.

Arthur Krock and Turner

Catledge came to Philadelphia to cover the convention for their
newspaper.

In the Willkie headquarters they were perplexed

by its amateurish character and by the fact that Willkie had
designated no floor leaders, those practical politicians who
knew convention strategy, how to get votes, and when to release
support.

Krock suggested that Willkie ask Governor Baldwin to

46"Gentleman from Indiana," Time,36:ll~, July 8, 1940.
47rbid.
48"G.O.P. Moves on Philadelphia to Pick the Man and
Issue," Newsweek, 15:31, June 24, 1940.
49Nel'-l_ York Times, June 24, 1940, p. 1.
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assist him in the capacity of floor manager, and Willkie asked

r

if Stassen wer•e available for the posj_ tion.

I

Krock told the

'

candidate that Stassen had indicated he-would not engage in any
convention activity.5°
In his column Krock revealed that vJillkie had not
appointed anyone to these important convention positions and
that it 90uld be too late to do much good because the other
candidates had liaison men and women in every delegation and
political floorwalkers in contact with the delegates.

Krock

declared that Willkie's campaign headquarters may have been in
his hat at one time, but that it was time to set up a strategy
committee--possibly including Baldwin, Stassen, Pryor, Simpson,
Marvin, and others who reportedly favored his candidacy.5l
On June· 23, the day before the convention was to begin,
it was reported that the first ballot strengths had not changed
after the week of political wheeling and dealing.

Dewey was

expected to have 350 votes on the ballot, with Taft receiving
275, Vandenberg eighty, James seventy-two, and others 163.

The

report also forecasted that after the second ballot Dewey would
lose ground to Taft and Willkie and that after the recess,
probably following the .third or fourth ballot, the fight would
be between Taft and Willkie.

It was predicted that the Willkie

50Dillon, op. P1~·, pp. 143-45.
5l.Arthur Krock, "Willkie 's Forces Seek Strategists_,"
New York Times, June 24, 1940, p. 1.

~
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forces would withhold from sixty to seventy votes on the first
ballot in order to show an increase on each ballot, to give the
illusion of a boom going up.52
Iri contrast to this picture of delegates and candidates
maneuvering and dealing for support and favors was the image
the convention presented to the public; outwardly, the conventio~

atmosphere differed little from any of its predecessors.

Samuel F. Pryor, Chairman of the Committee on Arrangements,
started the festivities by placing a huge metal badge with the
inscription "Official Mascot, Republican National Convention,
Philadelphia, June 24 11 on a seventeen-year-old elephant in the
city's zoo.53

Elephants again made the headlines when a forty-

two-yeal,-old elephant named Tizzie cUed in the Philadelphia
Zoo; Democratic papers declared they would look for further
signs of impending Republican doom.

Gannett imported three l:tve

elephants ana marched them through the streets.

Taft also dis-

played elephants, although his were of papier-mache.

Gannett

erected fifteen-foot pictures of himself, in color, and set up
a small theater in his headquarters to show campaign mov:l.es.
Taft also showed movies; however, both Taft and Gannett found
few callers for their epics.

All the campaign headquarters,

except Gannett's, formally served callers free liquor, an old

52James A. Hagerty, "Gains for Willkie, 11 New York 'J.1ime~,
June 24, 1940, p. 10.
53Ne~ York Times, June 8, 1940, p. 16.

159
and trusted campaign technique.

There were no peppy

ca~paign

songs; hov1ever, there were several slogans which aroused some
interest:

"Trust--in--Taft;" "Do It With Dewey;" "Gannett--

America's Best Bet;" and "Fan With Van," which was imprinted
on yellow fans.54
During the month of June the Willkie movement had continued
to "bleed'' support from the other candidates in spite of the
lack of delegate strength, the efforts of the "Stop-Willkie"
forces, and the apparent isolationist trend.

In the space of

twenty-three days Willkie's popular vote had increased from 10
per cent to 29 per cent in the Gallup Poll's sampling of G.O.P.
voters; the question as to whether this public support could be
translated into delegate votes was uppermost in the minds of
the candidates and their managers as the c6nvention opened.

54"conventi~n City," Time, 36:15-16, July 8, 191W.

1

CHAPTER Vl
THE REPUBLICAN CONVENTION
The outward optimistic attitude of the delegates, manifested in the slogans, elephants, and other symbols of convention "madness," was only a partial representation of the delegates' actual feelings because the prevailing sentiment at the
convention was that it was "the damnedest convention that ever
was. " 1 The 19!W Republican convention suffered from schizophrenia.

The delegates, on the one hand, expressed great opti-

mism and enthusiasm about the party's chances for 1940,
an attitude apparent in the parades, parties, speeches,
and other activities which characterized Philadelphia as the
.delegates and candidates prepared for the job at hand.

The

convention atmosphere was two-sided because the delegates also
exhibited attitudes of anger, hatred, and frustration.
The attitude of frustration resulted partially from the
general feeling among the
and

platfo~m

delegat~s

that unless the right man

were chosen, the party would again face defeat at

the hands of the Democrats.

Frustration also developed over

F.D.R. 's third term decision; he had not announced
his

cand~dacy,

coupled

~Ii

nor had he promoted a successor.

This,

th the chaotic interna tiona 1 situation, led many

--·---111

The Sun Also Rises," Time,
- 36:10, July 8, 1940. .

161
Republican leaders to the same conclusion which had been previously reported by the political pollsters--that F.D.R, if
he should choose to run in 1940, could sectwe the Democratic
nomination.

The G.O.P. leaders did not· relish the prospect of

facing the President for a third time, especially during a
period of international crisis.
Tpe fact that the President 1 s popularity was still high
and that the war in Europe had aroused deep feelings of anxiety
throughout the nation were certainly not conducive to any
feelings of optimism on the part of the delegates.

Both of

the front running candidates, Devvey and Taft, had expressed
near or outright isolationist foreign policy stands; and since
one of the two was expected to gain the nomination, the 1940
. campaign would presumably be fought on the basis of Republican
isolationism versus Democratic internationalism.

Having the

isolationist tag hung around their necks was something the
delegates did not at all relish.
Throughout the convention activities this split personality would manifest itself time and time again.

Outwardly, the

atmosphere and proceedings appeared to be those of a normal
convention; however, behind the scenes the Willkie candidacy
slowly overpowered the unbossed delegates; thci fear and
frustration of meeting Roosevelt during the crisis persuaded
the delegates to contribute to what has been called one of the
greatest upsets in American political history.

I.

,1!

THE FIRST DAY

The convention was called to order at 11:43 A.M. on June
24, 1940, by National Committee Chairman Hamilton.

During the

afternoon session the convention machinery was established and
in the evening Governor Stassen delivered the keynote address.
,c__-----!Ttre-ea-ri y

::re-s-s1.-on-mov~d-w±th-pi..,B-c-1-s-±on-;--s-e-l--e-c-t-ec1-c1elega-t-e-s-v'l-i-t-h------

prepared· motions were recognized by the chairman, and all moves
were unanimously approved.
the galleries were quiet. 2

During this business-like session

While these procedural activities were being carried out,
the candidates and their managers vied with one anothe:t• for
delegate support.

William Allen White reported that twenty-one

Congressmen from the Northwest had met and denounced vallkie
for his reciprocal trade views; hO\'iever, \lfhlte. added that the
movement would not mean much because it was the first Republican·
convention in forty years in which the leaders had lost control.
He revealed that the revolt against the bosses was manifest-Pew reportedly would lose fourteen delegate votes from his
delegation; and Landon and Martin would face some difficulty
keeping their delegates in line.

White also stated that a poll

of the delegates revealed that seventy per cent favored aid to
the Allies, but that the platform committee feared the proposition and had adopted a meaningless, straddling plank on the
2

Ne~

York

Tim~,

June 25, 1940, p. 16.

important issue.3
It was also reported that forty Republican Representatives and some Senators

~ad

started a "block-Willkie'' movement

to halt his growing boom and that supporters of the other
candidates had joined in the move.

If the group succeeded in

would recieve delegate support from sources heitherto not for
him.

Senator McNary declared that the Western States would

not support Willkie and predicted that when the balloting
began, his boom would decline as quickly as it had risen. 4
Willkie and his political strategists did not take any
action on·.the blocking attempts, preferring to evaluate the
effect of the attack, but

continu~d

to gather support.

The

candidate told reporters that he had made gains in the Southwest and that he would get seventeen Pennsylvania votes.

He

also announced that Governor Carr of Color.ado would deliver one
of his seconding speeches and would be a floor leader.

In

addition, it was reported that some Willkie supporters had
attempted to get Gannett to withdraw from the race to give
Willkie additional anti-Dewey votes and that Willkie had gained
support in the New Jersey and Massachusetts delegations.5

.
3william Allen White, "Republicans Act 'Like Democrats',"
New York ~:!:_m~~' June 25, 1940, p. 16.
4 James A. Hagerty, "Convention Opens," r..~w York Tim~~'
June 25, 1940, pp. 1,16o
5 Ibid • , p • 16 •
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During this first day# Dewey's managers declared that
their candidate would receive 400 votes on the first ballot
and more on the second.

Vandenberg# Willkie, and Taft made no

predictions, although Taft's vote was figured to be from 275 to
300. 6
At 10:00 P.M. Stassen delivered the keynote address in
which he drew a parallel between the Roosevelt administration
and the pre-war leadership in England and France and indicated
there was a necessity of real and not paper preparedness for
na tiona 1 defense.

He denounced the New Deal as ineffecti.ve in

its attempt to revive industry and reduce unemployment, declaring that a big stick was needed in Washington, not a big noise.
Concerning the Knox-Stimson appointments, Stassen remarked that
by going to the Republican party for these men Roosevelt had
confessed his failure in preparing the nation for defense.
Stassen received a standing ovation when he declared that no
one who believed in Communism, Fascism, or Nazism should be
permitted on the government payroll.7

Stassen defined the

foreign policy straddle of the platform by declaring that the
plank was pro-peace, but not pro-Hitler, and indicated that the
foreign policy plank advocated all possible aid to the Allies,
short of war. 8 To nip an appeasement charge in the bud,

6 Ibid., pp. 1,16.
B:sarne s, op. cit., p. 181.

7Ibid., p. 1.

Stassen declared that the Republican party wanted an adequate
air force, anti-aircraft defense, tanks and anti-tank weapons,
ample navy and costal defenses, and bases strategically located
in the hemisphere.9
Before the address John Cowles and Raymond Clapper had
worked diligently to obtain Stassen s support for the Willkie
cause, but the Minnesota Governor had refused to talk to the
candidate until after he had delivered the keynote address.
At 1:00 A.M., on June 25, the Cowles brothers, Stassen, and
Willkie met to discuss the situation.

Stassen indicated that

he would support Willkie if he could be his floor manager, to
insure that no mistakes would be made.

No other deal was made,

although Stassen did state that he might be around for a return
favor; Willkie replied that he would be glad to help him.lO
C. Nelson Sparks, Gannett's campatgn manager, later
charged that T. W. Lamont had purchased Stassen's support
through John Cowles; Cowles issued a strong denial of the
charge. 11 Stassen declared that he had joined the \Hllkie camp
because of the candidate's strong foreign polic_y stand and his
strong press support.l2

9"GOP .Convention Aligns Party for Its Most Vital campaign," Newsweek, 16:28, July 1, 1940.
1

~rnes, op. E~t., p. 182.
11 Ibid.' p. 184.
12 .
Dillon, £1?..· cit., pp. 147-1.18.
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.

Aside from the keynote address, there were few significant events occurring during the first day.

Outwardly, the

convention conducted merely routine business; behind the scenes
there was little change in the over-all activity as the
supporters of the various candidates attempted to build up
delegate strength for their men and to destroy that committed
or leaning toward his rivals.

This activity would continue

into the second day of the convention, intensifying as the
Willkie boom grew in strength.
II.

THE SECOND DAY

On the second day of t11e convention the delegates heard
an address by former President Herbert Hoover, an address which
earned him the cheers of the delegates and galleries and revived
talk of his candidacy.

Behind the scenes the managers continued

to plan and plot as the flood of telegrams and letters demanding Willkie's nomination started to pile up and as it became
more and more apparent that the convention Has unbossed.
Early in the day the platform committee re-opened the
drafting of the foreign policy plank, and the conflict between
the isolationst and internationalist wings of the party continued.

It was reported that the committee, led by the group

opposing any interventionist declaration, revrrote the plank to
assert that the G.O.P. stood for Americanism, preparedness, and
peace and that the Democrats represented unpreparedness and
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tactics leading to war. 1 3

This report appeared to be in dis-

agreement with Stassen's comment in his keynote address coneerning the character of the plank; there was a great deal of
confusion over the nature of the party's foreign policy stand.
The most significant event of the day was Hoover's
address.

The delegates and galleries rose and cheered the

ex-president as he entered the auditorium and again as he was
introduced by Joseph Martin, Jr., the Convention Chairman.
In his address Hoover covered a number of points concerning
both domestic and foreign policy.

In his discussion of the

former he declared that for the first time in 150 years the
United States had suffered a decrease in national income and
wealth and that one-third of the nation's people were still
frozen to poverty.

He stressed the issue that the national

debt had long since passed the danger point and attacked the
New Deal's currency policies; however, he received the greatest
reaction from the audience on the subjects of the third term
and foreign policy.

Hoover advocated that the United States

should give all possible aid to the nations fighting for freedom, providing the United States did not become involved in the
fighting.

Concerning the reciprocal trade issue, he declared

that such treaties would not be feasible in a world where
nations needed to become self-sufficient in order to survive.
1 3James A. Hagerty, "Hoover Challenge," New York 'rimes,
J'une 26, 1940, p. 1.
-- --- ·

---~------~--
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Hoover declared that the third term attempt not only violated
American tradition, but also the principle of restraint on the
centralization of

po~er

in this nation, and he delivered a

'-'
--~

challenge to the delegates by expressing his willingness to
again meet Roosevelt in a battle of ballots.

Hoover was given

an ovation at the conclusion of his address, and it appeared
that he had made his bid for the nomination; however, no one
knew just how strong his support was at that time. 14
It was reported that Hoover's address had given new hope
to his supporters and that a boom for his candidacy had
started.

The grmvth of the Hoover boom reportedly had caused

the other candidates in the race a good deal of worry; however,
the Dewey camp indicated that the "lack of enthusiasm" for
Hoover had greatly increased Dewey's chances for the nomination
because it was felt in many quarters that Hoover preferred
Taft to Dewey.

Dewey's managers also revealed that they would

throw their full strength into the first two ballots instead
of attempting to show a gradual increase on each ballot.l5
There was a difference of opinion between the reporters covering the convention and the Dewey campaign man?gers, for each
side tended to see the popular reaction to Hoover's address in
a different light.

---------------14

Ibid., pp. 1,16.

l5James A. Hagerty, "Hoover Challenge," New York Ti~,
June 26, 1940, p. 16.

The most persistent

l'1 umor

during the second day was that

Dewey and Taft would join forces to stop the Willkie boom,

but it was also reported that the merger would be ineffective
as long as Dewey insisted on gaining the nomination for the
presidency or nothing.

In add:t tion, Dewey declared to the

press that he could not find where "ltlillkie had made any inroads
on his

p~edged

delegates; however, several New York delegates

revealed that they had received telegrams from financial
leaders indicating that the G.O.P. could expect ample campaign
funds if Willkie were the nominee and nothing if Dewey won the
nomination.l6
Perhaps the most interesting behind the scenes news of the
second day was revealed in Vandenberg's press conference.

He

declared that a large segment of the delegates were "shopping
around" in an attempt to learn the stands of the various candidates on problems relating to foreign affairs.

Vandenberg also

related that his situation had improved within the preceding
twenty-four hours, but he decllned to offer a prediction of his
strength.l7

The ''shopping around" report seemingly verified

earlier reports that the convention was unbossed and unruled;
in such a situation nothing could be certain.

It was toward

this group of undecided, unbossed delegates that the Willkie
16 charles vl. Hurd, "Candidates View Hoover as Threat,"
New ~Times, June 26, 1940, p. 18.
1 7Ibid.
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supporters directed their efforts.
Willkie told reporters that he had seen more than 600
of the 1000 delegates and had gained
these personal contacts.

co~siderable

support from

He declared that Senator Bridges had

told him that if he could not get the nomination, he would
rather see V.Iillkie get it than anyone else .18 Willki.e also
stated that he had favored the reciprocal trade treaties since
their inception and that he had made public statements to that
effect; however, he indicated to the newsmen that the victories
in Europe had created a new world and conditions never before
faced by the world and that the treaties were no longer an
important issue--the United States had to deal with live
problems, not dead ones,

He repeated that he had not changed

his position on the treaties.l9
The Willkie boom, aside from picking up delegate support,
continued to attract prominent politicians.

Besides those

previously indicated--Pryor, Simpson, Barton, Vanderbilt, carr,
Baldwin, Stassen, and Marvin--Chairman Hamilton, who was not
supposed to support any candidate, joined the movement. 2 0

In

order to familiartze the delegates with the candidate and his
v~ews,

these politicians, Willkie's floor leaders and strategy

planners, brought up twelve delegates at a time to meet and.
1 8rbia.

19New_ York Times, June 26, 19LIO, p. 18.
20
Dillon, op . .2!!·' p.1ll7.
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discuss issues with the candidate.21

He answered questions

straightforwardly; for example, he stated during one of these
conversations that although he had fought the Tennessee Valley
Authority, he, if elected, would not attempt to tear it Clown.22
Those delegates who were shopping around for a candidate to
support found in Willkie a man who was not afraid to state his
opinions.

Willkie's strategists not only attempted to reach the

delegates through personal contact with the candidate, but they
also launched an over-powering propaganda campaign to "assist"
the undecided delegates in making up their minds.
During the first two days the delegates were cornered
by strangers who demanded that they vote for Willkie; were
sent hometown newspapers which carried advertisements and
editorials favoring Willkie's candidacy; were subjected to the
gallery chants of "We Want \'lillkie;" and were deluged with
telegrams from wives, friends, pastors, banks, and interested
citizens calling for them to Sltpport Willk.ie .23

The petitions,

telegrams, postal cards, and letters were addressed to the
delegates personally; however, the entire procedure of obtaining, sorting, and delivering the endorsements was administered
by Willkie's supporters.24
21Ibid., p. 149.
22Barnes, oR· cit., p. 18o.
23 11 'J.1he Sun Also Rises, 11 Time, 36:12, July 8, 1940.
2llBarnes, OP._. cit., pp. 178,185.
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The delegates, both those who had made up their minds
and those who were still undecided, were subjected to the
propanganda barrage.

The advertising men working for Willkie

used their skills to sell Willkie to the delegates.
III.

THE THIRD DAY

The agenda for the third day contained two major events
of the convention: the presentation of the platform and the
nominating speeches.

The platform had been uppermost in the

minds or many delegates because of the confusion over the
structure of the foreign policy plank and the fight between
the isolationists and internationalists on the committee drafting the plank.

The nominating speeches, demonstrations, and

seconding speeches were likewise awaited with anticipation;
for their reception by the delegates would indicate, to some
degree, the comparative strengths of the candidates.
While the delegates and the nation awaited these two
major events, the candidates and their strategists moved to
maintain their holds on the committed delegates and to capture
the doubtful votes.

Throughout the day, various delegations

held caucuses to determine stands, analyze events, and plan
strategy.

All through the day the flood of telegrams and

letters advocating \llillkie 's nomination continued to pour into
Philadelphia .to be delivered to the delegates concerned.

In

addition, there were many rumors circulating throughout the
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auditorium that new efforts were being made to halt the Willkie
boom and that Hoover would spearhead such a move.
rumors was the fact that Taft,

Vandenbe~g,

Feeding the

Bricker, and James

had each visited Hoover; but none of the individuals
·mentioned offered any other reason for the meeting other than
it had been a social call.

Another anti-Willkie force at work

was Frank Gannett, who declared in a press conference that the
convention should nominate a Republican for the presidency.25
It was also reported that no negotiations had been held
for a Dewey-Taft deal because both candidates believed they
possessed an excellent chance to capture

t~e

nomination.

The report also revealed that neither candidate could
"deliver" enough delegates to carry out a dea1.26
The talk of deals and counter-deals was not the only
manifesta tton of the grO\'ling pressure building up at the convention.

The anger and crittcism which greeted the first

important item of business of the day, the presentation
of the platform, stimulated a great deal of discussion as.to
the "proper" candidate to run on the
'l1he

Republic~

19~0

Republican Platform.

Platform

The platform was received with little applause and much
25Lawrence E. Davies, "candidates Gird for Final Battle,"
New York Times, June 27, 1940, p. 1. [Italics mine_J
.
26James A. Hagerty, "A Night of Speeches," Net>l York Times,
June 27, 1940, p. 4.
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criticism.

The party leaders felt that in order to achieve

victory in the November election the platform had to indicate
accurately the party's position on the issues of the day.
There were, however, two factors which made this task
·impossible: the immense popularity of the New Deal and the
tense international situation.

The committee had to decide

which, if any, of the New Deal measures the G.O.P. should
favor retaining and which to condemn.

It was to be a very

difficult task.
The Resolutions Committee had used as the basis for
the platform the 35,000-word report by Dr. Glenn Frank, and
had met in the North Garden of the Bellevue-Stratford
Hotel a week before the convention began to put the platform
into final form for presentation to the delegates.

They had,

in addition to preparing an acceptable platform, the toughest
problem faced by the party in twenty-four·years--the drafting
of the foreign policy plank. 2 7 In attempting to work out the
plank, the committee went into fourteen-hour se ss:i.ons; however,
the task of attempting to satisfy the isolationist wing of the
party without offending those who favored aid to the Allies was
an impossible one. 2 8
There were three courses of action open to the committee
2 7"campaigns: The Story of Wendell Willkie," Time, 36:18,
June 24, 1940.
-28"The Trumpets Blow," Time, 36:17, July 1, 1940.
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in formulating the difficult plank.

In the first place, they

could denounce the President as a warmonger and go into the
1940 campaign entrenched in the isolationist camp; however,
this position would have embarrassed those members of the
party who had endorsed the administration's foreign policy,
. either wholly or partially.

The second course of action was

to support Roosevelt's position--all measures, short of war,
to assist the Allies and all measures to promote national
defense; however, by taking this position the party would have
to repudiate support from the isolationists and would have
to forget that a large measure of the reasponsibility for the
weak state of the national defense system rested with certain
isolationist Republican Congressmen who had opposed administration defense measures before the international situation had
become critical.

The last course of action was a compromise

stand; however, this position would satisfy no one and would
alienate all factions concerned.29
The platform as a whole, and the foreign policy plank in
particular, was received better by the delegates than by the
press.

Perhaps the delegates realized that the nominee which

they would select on the following day would utilize only those
planks which he considered useful or desirable in his campaign.
The delegates, being politically wise, perhaps thought that it

. 2 9charles Malcolmson, "Rites for the GOP," f'he Nation,

150:748, June 22,

19~·0.
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would not be good politics to criticize publicly all or part
of the platform when it was presented to the assembled delegates.

Another possible explanation for the delegates' calm·

reaction could have been a desire to get the platform
accepted, so that the nomination procedure could be
started; the speeches and the balloting were probably far more
interesting to the delegates than the re-opening of the
fight between the isolationist and internationalist factions
of the party or of the arguments for and against the New Deal
domestic policies.

Had these arguments been voiced, perhaps

the party would not have been subjected to.the abuse which
they were to receive.

It would be difficult to access the

damage, if any, this criticism would have on the party's image
among the electorate.3°
~reported

that the platform presented a foreign

policy based on a "somersaulting weasel,rr31 and ~sweek told
its readers that Landon had lost his fight to prevent the party
from adopting an inelastic keep-out-of-war plank.

Concerning

the platform as a whole, the magazine stated that "seldom has
a pblitical platform been so watered down with vague generallities and evasions."3 2 The Nat~<?E. declared, "There are more

3°see APPENDIX C for Summarization of Platform.
31 "1'he Sun Also Rises," Time, 36:12, July 8, 1940.
32 "Voters' Drafting of Willkie Like Shot in the Arm to
U.S.," Newsweek, 16:15, July 8, 1940.

.----------
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half-truths, juggled figures, and stacked cards in this report
than we can attempt to set straight in this editorial."33
Life stated that the platform rehashed all the 1936 criticisms
of the New Deal, then supported almost all the things the New
Deal had done, promising vaguely to do them better.

The

foreign policy plank, according to Life, was neither isolation1st or interventionist, nor halfway between, but both at the
sa me time. 34
Stefan Lorant reported that the G.O.P. had adopted a
platform which an eminent historian, not named, had called
"a masterpiece of equivocation, evasion, ambiguity and genera 1ization," with a straddling foreign policy plank pledging the
country to "Americanism, preparedness and peace," and promising the democratic victims of aggression "such aids as shall
not be in violation of international law or inconsistent with
the requirements of our own national defetlse."35
Donald Bruce Johnson explained the poor reception of the
platform in terms of the following three observations: first,
the platform did not represent the true picture of G.O.P.
opinion throughout the party; second, the American public
realized that the campaign would be waged over much less broad

1940.

33"Frank but Not Candid," The ~ation, 150:326, March 9,
34"Life on Newsfronts," Life, 9:20, July 8, 1940.

35stefan Lorant, The Presidency: A Pictorial !'Iist<:>TJL of
Presidential ~lections from ~aspington to Truman, p. 623.
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principles than the management of Roosevelt's reform programs;
and third, the Republican party did not appear to be cognizant
of the changing political significance of the European war and
the growing importance of foreign affairs policies.36
Another explanation concerning the formation of the
foreign policy plank was reported by Newsweek.

According to

this theory, Roosevelt had sanctioned the use of American
flyers to pilot planes to Halifax; had outlined a plan to draft
the nation's youth; had sounded out friendly Congressmen on the
possibility of declaring war on Germany and Italy; and had
named Stimson and Knox, two avowed interventionists, to the
cabinet--all measures designed to force the Republicans to
draft a platform too isolationist for the country to swallow.37

The most comprehensive analysis of the platform was that
of a New

Yor~

Times editorial of June 27; it was the only true

analysis, showing both the assets and liabilities of the platform.

The editorial stated that although the current inter-

national situation was moving too rapidly for anyone to
reasonably expect an explicit and forthright statement of
foreign policy from either political party, the country had a
right to expect a less politically minded approach to the

3 6nonald Bruce Johnson, The Republican ?arty_ and Wendell
WilHcie, p. 43.
37ua 0 P Convention Aligns Party for Its Most Vital
Campaign., u Newsweek, 16:27, July 1, 1940.
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problem than the declaration that the Republican party stood
for Americanism, preparedness, and peace and that the Democratic party had to bear full responsibility for the country's
unpreparedness and for the consequent danger of involvement in
war.

The editorial declared that the argument did not stand

examination, that the G.O.P. was not entitled to claim for
itself superior virtue in preparedriess in light of the fact
that a majority of its spokesmen in the Senate had opposed
measures to provide 6,000 new planes for the Army, an increase
in the battleship strength of the Navy, and the acquisition by
both services of strategic war materials.

The paper stated

that the party could not call itself the "peace party" when
the record showed that its representatives for twenty years
opposed a system of collective security, the only institution
that could have saved the peace of the modern world.

Concern-

ing the aid to the Allies statement, the editorial expressed
agreement in principle, but indicated that it was regrettable
that the platform had not made the distinction between democratic and totalitarian belligerents clear, and that no mention
was made of Britain's heroic stand or of the fact that our
future secu.rity rested in her seapower.

Also stressed in the

editorial was the fact that the domestic sections of the platform had not escaped the effort of the platform committee to
conciliate every section and avoid or treat with ambiguousness
the questions on which opinion within the party was divided.

-----~~-~---···
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The Time's summation of the platform indicated that the
document was more vigorous, sound, and outspoken than there
seemed reason to hope for, that it made a true and telling
i..:!
~~

indictment of many of the Nev.r Deal domestic policies--the
President's power to manipulate. currency, the repea 1 of the
Thomas Inflation Amendment and the Silver Purchase Act, the
reform in the relief program, the revision in the Securities
Act, the reduction of government competition--that the agriculture plank was vague, and that the plank on the tariff
satisfied G.O.P. die-hards at the least sacrifice of common
s~nse,

policy~

leaving the candidate free to follow an enlightened
The editorial closed with the statement that the

party, under a fOl"thright leader standing on tb.e platform,
could not fairly be -accused of lacking a p~ogram.3 8
As the editorial pointed out, there were several outstanding features of the platform; however, it would have been
difficult to convince a
this "enlightened" view.

m~jority

of the press or the nation of

Democrats rid:i.culed the ambiguous-

ness of the platform; Republican conservatives denounced
the acceptance of the new Deal reform programs; and Republican
liberals condemned the foreign policy plank.

The delegates_,

popular acceptance, or rejection, of their platform; with the

38"The Republican Platform," a New York Times Edi toria 1,
June 27, 1940, p. 22.
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type of candidate needed to carry the party's program to the
people; and with the confusion

~nd

furor surrounding the

party's foreign policy stand.

These concerns were temporarily

set aside as the convention readied itself for the main event,
the nomination of the candidate.
~Nominations

Beg n

The last order of business on the third day was
the placing of Dewey, Gannett, Taft, and
nomination.

Willk~e's

names in

The nominating and seconding speeches and the

demonstrations which followed reflected, to a degree, each
candidate's popularity with the delegates and galleries.
John Lord O'Brian entered Dewey's name in nomination,
but the demonstration which followed was disappointing to
his supporters.

In his speech O'Brian traced .Dewey's career

as a racket-buster and recounted his vote-getting ability, but
he and the candidate's managers had been caught flat-footed in
arrangements for the demonstration.

They had not expected

Dewey's name to be placed in nomination so early, and
many of his supporters had not reached the auditorium.39

The

lack of bands in the hall detracted from the usual color of the
demonstration; however, there was a great deal of shouting and
cheering, and standards from at least twelve states joined in

39James A. Hagerty, "A Night of Speeches," New York
Times, June 27, 1940, p. 1.
-------
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the parade.4°
Gannett's name was placed in nomination by Representative James W. Wadsworth of New York, who characterized his
candidate as a successful businessman and a victor in a fight
with the New Deal.

Gannett's demonstration was hampered by

the lack of any considerable number of delegates, and the
spectators who attempted to demonstrate were not permitted on
the floor. 41
Grove Patterson, edj_;t;or of The Toledo B'lade, delivered
T~ft's

nominating speech, in which he stated that the critical

international situation demanded a candidate who possessed the
equipment for leadership and that Taft's ability, education,
training, and experience qualified him for the nomination.
The demcinstration which followed was

bette~

organized than the

previous two, but the lack of bands again appeared to take
some of the enthusiasm out of the parade.4 2 On signal the
delegates participating in the demonstration jumped to their
feet with placards, balloons, and standards; and a cheering
section began shouting lf\\fe Want Taft."

Instead of allowing the

"pandemonium" die down gradually, Taft's managers cut i.t · off,
40 charles w. Hurd, "Candidates' Nominations Cheered in
Lively Night Session," New~ f'il!l~' June 27, 1940, p. 2.
41James A. Hagerty, "A Night of Speeches," New. :xork Times,
June 27, 1940, pp. 1,4.

42~., p. 4.

a move which was very effective.43
Willkie's name was put in nomination by Representative
Charles Halleck of-Indiana, who departed from the traditional
rules of nominating speeches to make a fighting address in
which he virtually dared the convention to break precedent and
nominate Willkie.44

The reaction to the speech demonstrated a

differenpe of opinion over Willkie's candidacy, for there was
booing from the floor and cheering from the galleries. 45
Halleck began the speech with the following statement:
If anyone were to ask me what job in this convention I'd like best to have I would choose the job I've
got right now, I'd say I want to place in nomination
before this great independent body the name of the nex4
President of the United States, Wendell Lewis Willkie. 6
In the speech Halleck declared that 1:Jillkie was a man who understood business, labor, and agriculture and that he would never
make a deal to sell one of them out.

To emphasize this point

Halleck stated that " ••• it will be better to have a public
utility President than a President who has no public utility."47

43sidney M. Shalett, "Delegates Get Their Inning as Nominating Ora.tory and Demonstrations Begin," !i,e~'/ York !_im.~~, June
27, 1940, p. 3.
44charles W. Hurd, "Candidates' Nominations Cheered in
Lively Nig.ht Session,"~ York Times, June 27, 1940, p. 2.
45"The Sun Also Rises," Time, 36·:13, July 8, 1940.
46charles A. Halleck, "vJendell \nllkie--A t.J!an Big Enough
to Be President,n Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol VI, July 15~
191W, pp. 586-87.
--- -47 Ibid., p. 587.

··~~-

He put forth Willkie as t6e man to fight the totalitarian
threat, to preserve the competitive system, to free the
country from the depression, and to build the greatest defense
system in the world.

Halleck declared that Willkie could win

and that all America would back him.48
. Before the delivery of the speech Halleck had wavered,
and several of Willkie's managers were not sure that he would
go through with it; Halleck wanted no part of the project if
Willkie's candidacy proved to be unpopular.

He had made no

. arrangements for the Indiana delegation to lead off the demonstration, the customary procedure for the candidate's home
state.49

The Willkie demonstration did get started, although

fewer placards and standards were in evidence compared to
Taft's or Dewey's demonstrations; and the galleries joined in
with loud choruses of

11 \~e

Want Willkie. u50

'l1he

demonstration

was also marked by several fights over control of state
standards.

Mayor Marvin and several other Willkie men in the

New York delegation fought five Dewey men for control of the
state's standard; and in the Virginia delegation the state's
standard first went up, then down.

The demonstration lasted

48!bid., pp. 588-89.
4gDillon,

££· cit., p. 159.

50sidney M. Shalett, "Delegates Get The:i.r Inning as
Nominating Oratory and Demonstrations Begin," £!~~York f'.~·.l!l~E._,
June 27, 1940, p. 3.

for twenty minutes and ended when the police moved in to
break up the fights.5 1
The seconding speeches for Willkie's nomination were
made by Representative Bruce Barton of New
Ralph Carr of
Connecticut~

Colorado~

that

Taft~

Govenor

Governor Raymond Baldwin of

and Anne Stuart of Minnesota.

the delegates were

York~

quiet~

The galleries and

and it appeared to many observers

on the basis of his

demonstration~

had captured

the nomination.52
After the session Colonel R. B.
the Texas delegation and a Taft floor

Creager~
leader~

a member of

declared that

the Committee on Arrangements had packed the g·alleries with
Willkie supporters.

Investigations disclosed that the com-

. mittee headed by Samuel Pryor had issued thousands of special
admission
only.

tickets~

which were good for the June 26 session

Creager claimed that Pryor had issued the tickets;

however~

the latter could not be reached for comment at the

time.53

As the time for balloting approached, the campaign-

ing had be.come more intense; the pressure was building.
IV.

THE FOURTH

DAY

On the fourth day of the convention the delegates accom-

5lnrrhe Sun Also Rises, 11 Time, 36:13, July 8, 1940.
52 Ibid.
53New York Times, June 27, 19J.W, p. 3.
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plished their major duty, the nomination of the party's 1940
standard bearer.

Through the first three ballots Willkie

trailed Dewey and Taft, and through the next three ballots
the situation was reversed as the appeal of the Willkie candidacy continued to grow and win converts from the delegates; on
the sixth ballot the appeal snowballed and gave Willkie the
nomination.
Earl,y on the fourth day Iowa's MacNider was placed in
nomination by Verne Marshall, editor of

~

Cedar

Rapid~

Gazette; Michigan's Vandenberg by Representative Roy
Woodruff;

!~lew

o.

Hampshire's Bridges by Representative Foster

Stearns; OI•egon 's McNary by W1lliam A Ehwall; Pennsylvania's
James by Senator James J. Davis; and South Dakota's Bushfield
by Gladys Pyle, the first woman to deliver·a nominating
speech.54

The convention adjourned at.2:50 P.M., to reconvene

at 4:30 P .. M.55
At 4:50 P.M. the fight began as Alabama cast seven votes
for De;.'ley and six for Taft.
the~

The political experts felt assured

knew the eventual outcome of the first ballot, and they

were fairly confident of the second.

They reasoned that Dewey

would receive approximately 377 votes on the first ballot, with
Taft picking up about 250 and Willkie getting about 100.

On the

5 4 charles vl. Hurd, "Crucial IJ'est for Presidential Candidates Began in Balloting at Night Session," Ne\v York 1'1mes,
June 28, 1940, p. 3.
55u~'he Sun Also Rises," Time, 36:13, July 8, 1940.
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second ballot 1 it was reasoned, Dewey would slip a little;:
Taft would increase his vote to 300 1 and Willkie would get up
to 150.

The experts, in their predicticns, believed that.

after the second ballot, it would be anyone's battle.56

The

first two ballots did proceed according to "plan;" however 1
the experts soon realized that they had over-estimated Dewey's
and Taft.'s strength and had under-estimated Willkie 's.
On the first ballot Dewey received 360 votes, trailed
by Taft with 189, Willkie with 105, Vandenberg with 76,

~mes

with 74, Martin with 44 1 Gannett with 35, MacNider with 34,
Hoover with 17, and McNary with 13.
at the results; the galleries were
every Willkie vote.57

The Taft men were shocked
delighted~

and they cheered

In the balloti~g Willkie had received

.votes from twenty-four states, including all of Connecticut's
sixteen, nine from Indiana, and eight from New York.5 8
On the second Ballot Dewey dropped to 338; Taft gained
to 203 1 and Willkie increased to 171.

Willkie had picked up

a few votes from the Pennsylvania delegation and had votes
scattered in twenty-six delegations, including nine votes from
Maine, eight from Massachusetts, and thirteen from Missouri.
Of the other candidates, only Hoover showed an increase.
56 Ibid.
57Ibid., pp. 13;.,14.
, 5f\~evr York r.I.'in~~' June 28, 1940, p. 4.

i'
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Vandenberg dropped to 73 1 Gannett to 30, James to 66, McNary
to 10 1 and Martin to 26; MacNider held on to this 34, and
Hoover gained to 21.59

The convention adjourned at

6:50 P.M.1 to reconvene at 8:30 P.M.60
During the recess floor managers worked to strengthen
their lines and to persuade favorite son supporters and others
to swith their votes.

States held caucuses in hideaways all

about the auditorium.

It was reported that, despite appeals

from Willkie and Taft men, Kansas had resolved to support
Dewey on the third ballot and that Pennsylvania had decid.ed to
stay with James.

The Willkie forces reportedly had made a

great many converts within the New York delegation during the
recess; however, Taft appeared to be the candidate to beat.6 1
On the third ballot Willkie picked up steadily all along
the line.

New Hampshire's delegation was released by Bridges,

and six delegates went over to Willkie; Massachusetts was
released by Martin with the same results--t\<Ienty-·eight voted
for Willkie, and the galleries went wild.

New York split,

and twenty-seven delegates joined the Willkie forces; fifteen
Pennsylvania delegates left James and took the same route.62
59rbid.
60 "The Sun Also Rises," Time, 36:14, July 8, 1940.
6lTurner ca.tledge, "Republicans Nominate Wendell Willkie
for the Presidency on the 6th Ballot," Ne\'1 York Time~, June 28 1
1940, p. 5.
62nillon, op. c~., p. 161.

On the ballot Willkie received votes from thirty-four states
and picked up, in addition to those mentioned above, Arizona's
six, Delaware's six, and ten from Maryland.

The results

showed Dewey with 315, Willkie with 259, Taft with 212,
Vandenberg with 72, James with 59, Hoover with 32, MacNider
with 28, Gannett with 11, and McNary with 10. 6 3

·--~~~~----------------------------

The fourth ballot was considered to be crucial because
it would mark the release of a portion of Dewey's support and
it would test Willkie's and Taft's second-choice strength.

On

the ballot Taft picked up twenty-seven Illinois votes, while
Willkie received votes from thirty-six states, including thirtyfive from New York, twenty-three from New Jersey, and fourteen
from Maryland.

The.results showed that both Taft and Willkie

·had gained at Dewey's expense.

Willkie led the balloting with

306, followed by Taft with 254, Dewey with 250, Vendenberg with
61, James with 56, Hoover with 31, MacNider with 26, McNary
with 8, and Gannett with 4--the favorite son support continued
to break down. 64
The. fifth ballot was adjudged to be significant in that
it would indicate willkie's ability to hold his own and win.
The tension was high; and there was a great deal of pressuring,
with floor managers collaring delegates and appealing to their

63New York Times., June 28 ' 1940 J p • 4 •
6!~Ibid.
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sense of reason. 6 5

c.

Nelson Sparks, Gannett's campaign man-

ager, revealed later that between the fourth and fifth ballots
Willkle turned down two offers of support from Taft men, one
in exchange for a cabinet post and the other for a agreement
on an individual to run in the number two spot on the ticket. 66
On this ballot Dewey and the remaining favorite son candidates
lost heav11,Y to Taft and Willkie, \\Tho both gained 123 votes.
The results showed Willkie maintaining his lead with 429 votes,
followed by Taft with 377, James with 59, Dewey with 57,
Vandenberg with 49, Hoover with 20, McNary with 8, MacNider
with 3, and Gannett with 1,
z

In the balloting Taft picked up

thirteen votes from Iowa, ten from New York, eighteen from
Oklahoma, $even from South Dakota, all of Kentucky's twentytwo, all of Louisiana's twelve, and all of Washington's sixteen.

Willkie, possessing votes from thirty-nine states,

received all of Kansas' eighteen, all of Maine's thirteen,
seventeen .from Illinois, twenty from Indiana, nine from Oregon,
nine from South Carolina, and seventy-five from New York. 6 7
The switch of forty additional votes to Willkie from New York
was a blo1·1 to Taft's chances. 68

After the balloting, many

65 11"1'he Sun Also Rises," !!_mJ:_, 36:14, July 8, 1940.
66Barnes, op.

21!·,

p. 184.

67New J~r~ Times, June 28, 1940, p. 4.
68-''Voters 1 Draftlng of WilJ.kie Like Shot .in the Arm to
U.S:.," ~ei.•rs~k, 16:13, July 8, 1940.
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political experts expressed the belief that if Joseph Pew had
released the fifty-one James' votes to Taft to offset the
New York votes, the v:illkie boom could have been halted; 69
however, Pew did not switch, and the boom continued.
During the fifth ballot a rumor that Dewey was coming
to the convention hall to withdraw in favor of Taft spread
through the auditorium, causing some delegates to refrain from
switching to Taft and Willkie.

The rumor changed as the sixth

ballot began, revealing that Dewey would not appear in person,
but would telephone his announcement.7° These rumors represented only part of the political maneuvering which took place
between the fifth and sixth ballots.

Governor Bricker

tl~ied

to arrange a recess in order to stem the Willkie boom, but
Chairman Martin announced that since no majority had been
attained, the sixth ballot would be taken.71
one source, Willkie had asked one thing

o~

(According to

Martin, and that

was if the tide was going for him, he would not recess; Martin
promised and kept his woro.)72
Before the sixth ballot was taken, Vandenberg's campaign
manager, Howard C. Lawrence, announced the release of the
69

Lorant,

o~.

.
cit., p. 626.

70charles W. Hurd, "crucial Test for Presidential candidates Began in Balloting at Night Session," New York ~imes,
June 28, 1940, p. 3.
7 1Lorant, 2£• ~., p. 626.
72Johnson, .2£· cit_., N., p. 98.

Csource withheld.:]
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Michigan delegation.73

The delegation went into caucus; and

Stassen went to Leo E. Anderson, the leader of the California
deleg.atio:n., to have that state poll their delegation to give
Michigan time to complete the caucus.

Hamilton and Pryor

moved continuously from the floor to the platform to inform
Stassen as to who was weakening and who might switch.7 4 During
this inte.rlude Hamilton was shocked at Willkie 's promising the
Michigan professionals they could choose the Federal Judgships
in their state in exchange for their support.75
As the sixth ballot began, it appeared that Willkie had

run ·out his spurt; he was barely holding his ovm.

He was a

few votes ahead when the ballot reached Michig-an; Lawrence
announced that a poll of the delegation had been completed and
that the state cast one vote for Hoover, two for Taft, and
thirty-five for Willkie.

The Michigan vote put Willkie within

sixteen of the goal; it was now up to Pennsylvania, but the
state passed.7 6 Minutes later, at 1:01 A.M., Washington's
vote gave ltlillkie the monimation.

At that time ex-Senator

David A. Reed of Pennsylvania seized the microphone and shouted
that the ,state's

seventy-t~tio

votes were cast for vlillkie, but

73·"The Sun Also Rises," Time, 36:14, July:8, 1940.
74ni1lon, op. cit., p. 164.
75Ibid., p. 166.
761'urner Catledge, "Republicans Nominate \'lendell Hillkie
for the Presidency on the 6th Ballot," New York ,Times, June 28,

1940 J p. 5.
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the statement came too late; Willkie had already gone over
the top and Bricker was already mounting the platform to move
that the nomination be made unanimous.77

The vote of the

sixth ballot was never officially totaled because so many
states shifted at once to Willkie; however, the unofficial
totals were as follows: Willkie 659; Taft 312; Hoover 9;
Dewey 8; MacNider 3; and Gannett, Martin, and James 1 each. 7
The vote was made unanimous at 998 because two delegates were
absent from the hall, 79 and the announcement of the nomination
was greeted with a "mighty roar" from the galleries and the
floor.

The convention hall was quiet during the losers' con-

gradulatory speeches and remained so as the galleries and
.. .
80
delegates filed out at the end of the session.
V.

THE FIFTH DAY

During the anticlimactic fifth day· the convention chose
Senator McNary for the second spot on the ticket, a choice
which was both hailed and criticized.

After the balloting,

Y.lillkie broke with tradition by appearing before the assembled
delegates to make a statement.
77"The Sun Also Rises," Ti~, 36:14, July 8, 1940.

78~ew York Times, June 28, 1940, p. 4.
79Turner Catledge, "Republicans Nominate 'tlendell Willkie
for the Presidency on the 6th Ballot," New York Times, June 28,
1940, p. 1.
--8°sidney M. Shalett, "Ballot Shifts Kept Convention
Tense," New York Ti~, June 28, 1940, p. 2.
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Be.rore the delegates met to nominate Willkie 's running
mate, the candidate held a press conference with nearly 300
newspaper and magazine correspondents and editors at the
Warwick.

During the course of the interview Willkie stated

that he ltlould resign his position with Commonwealth and
Southern; that he believed the major issues of the campaign
would be national unity, rehabilitation of the nation's
economic system, and buildup of the defense system; that he
would accept the nomination and would make a hard fight for
election; that he would go to the White House to confer with
Roosevelt; that he

woL~ld

stand on the 1940 Republican party

platform; that he favored the contributions limitations set
down in the Hatch Act; that he would not choose his running
mate, but that the convention would do it; ·that there was no
basis for the belief that he was an

inte~ventionist;

and that

he had f'irst thought of campaigning for the presidency on May
11, when he accepted the invitation to speak before Republican
leaders in Minnesota. 81 Willkie appeared to be a candidate
who \•lould

11

bare his soul" before the press; he provided his

questioners with direct answers to their inquiries.
When the delegates met to choose the vice-presidential
candidate., there appeared to be little doubt as to whom the
delegates wanted for the position; for they nominated Oregonts
81James A. Hagerty, "Willkie Approves Platform, Opposes
Big Campaign Gifts," N.e\'1 ~.£_rk Times, June 29, 1940, pp. 1,3.
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McNary on the first ballot.
decli~ed

It was reported that he had

to seek the nomination at_first, but bad later stated

that he would accept if the convention wanted him.

In the

balloting McNary received 890 votes to 108 for Dewey Short of
Missouri, who, after the results were announced, moved to make
the vote unanimous; McNary bad been drafted. 82
MqNary, the Senate Minority Leader, was a supporter of
public power, a westerner, a life-long Republican, and a
seasoned politician; and many party leaders felt that there
was no better man in party to help Willkie meet the problems
he would encounter in Washington. 8 3 This opinion of McNary as
Willkie 's running rna te was not unanimous.

Many Republi.cans

pointed out that the Senator had been anti-Willkie during the
.fight for the presidential nomination; that he was pro-public
power, while Willkie had been the chief spokesman against
public power; that McNary had voted against the repeal of the
arms embargo, while Willkie bad declared himself in favor of
aid to the Allies; and that McNary had been a consistent and
vigorous

a~vocate

of "high protection," while Willkie had

supported the reciprocal trade treaties.

A New York Times

editorial recounted the feelings of those who opposed McNary
because of such inconsistencies on the ticket by declaring

82Turner Catledge, "Senator Drafted," New Yor~ Times,
June 29, 1940, p. 1.
8 3"Good Soldier," Time, 36:16, July 8, 1940.

(,

li
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that the best that could be said about the situation was that
the office of vice-president was of comparatively little
importance in policy determination. 84
After the convention had chosen McNary, the delegates
and spectators waited to see if their ne'\1/ly selected champion
would break tradition and appear before them; they were not
disappointed.

Willkie's entrance triggered a "deafening shout"

and wild cheering, and each assertion in his statement brought
about another ovation.85

Adding to the color and excitement

of the occasion was the introduction of what was to become
Willkie's campaign song.

It was written by Ray Ghent and

Eleanor and Donald J. Smith, and the music was from Walt
Disney's "Snow \fuite:"
Heigh-ho, heigh-ho, its back to work we go,
With Wendell Willkie leading us
The jobs will grow.
Heigh-he, heigh-ho, heigh-ho,
We've all been feeling low,
But Willkie's hand will save the l~nd,
Heigh-ho, heigh-ho.
Heigh-ho, heigh-ho, its back to work we go,
With Willkie's plan the New Deal sham
\vlll have to go.
Heigh-ho, heigh-ho, heigh-ho
The fact we want to know;
Wyn has no fear, he'll make. things clear,
Heigh-ho, heigh-ho.

84 11 !-'Ir. Ivi'Nary--A Poor Choice," a New York Times Editorial,
June 29, 1940, p. 14.
-- - 85sidney M. Shalett, "Willkie Breaks Party Tradition by
Personal .Appearance Like Roosevelt's in '32," Nevi Yor~ Time~,
June 29, 1940, p. 3.

197
Heigh-he, heigh-ho, its back to work we go,
With confidence restored again
Defense will grow.
Heigh-ho, heigh-ho, heigh-ho,
We've all been worried so,
But Willkie's fight will us unite,
Heigh-ho, heigh-he.
Heigh-he, heigh-he, its back to worl<: \"le go,
The people's voice expressed their choice,
The vote will show.

,c___~~-~~-~-;ire-i-gh -h-o-,---1-re-tgh -h-o-,-hei-gh--ho-,,----------------c----~==

want the world to know
.
That Wendell Wil.lkte is the man
We want. Heigh-ho! 8 6
\~e

In his statement before the delegates Willkie declared
that he had not come to diSCI.lSS principles, but to thank .the
delegates and to express his appreciation.
democ~ricy

He stated that

was facing its crucial test and that the United

States was the last untouched foothold of freedom in the world;
he pledged to wage a·crusading, aggressive, ancl fighting campaign to bring unity to America--to bring unity to labor and
capital, to the worker and the farmer, and to all classes--in
support of the great cause of the preservation of freedom.

In

calling on the delegates to join in the crusade, Willkie made
an a rna teur 's mistake, the first of many he \'Wuld make before
the campaign's conclusion in November; he stated,
you

R~publicans,

11

And so,

I call upon you to join me, help me.

cause is great. · \tle mt1st wi.n.

The

We cannot fail if we stand

together in one united fight."87 ·It was a thoughtless remark

8~ew ~Time~, June 29, 19110, p. 4.

87~ Yor~ 'l'im_~E' June 29, 19L10, p. 3.

Crtalics mine_:7
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and aroused the old doubts. 88

While the doubters were left

to ponder the psychological implications of the remark,
Republicans, Democrats, and the world were expressing their
reactions to the nomination and seeking to explain its cause.
VI.

THE COIVJ.MENTS .AND THE EXPL.AN.A TIONS

The comments on Willkie's victory and the explanations
concerning its cause reflected the magnitude of the political
upset.

Both were given freely as the nation and the world

came to realize what had transpired.
The comments issued by the Republicans clearly, and
qu:lte naturally, pointed out that Willkie's campaign would
prove to be a good one and would put the party back into
control of the natiol).

Dewey declared that Willkie v-1ould make

"one hell of a good campaign."

Taft's comments took on a more

scholarly tone as he foresaw the Willkie victory restoring
government based on reason, common sense, and business principles.

Hoover, quite optimistically, declared that Willkie

would be elected just like that--a snap of his fingers. 89
Landon applauded the nomination, stressing the importance of
Willkie's foreign policy stand on aid to the .Allies.9°

88 Dillon,

~·

cit., p. 173.

89"voters' Drafting of Willkie Like Shot in the .Arm to
u.s.,n Newsweek, 16:17, July 8, 1940.
90New York Times, June 28, 1940, p. 3.

Vandenberg stated that the nominee had captured the imagination of
the American people and that he would put his shoulder to the
wheel to

wo~k

for Willkie's election.

Gannett stated simply that

the convention had selected Willkie and that he would work for
him.

Bridges remarked that the delegates had made an admirable

choice and aQ_pealed to all members of the party to get
together behind their candidate.9 1
The Democratic party leadership regarded the nomination as beneficial to their chances to win the election.
Roosevelt 1 s only public statement on the Willkie victory was
that he v;.ould be glad to see vlillkie if the latter felt
inclined to come to the White House to discuss international
rela tion;s; however, Far· ley and Ickes revealed more specific
reactions.

Farley declarid that the nominition greatly clar-

ified the issues before the nation--which would contr•ol the
nation: the historic American processes

Ol"~

the new and some-

what foreign methods of concentrated control?

Ickes declared

that Roosevelt would be nominated, giving the people
the choic,e between a man with_ experience in public affairs,
possess1ng strength and training in international relations,
and a man without experience except as a clever lawyer andsucce ssf'ul public utili ties hold:!.ng company repre senta ti ve. 92

91Lawrence E. Davies, "Fight for VJillkie Pledged by
Losers,'' Ne\'!. York Times, June 29, 19~~0, p. 3.9~New Yor~ Time~, June 29, 1940, pp. 1,3.
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Ickes was not so positive about the outcome of the election
in his diary, for in it he wrote, "Nothing so extraordinary
has ever happened in American politics. ~·93

In his analysis

of the candidate's chances, Ickes recorded that Willkie was
an attractive, colorful, ana utterly unscrupulous character
ana that it would not be easy to defeat him, especially with
Senator McNary on the ticket.94
On the humorous side, Henry L. Mencken saw the
Philadelphia events as representative of a miracle:

11

At one

time I actually saw an angel in the gallery reserved for
Philadelphia street railway curve-greasers.

To be sure, the

angel had on a palm beach suit, but nevertheless it was
clearly an angel. n95

Damon Runyon de clare a, "vle are the

fellow who aid not di~cover Willkie. rr96
The reaction across the sea reflected the political
position of each country.

The Italian New Agency stated,

"The fact that Willkie isn't a professional politician augments the probability of a Republican victory at the coming
elections. rr97

The Frankfurter Zeitung. pictured vlillkie as a

93Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes,
Vol. III., Tl}~ Lowering CloUds, 1939-m-;- p:- 221-.-94Ibid.

u.s.,"

95Barnes, ~· cit., p. 174.
96 "Willkie in Print," Time, 36:53, July 8, 1940.
97rrvoters' Drafting of Willkie Like Shot in the Arm to
Newsweek, 16:18, July 8, 1940.
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dynamic personality who could successfully oppose Roosevelt
and his appalling domestic and foreign policy.98

The Hamburger

Fremdenbl.a·tt reported that Willkie was not a professional
politician, but .a businessmen; the paper also concluded that
because tbe Republicans chose the latter type of candidate, it
seemed to indicate that the electorate was fed up with party
slogans and shibboleths.99

Reuters, the British news agency,

declared that the news of the nomination brought pleasure to
the belea:guered island, especially in light of all the isolationist sentiment at the convention.

It was also reported

that Briti;sh newspapers ran headlines such as "Aid Britain Man
to Run ror

Presidency~

and VAllies Supporter to Fight for

United States Presidency."lOO
Not all of the comments were of a light nature, nor were

they all congradulatory or optimistic.

After the convention,

the nation's political analysts and writers sought to explain
the nomination to their readers and to one another.

They

attempted to evaluate the event and pinpoint the cause or
rea son 1.vhich enabled Willkie, the utili ties executive, to
capture the Republican nomination.
The New York Times declared that the Republicans had

98Ibid.
99New York Times, June 29, 191W, p. 4.
lOOibid.
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put up the best candidate at their command, a man who stood
head and shoulders above his rivals for the party's favor.

As

for the cause of the "miracle," the newspaper reported that the
talk of "utility money" making the show of public opinion and
influencing the delegates was quietly dismissed as nonsense by
both the public and the delegates.

The editor:Lal stated that

the nomination had obviously sprung from the spontaneous wave
of public sentiment, that as the seriousness of

~the

war

increased and as its implications regarding a threat to the
United States grew, popular sentiment developed from virtually
nothing to amazing proportionso

The announced candidates, the

Times stated, attempted to follow public opinion instead of
lead it, advocating an ostrich-like isolation policy, while
· Willkie declared that Britain and France constituted Amerj.ca 's
first line of defense.

The delegates knew that the flood of

letters and telegrams and the shouts of the galleries was not
part of a manufactured demonstration, but the spontaneous outburst of the feelings of the rank and file. 101
Arthur Krock also attributed the nomination to the
spontaneous public demand.

He stated that democracy bad worked

at a time when triumphant war machines had been erected on its
ruins in nearly all the rest of the world.

Krock labeled the

nomination a "miracle" because it had been accomplished in the

lOl"Political Miracle," an Edltorlal in the New York
Times,June 30, 1940, IV, p. 8.
-.- - -
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face of powerful obstacles:

Willkie had never held public

office and had conducted no primary campaign; he had been
identified as an utilities executive and a director of a Wall
Street bank; and he had to defeat two strong professional organizations possessing impressive commitments.

Against these

obstacles and every political device his opponents could bring
to bear, Willkie rose to victory on the back of a wave of
public support, manifested in

th~

action of the galleries--

which only reflected a vast national gallery--and a deluge
of telegrams, letters, and calls.

There was no kingmaker
involved in the Willkie nomination. 102
Jonathan Mitchell, writing in J.he Ne__! Reeublic, also

a1•gued that the verifiable petitions signed by fom• and onehalf million voters, plus the telegrams, contributed significantly to the Willkie victory; however, he reported that they
had not been the result of spontaneous support for the candidate, but of a carefully planned political maneuver.

Mitchell

reported that the Associated Willkie Clubs and the Willkie
Mailing Committee had initiated the petitions, collected them,
and had insured that they were dellvered to the appropriate
delegates and that the entire processing had been administered
through an office in Philadelphia.

Mitchell also indicated

that support from a group of politically-oriented businessmen

l02Arthur Krock, "Nomination of Willkie Like a Revolution
Here," New York Times, June 30, 1940, IV, p. 3.

204
and from several Southern delegations contributed to Willkie's
successful bid for the nomination.l03
Robert Bendiner, writing in The Nation, attributed the
nomination to the Republican's attempt to make up for the lack
of a sound political program •. He asserted that the confused
G.O.P. platform--supporting national defense, but not the NevJ
Deal's administration of the defense programs; collective bargaining, but with a toned-down Wagner Act; and relief, but not
the New Deal's "graft-ridden" programs--and the isolationist
foreign policy stands of Dewey, Taft, and Vandenberg forced
the Republican party leaders into an impossible situation:
they had been caught between their hostility toward the candidate, and their mistaken confidence in their ability to stop
him, and the strength of his appeal and the swiftness of the
Willkie drive. 104
Raymond Moley, writing in Newsweek, stated in his
analysis of the nomination that it had not been the galleryinspired third ballot switches, the popular enthusiasm for
Willkie, nor the illusion that the candidate was a great
natural and could survive even serious political mistakes
which had effected the phenomenal event.

According to Moley,

103Jona than rlli tchell, . "How They Won with Willkie'
New Republic, 103:48, July 8, 1940.

II

The

l04Robert Bendiner "Grand Old Paradox," The Nation,
151~6, July 6, 1946. · '
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a partial explanation was that the Republican party had
realized that they could not have won with any of the other
candidates.

He declared that the vote

~witching

had been

gradual, accomplished by delegates whose reason told them that
the peculiar circumstances of 1940 demanded a new kind of
candidate.

The flood of petitions and telegrams served to

indicate the surge of public opinion; but, according to Maley's
analysis, the newspapers, magazines, and radio broadcasts did
more to educate the delegates of the vastness of the Willkie
appeal and materially influenced their reasonable selection of
the nominee.l 0 5
Denis Brogan also believed that the nom:tnation had not
been the result of a spontaneous political movement or of
Wi1lkie's advanced position on aid to the Allies, but that it
had resulted from the realization by the
and reluctantly, by the delegates that it

voter~

and, slowly

essential to
have a candidate who was positive about something. 106
~las

J. C. Furnas ·saw in the Willkie nom5.nation a revolt
against the old-line politicians, a revolt representative of
the idea that amateur spontaneity could lick professional
efficiency every time.

The people had been responsible for the

l 0 5Ra ymond Moley, "Perspective: A Clear Ca 11," News"!_eek,
16':56, July 8, 1940.
106 Denis VI. Brogan, "The American Election," The Politlcal
~uarterl~, Vol. XI, No. 4, p. 332, October-November,-r940.
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Willkie boom and the resulting nomination, not the influence
of money, business, or political organization. 107
Luther A.

H~ston,

writing in The Living Age, also came

to the conclusion that the convention had not been bossed by
the political powers within the party, but by the voices from
the gallery and from the floor.

He pictured the nomination

as being more representative of pure democracy than any other
in a political generation. 108
In an editorial, The New Republic attempted to refute
the "official" theory concerning the nomination: that the
plain people had asserted themselves over the will of the
machine politicians.

This theory, according to the magazine,

was erroneous because the nomination had been one of the most
skillful professional publicity jobs the country had ever seen.
Russell Davenport, the ex-managing editor of Fortune; Robert L.
J·

Johnson, the publisher of Promenade, a foUnder of !ime, and a
promotional expert; Fred Smith,. a publiclty expert from the
firm of Selvage and Smith; Harry M. Shakleford, the Advertising manager of the Johns-Manville Corporation; Steve Hannagen,
a publicity expert; and Ned Stevenson and Associates, counselors on radio relations, had all been instrumental in presenting
1°7J. c. Furnas, "Who \'!ants Willkie?" The Saturda~
Post, 213:12, November 2, 1940.
--

~-vening_

The

l08Lutber A. Huston, "Political Parties Choose Generals,"
359:20, September, 1940.

Li::~ ~ge,.
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Willkie to the delegates.

In the performance of their task,

according to the magazine, they suppressed the picture of
Willkie the New Yorker, utilities executive, and Wall Street
lawyer and built up the picture of a small-town boy from
Indiana. 10 9
Wendell Willkie had come to the Republican convention
with a large pubiic following, riding the crest of a boom;
but his candidacy had not been taken seriously by many professional politicians of the party because he had few delegate
votes and no political organization.

He had, at best, only

a slight chance of capturing the nominat:i.on, and that chance
was contingent upon a deadlocked power struggle between Dewey
and Taft.

In addition, there were several other dark horse

candidates in a much better position to gain strength in a
deadlocked convention because they possessed both delegate
votes and political organizations; howevet, it was Willkie who
emergedas the Republican nominee, and the accomplishment of
that feat represents one of the greatest stories in American
political history.

The opinions as to the prime cause of the

phenomenal event differ widely; the question remains: how
was Willkie able to overcome the obstacles to his nomination
and become the Republican standard bearer?

109 ··~~ho Wanted lNillkie? 11 Th~ Ne~ ~epublic, 103:105,
July 22, 191~0.

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS
The explanations which have been advanced since the
Willkie nomination attempt to affix its cat1se on certain events
occurring during the Spring of

19~0;

however, the authors of

these theories have glossed over essential factors in their
general sweep of the subject.

Willkie's nomination did not

result from the spontaneous surge of public opinion; the banding together of the nation's businessmen; the support of the
Sottthern delegations; the attempt to make. up for a paradoxical
platform; the grassroots revolt against the professional
politicians; the reactions of the galleries; the flood of
telegrams, letters, telephone calls, and postal cards; nor the
result of a professional publicity job.

Each of these proposed

explanations represents only a part of the total picture;
collectively they still represent only a partial explanation.
The authors of these explanations have neglected the most
important factor--the attitude of the individual delegate and
his ultimate decision.
As the convention opened the main topic of conversation
was Willkie's spectacular dark horse challenge.

His boom had

contributed to the uncertainties pervading the convention
because he had risen in the polls from nowhere to the second
position in party popularity, and he had obtained the support
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of the larger metropolitan areas and the business and financial
interests of the Eastern

Seaboard~

In addition, Willkie's

supporters had publicized the fact that the boom had continued
to spread throughout the nation at an ever-increasing rate. 1
His managers proclaimed that the impetus behind the boom was
the man himself, and the reporters covering the pre-convention
Republican campaigns concurred that a large measure of the
candidate 1 s popularity could be attributed to his personal campaign appearances and his unappeasable stands as a foe of the
New Deal domestic policy •. Willkie's chance for the nomination
depended on a deadlocked convention; however, the great
question in

ever~one's

mind was

wh~ther

he could translate the

tremendous surge of public opinion into delegate votes; this
was the key to the nomination.
It is the contention of the study that the European war
triggered a reaction among the rank and file of the party which
resulted in a switch in their support from Dewey to Willkie;
the latter's nomination resulted from the delegates' realization that such a switch had occurred and that the party needed
a vote-getter of Willkie's caliber and popular appeal.
I.

WILLKIE AND THE RANK AND FILE

An integral factor in Willkie's nomination was the great
1 Turner Catledge, "Willkie's Rise Puts G.O.P. in a
Dilemma," New York Times, June 16, 1940, IV, p. 6.
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amount of popular support granted to the candidate.

S.ince it

was this support which finally persuaded the delegates to
switch to Willkie, it is essential to subject the formation
of this rank and file support to careful analysis.
The Republican party's defeat in 1936 resulted ·in a
shake-up of the G.O.P. organization.
Chairman Hamilton, the Republican
structure and were

successf~l

Under the guidance of

l~adership

rebuilt the party

in staging a political comeback

in the Congressional elections of 1938.

In these contests the

Democratic party lost ground in thirty-six of the forty-six
states they had carried in 1936; in twenty-seven of the states
the G.O.P. gains amounted to a five per cent increase or more.
The Republicans captured eleven Senate seats, 169 House seats,
eighteen governorships, and control of both state houses in
nineteen states.

The public opinion polls published dtwing

the Spring of 1939 predicted that the G.O.P. would

captu~e

the

White house in 1940, although they reflected that the vote
would be close.

The Republican party was given New England in

the polls, while the Democratic party was granted the South
and the West.

As the popular support for the opposition party

grew, the members of the party became satiated with the desire
to win in 1940.
inten~ity

This prayer for a winning ticket grew in

as one went down the scale in the party. 2
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This desire, most prevelant among the rank and file,
stimulated the search for "a man on a wh;tte horse," a votegetter who would free the nation from Roosevelt and the New
Deal.

The first beneficiary of this attitude was Dewey, who,

because of his vigorous prosecution of the rackets in New
,.___ _ _ __:=Yc-=co=r=k'-----'"'C=i__,_,ty, led in the public opinion polls of G.O.P. voters
f1•om January, 1939, to Late June, 1940.

In February, 1939,

the Gallup Poll showed that he led other Republicans in par•ty
popularity, obtaining 27 per cent of the vote to Vandenberg's

21 per cent (his nearest rival);

how~ver,

50 per cent of the

G.O.P. voters indicated that they were undecided at that time.
As a direct result of further crime-busting successes,

Dewe~1's

percentage had, by Niarch, increased to 50 per cent of the
.Republican party popularity vote to 15 per cent for Vandenberg
and 13 per cent for Taft.

In the August polls Dewey still led

all comers with 45 per cent, with Vandenberg increasing to 25
per cent and Taft to 14 per cent; but 44 per cent of G.O.P.
voters remained undecided as to their choice for the party's

1940 standard bearer.
nomination,

~he

Up to this point in the race for the

central issue had been the New Deal's domestic

failures; hm'l'ever, in September the European war began, and
its effect on the American political scene was far-reaching.
The first apparent affect of the war was to be seen in
the public opinidn polls.

Taft had announced his candidacy in

August, and his percentage in the popularity poll should

~ave
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been affected as a result of the increased publicity;.however, the war news overshadowed his entrance and held his
popularity index down.
sion~

within the party.

The war caused more serious repercusIn early October Taft declared that

the G.O.P. was bound to become the peace party in 1940; and
Representative Hamilton Fish of New York, an

isolationi~t,

announced that he would enter the race if the candidates.continued to "soft-pedal" the importance of remaining neutral.
The war also affected the Republican race by cutting
down Dewey's popularity and by elevating Vandenberg's and
Taft's.

By October, Dewey's popularity had dropped to 39 per

cent, while Taft's had risen to 17 per cent and Vandenberg's
·,to 27 per cent; the undecided vote had dipped to 37 per cent.
·.It may be noted that whenever Dewey's vote dropped during
the period from January, 1939, to May, 1940, Vandenberg's
rose correspondingly and Taft's remained virtually constant.
This trend appeared to indicate that the rank and file, when
deserting Dewey, preferred Vandenberg to Taft.
June of

19~0,

Dur•ing r-ia y and

when Dewey's percentage again decreased, it was

Willkie, not Vandenberg, who was the recipient of the switched
support, while Taft's and Vandenberg's vote remained unchanged.
The rank and file had decided to tqrow support behind a more
experienced candidate immediately after the start of the war;
however, after Vandenberg had been soundly defeated by Dewey
in the primaries, he lost his place as the second choice of
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the rank and file.

When the international situation

deteriorated during the Spring of 1940, it was Willlde, not
Vandenberg, who benefited from the desertion from the Dewey
camp.
A partial explanation for Dewey's loss of support
following the outbreak of war could be attributed to the fact
that many G.O.P. leaders reportedly opposed h:Ls candidacy
because they believed ·that his youth and inexperience would
detract votes from the party in light of the tense international crisis.

The outbreak of war also affected the undecided

· vote; for in August, 1939, the percentage had been 44 per cent,
but the October poll indicated that it had fallen to 37 per
cent.

The war had forced many of the rank and file to make

up their minds; this fact, plus the desertion of a considerable
amount of De\'ley •s support, increased Taft 1 s and Vandenberg 1 s
popularity.
The war also had repercussions within the Democratic
party.

In November, 193p, 62.5 per cent of the electorate

approved of the President; however, by December of 1938 this
popularity

i~dex

had fallen to 55.5 per cent.

In the after-

math of the Republican congressional victories of 1938
Roosevelt's popularity again began to rise, 58 per cent in
January, 1939, to 63.5 per cent by March.

From this point,

F.D.R.'s popularity again took a nose-dive, falling to 58.8
per cent by May to 56.6 per cent by August; however, the out-
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break of .the war in Europe shattered this downward trend.

By

November, 1939, Roosevelt's popularity had risen to 62.7 per
cent.

The inroads which the G.O.P. political orators had made

into the President's popularity during the period March to
August of 1939 had been offset by the Roosevelt surge following the declaration of war; however, all was not well within
the ranks of the Democratic party.

The party was in a state

of confusion throughout 1939 because the President had refused
to reveal his plans for 1940.

His silence on the third term

decision continued into 1940, and the Democratic presidential
aspirants.were effectively blocked from entering the race for
the Democratic nomination.
The war also changed the political

~ituation

between

the parties by producing mass insecurity and the desire "not
to change horses in mid-stream," thus elevating the Democratic
party to the position of first choice amotlg the nation's
electorate.

In November, the polls indicated that 54 per cent

of the electorate had indicated a preference for a Democratic
victory in 1940; in April of 1939 the polls had reported that
52 per cent preferred a Republican victory.
Another extremely important effect of the war was the
manner in which it had affected public opinion on the third
term issue.

F.D.R. had artfully dodged the issue throughout

1939, and certain sources in the adminstration had reported
that Roosevelt would. lose his power to conduct policy were he
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to make any announcement relative to the third term decision.
\'lhile the nation waited for his answer, the polls showed that
sentiment .favoring a third term was on the increase.

In

March, 1939, only 31 per cent of the nation's voters favored
a third term; by May it had increased to 33 per cent.· In
August the Gallup Poll reported that 52 per cent of young
Democratic voters had expressed themselves in support of the
third term; however, the poll also indicated that only L!8 per
cent of all Democratic voters held such an opinion.
of· all voters published during August revealed that

A survey
L!O

per

cent of the nation's electorate favored a third term, representing an increase of seven per cent in three months.

This

increase in the pro-third term sentiment occurred at a time
when Roosevelt's popularity was dropping from 63.5 per cent
in March to 56.6 per cent in August.

It was apparent that as

the Republican campaign against the New Deal's domestic policy
gained support from the nation's

voter~,

F.D.R. 's popularity

dropped; and the rank and file Democrats began to look on the
President as the man to save the party in 1940.

The pro-third

term sentiment increase resulted from the increased Democratlc
support.

Another Gallup Poll conducted during this pre-war

period indicated that 48 per cent of all voters thought F.D.R.
would attempt to secure a thlrd term, and L15 per cent believed
that he t.·muld be successful; however, in September, after the
outbreak of war, the poll showed that 48 per cent of the voters
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approved o£ a third term--an increase of eight per cent after
the war had begun.

By November, after the initial shock of

the war had passed, the pro-third term sentiment dropped down
to 43 per cent; however, the Gallup Poll reported that four
out of every five Democrats favored the third term.
These changes in the political situation following the
outbreak

o~

war did not remain in force--the war continued to

produce changes.

After the initial impact following the decla-

ration of war--October through December, 1939--the nation's
political scene underwent another series of alterations.
In the Republican race the undecided vote moved from 37 per
cent in January, 1940, to 36 per• cent in February to

liQ

per

cent in March, representative of a trend which seemed to
indicate that some reservations were held
bers as the war news filled the headlines.

by

the party memDewey's popularity

increased from 39 per cent in October to 60 per cent in
January; however, after reaching this percentage, his vote
again started to decrease, falling to 56 per cent in lt,ebruary
to 53 per cent in March.

During these first three months of

1940, Taft'.s popularity rema1nea rather constant, although his
popularity had dropped during the last months of 1939.
Vandenberg dropped from 27 per cent in October to 16 per cent
in January to 19 per cent in March--statistics which seemed to
indicate t.ha t the pro-Vandenberg trend of September-·October
had been halted after the initial shock of the war's beginning
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wore off.

The impact of the war cut into Dewey's popularity

ana elevated Taft's and Vandenberg's; however, after this
initial reaction, the situation was back as it had been in
August, except that Dewey was stronger ana Vandenberg was
weaker.

Almost immediately Dewey began to lose strength;

however, Vandenberg's popularity increase during these first
months of 1940 indicated that he was not receiving the cast
off Dewey support to the degree which had characterized the
earlier trend.

The war and the realization of the situation

within the Democratic party stimulated a segment of the rank
and file .to again survey the field of candidates for a new
vote-getter to run under the new political conditions.
Inthe Democratic party the aftermath showed no such
drastic reversion back to the pre-war situation; the trend set
into motion after the outbreak of the war continued to develop.
In January the polls reported that 78 per
Democratic voters preferred F .D .R. in

~ent

1940~

of the

and in Febt•uary

they reported that 64 per cent of the nation's electorate
approved of the President.

The pro-third term sentiment had

been 43 per cent in November; however, by February the vote
had increased to 46 per cent.

There was a reversion in this

sentiment, for the vote favoring the third term had dropped
from 48 per cent in September to 43 per cent in November.

The

trend did not continue; the percentage again began to rise.
An interesting development almost unnoticed was that the 1940
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increase in the pro-third term sentiment accompanied a corresponding rise in the President's popularity.

The earlier

growth of this sentiment had been attributed to the G.O.P.
attacks; the new increase resulted from the international
crisis.

The February Gallup Poll also indicated that 52 per

cent of all voters thought Roosevelt would attempt to secure
a third term and that 60 per cent believed that he would be
successful.

By March the polls showed that the pro-third term

sentiment had increased to

~7

per cent and that 55 per cent

of the electorate favored a Democratic victory in

The

19~0.

President was firmly in command of his party, the party
favored to win the election.

F.D.R. refused to withdraw his

name from the eleven primary contests in which his supporters
had entered his name.

His silence effectively halted the

booms of the potential Democratic candidates and prevented
the Republicans from having a distinct target upon which to
craw a bead.
The changes in the political situation following
September, 1939, as well as those occurring during the fi.rst
months of 1940, did take away a measure of the optimistic
attitude which had pervaded the G.O.P., but the rank and file
would not, nor could not, be counted out of the race.

The

Gallup Poll showed that even though the Democrats held a 55
per cent to 45 per cent edge in national popularity, in some
states, possessing sufficient electoral votes to sway the
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election, the vote had been calculated to be extremely close.
The G.O.P. went into.the primary contests knowing that the
fortunes of politics could change at any time.

The rank and

file, though with reduced enthusiasm and support, continued to
back Dewey's candidacy, believing that in him they had their
best bet to win in November.

In the primaries Taft avoided

a direct confrontation with Dewey; however, Vandenberg and
Gannett met the front runner head-on and were effectively
eliminated from serious contention and consideration by the
rank and file.

As a result of his primary successes and his

Western campaign tour, Dewey's popularity among the rank and
file again inc1•ea sed.

In the mid-r.'Iay Gallup Poll Dewey

received 62 per cent, compared to Taft's 14 per cent and
Vandenberg 's 13 per cent; hmvever, a new fj_gure had, by this
time, entered the race.

Willkie had scored less than 1 per

cent in the t-1arch polls, but had increased' to 3 per cent by
April and 5 per cent by Mid-May.

The Willkie boom had

started among the rank and file.
During the pre-primary and primary campaigns Dewey,
Gannett, and Taft had concentrated on domestic issues when all
the nation had expressed concern over the tense international
. situation.

Taft had declared that there existed no immediate

danger to the United States if Britain and France fell to the
Nazi army and had warned that Roosevelt would become an allpowerful leader in such a situation.

This neglect of

220
foreign a.ffair.s would come back to haunt these candidates.·
After the primaries Dewey held a commanding lead; in
addition, the undecided vote had dropped to 32 per cent by
May, indicating that more of the rank and file had found
in Dewey a vote-getter with which to

d~feat

the Democrats.

This situation was soon to change, for by late May Dewey's
popularit~

among the rank and file had fallen to 56 per cent,

while \<J'illkie 's bad risen to 10 per cent.

Vandenberg's and

Taft 1 s per.centages remained virtually unchanged.

vHllkie

appeared to be moving at a very rapid pace, detaching vdtes
from Dev1e.y and grabbing off the remaining undecided votes.
This chan,ge represented one of the dramatic repercussions
evolving out of a change 1.n the course of the European war.
·'

The conduct of the war from September, 1939, to .April,,

19'-4-0, has been labeled as the

pel~iod

of the "phony war"

because only an occasional skirmish took place, both on land
and on sea.

The change in the war situation occurred on the

day of the Illinois primary, ironically the date of one of
Dewey's great primary viqtories---victories which had boosted
his popularity from 53 per cent to 62 per cent and which
placed the rank and file in his pocket as the champion votegetter.

On that date Germany invaded Norway and Denmark;

later, in early May, the Nazi war machine roared into the
Lm·llands.

The German offensive caused another round of

changes in the United States political situation.
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In the Democratic party the trend which had placed
Roosevelt in the position of accepting the nomination or of
naming his successor continued to
invasion.

devel~p

after the German

Before the escalation of the war,

47 per cent

of the electorate favored a third term; after the invasion

57 per cent expressed.the desire to have F.D.R. continue in
office.

In addition, 91 per cent of the Democrats and 8 per

cent of the Republicans favored a third term.

This change in

public opinion was significant because the April primary
results had indicated that the President would have a difficult ·
time in a third term attempt.

The anti-third term vote given

Garner plus the Republican vote in their primaries showed a
near even split in publ:I.c sentiment over the third term.

The

April Gallup Poll also indicated that if the election were held at
that time, its results would be close; the poll reported that
in seven states the split between the two parties was 51 per
cent to 49 per cent.
In the Republican party the end of the "phony war"
caused Dewey to lose the support of the rank and file,
just as he had following the outbreak of the war in 1939.
The defection from the Dewey camp was not the result of
the activity or influence of the "Stop-Dewey'' movement because
this group had attempted to stop the Dewey boom through
their contacts with state party leaders and delegates, not the
rank and file.

Their attack on Dewey's youth, lack of larger
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governmental experience, and inconsistant foreign policy stands
did not af:fect the candidate's standing in the polls, The
derection was not caused by the arguments of the party conservatives because their philosophy was not accepted by the
rank and file in their desire for a vote-getter.
J--~~~~~V,._,an_denberfl'

When

s ·chances were elipsed by Dewey in the primaries,

he demonstrated to the rank and file that he was not the
vote-gette.r for which they had been seeking; therefore, they
apparentl~

discarded any thoughts of supporting the conserva-

tism of Vandenberg or Taft in favor of a potential vote-getter.
Vandenberg stated that he had found amazing concern
throughout the rank and file over the new development in the
war; the press reported that Vandenberg's utter neutrality
stand no l,onger had its appeal.3

In Taft's campaign, local

Republican leaders informed the candidate that there was overwhelming sympathy for the .Allied cause, a further indication
that the isolationist stands were not popular.

In addition,

the Gallup Poll revealed that a rna jori ty of the electorate
favored aid to the Allies.

Taft did not heed the advice and

continued his conservative, near isolationist, stand and concentrated on domestic issues.

He further hurt his chances to

gather the support of the rank and fiie by declaring that he
opposed aid to the Allies on the grounds that it would be
cowardly for the nation to send aid without sending men; he
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did not move in the popularity polls.
By mid-June, Dewey had dropped from 56 per cent to 52
per cent, while Willkie's popularity had increased from 10 per
cent to 17 per cent during the same period.

Taft's popularity

also dropped, falling from the 16 per cent held in mid-May to
13 per cent; Vandenberg maintained his 12 per cent.

It was

apparent that Willkie was receiving the support of those
members of the rank and file who were either undecided or who
had supported Taft and Dewey.

The final gallup poll, released

on June 21, revealed that Dewey's vote had dropped to 47 .Per
cent, a decrease of five percentage ppints in nine days.

Dur-

ing the same period, Willkie's vote rose to 29 per cent, an
increase of 12 per cent.

Taft and Vandenberg lost heavily in

these nine days: Taft dropped from 13 per cent to 8 per cent,
and Vandenberg fell from 12 per cent to 8 per cent.

The

strength of the Willkie boom had certainly manifested itself
during the closing stages of the pre-convention campaigns; the
Indianan had somehow captured the imagination and support of
the rank and file of the Republican party.
Willkie's metoric rise in the public opinion polls
resulted from two factors: first, the change in the course of
the war put him in the position of possessing the soundest
Republican foreign policy stand; and second, the formation of
agencies for the distribution of his program to the rank and
file.

Prior to the Nazi invasion of April-May, 1946, Willkie
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had achieved a measure of recognition as a critic of the New
Deal domestic_policy; however, he possessed no organization to
promote his candidacy, for he was not even a declared candidate.

Willkie's condemnation of the Roosevelt administration's

failure to solve the nation's economic problems attracted the
interest o:r a young New York lawyer, Oren Root, Jr., who
decided to, examine the possibility of running Willkie for the
presioency •.. On April 11, 1940, Root announced that he had
mailed· out nearly.
.
. 1,000 "declarations" to individuals throughQUt

the qottntry to sample the public SUpport.for his "candi-

date;" ara,p by April 15, he was able to report that he had
•"i'>f•i'

'

received.J:>rders
for 20,000 "declarations."
.
·;}.: ~.

opened

.

a~;¢ampatgn

Late in April Root

.

headquarters in New York from which pamphlets,

.•(

petitions,.. and buttons were sent to interested parties from
·

·'

coast to coast.

By the er:-d of April Root declared that 200,000

Americans had signed the "declarations" expressing support for
..

Willkie; the boom was on, without the candidate.
When Davenport, the Cowles, Luce, and the Retds joined
the boom, Willkie's program reached millions of people through
the newspap;er meaia; in addition, the formation of \'/illkie-ForPresident clubs brought the candiaate's economic and political
philosophles to still more people.

By his own admission, he

became a candidate late in May \vhen he accepted an in vita tion
to meet \'lith Governor Stassen and other Republican leaders in
Minnesota.

It was during this period that the American
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political system was attempting to recover from the impact of
the Nazi invasion; Willkie began to gather support as his
ideas became publicized in an intense propaganda campaign.
Willkie Clubs and Willkie-For-President clubs sprang up all
over the nation, and by June it was reported that the latter
organizations numbered nearly 500 and were growing at a rate
of twelve new clubs per day.

It was also reported that the

clubs had distributed 350,000

ca~paign

buttons and 150,000

copies of pamphlets explaining the candidate's program and
that an estimated four and one-half million persons had
signed the "declarations" calling for Willkie's nomination.
The electorate, especially the rank and file Republicans,
were being given the word.
Basically, \'lillkie's appeal rested with his "liberalconservative" political philosophy: he supported Roosevelt's
foreign policy, including aid to the Allies, and he condemned
the New Deal domestic policy.

He explained this rather

contradictory program by declaring that the country would be
endangered by offering the electorate a choice bettJeen two
half-rotten apples in November: one supporting the correct
domestic policy and the

~rong

represented the opposite.

foreign policy, while the other

Instead of taking the Taft stand

against aid to the Allies, a stand to which Dewey had become
committed during the primaries and a stand to which Vandenberg
had devoted years to defending, Willkie stated that Britain .
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and France constituted America's first line of defense and
that aid to the Allies was the most effective way to keep the
nation out of the war.

While the other .Republican candidates

concentrated on domestic issues during May and June, Willkie
was declaring that the war represented a threat to the United
States foreign trade unless the country protected its European
markets by aiding the Allies.

The public op:l.nion polls

indicated that Willkie's message was reaching the Republican
rank ahd file; however, he was still far behind the front
runners.
The flood of petitions coming into the Willkie headquarters and the incredible growth of the clubs indicated that
millions of the Republican rank and file had found their votegetter; however, Dewey still led in delegate strength, followed
closely by Taft.

As the center of attention focused on

Phlladelphia, it was apparent that opinions within the party
were split.

The delegates, possessing the responsibility for

the nomination, would vote according to the commitments of
the pl"imary victories and prom:l.ses of support given to Dewey,
Taft, and others.

On the other hand, the rank and file had

chosen another candidate; but, unfortunately for Willkie, they
would have no vote in the convention.

They could only attempt

to influence the delegates to their way of thinking; for in
order for Willkie to w:l.n, the delegates had to be persuaded
that Willkie was the only candidate the Republicans could name

c: _ _
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who had a chance to defeat Roosevelt or his chosen successor
during the international crisis.

Others also recognized the

strength and appeal of the Willkie candidacy and sought to
deflate the build up of popular sentiment for Willkie by
emphasizing that he possessed no organization or delegate
strength, that he had too many political liabilities, and that
he could not possibly win either the nomination or election.
II.

THE STOP-VIILLKIE GROUP

Under normal circumstances Willkie probably would not
have been nominated because he would have been stopped by the
methods of the professionals who opposed his candidacy; however,
under the peculiar circumstances of 1940, their usual methods
had little effect on the boom.

Just as the "Stop-DevJey 11 move-

ment failed to dissuade the rank and file from Dewey when the
latter's popularity was at its height, so then did the professionals fail to halt the delegates from switching to Willkie.
The methods they employed were an appeal to partisanship, emphasizing Willkie's conversion to Republicanism; an
attempt to block his candidacy by matching his appeal against
Dewey's personality and prior vote-getting ability; an effort
to overcome the Willkie tide with Taft, stressing his strong
Republican background and firmness of conviction; and, finally,
an effort to construct an old-fashioned combination of the type
which had been used in the past to weed out political intruders

,----~----------------------

·--
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or other individuals not wanted by the professionals •11 The
Willkie forces countered the appeal to partisanship by emphasizing the character and importance of some of the Willkie
converts, notably Governors Baldwin and Stassen; they effectively blocked the combination--the group of twenty-one Conggressmen from the Northwest who issued the statement that they
would not attempt re-election were Willkie nominated--with the
recruitment of Governor carr of Colorado and other important
Western Republican leaders.

The whisper campaigns against

Willkie's business connections, utilities affiliations, and
Wall Street influence were partially nullified by Willkie's
personal conversations with the delegates and his public
declarations that he was proud of his bcisiness associations.
His supporters concentrated the issue by stating that a businessman's sense and ability were needed to right the nation's
economy, to run the government on the

pro~it

side.

All these

attempts to block Willkie's chances failed· because the delegates would not stand for it; they demonstrated their
independence by thinking for themselves.

They had always

stood for it in the past; the situation was unique.5
Throughout the convention period there were rumors that
the "Stop-Willkie 11 forces planned to block his candldacy with
4Arthur Krock, "Willkie Credited for Own Victory," New
York Times, June 28, 1940, p. 1.
5rbia., p. 6.
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a Taft-Dewey combination; however, it was also reported that
each front runner believed himself to be in a position to gain
the nomination on his own and would not accept the second spot
on the ticket and that the combination could not be effected
because neither could deliver his support to the other.·
The growth of Willkie's pre-convention boom represented
an expression of the rank and file's enthusiastic support,
support '\'Ihich had not yet been translated into delegate votes •
.After the "Stop-Hillkie" movement failed in its attempt to keep
the boom confined to the rank and file, Willkie's message was
able to reach the unbossed delegates.

III.
...

THE WILLKIE .APPEAL AND

1~E

DELEGATES

The explanation of the cause of the delegates' switches

~·

to Willkie during the balloting rests on the premise that the
political situation which existed after the Nazi invasion of
the Lowlands created a body of delegates who were susceptible
to the persuasive appeal of the rank and file and the Willkie
campaign forces.

As a result of their combined arguments the

delegates slowly realized that Willkie was the best candidate
they could nominate.
Jhe

S~'?~.Etibilij:;z

of the

~).:.~ff.a.te.:?_:

As active members in the

Before

t~

Conventi<?E_.

G.O.P., the delegates felt the

same desire for a winning ticket as did the rank and file; hmvever, the change in the course of the war did not have the same
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dramatic r.eprecussions among the delegates because they did
not~

and could

not~

switch as rapidly as the rank and file.

Commitment.s placing support behind other candidates prevented
the delegates from joining the popular movement for \IJillkie,
even if they had so desired.

It was easier to leave the

DevJey camp and to sign a Willkie petition or join a Willkie
club than it was to go back on promises of pledged support
based on primary victories, favorite son considerations, or
promises ·Of jobs or favor-s.
The Nazi invasion and the resulting confusion within
the Republican party during the Spring of 194'0 produced
attitudes of anger, frustration, and anxiety within the party
structure.

The immediate effect of the outbrea l{ of the \'Jar in

September, 1939, was a reversal of the nation's public opinion
as to

wh~ch

party should lead the nation.

Even with this

change in public opinion, it was believed that the election
would be close and that the G.O.P. still had a chance with a
strong candidate, a vote-getter.

The flare-up in the Spring

of 1940 dealt this optimistic sentiment a severe blow because
it a ssu:red the nomination of Roosevelt, or his carbon copy
choice, and placed the Democratic party in excellent position
to continue the New Deal administration.

To win, the

Republicans needed a strong candidate and program; in order to
have even a slight chance, they had to put up the strongest
candidate at their disposal.

The question as to the identity
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of this candidate and as to the problems involved in candidate
switching contributed to the frustrated state of the delegates.
Public opinion polls had indicated that an isolationist
candidate and program could have a difficult time gaining
public support during the tense international situation because
a majority of the nations' voters had shown sympathy for the
Allies and favored the granting of aid to assist them in their
fight.

This prevailing opinion only added to the difficult

decision-making task of those delegates who 'lt'lere pledged to
support candidates who had taken near or outright isolationist
stands on foreign policy issues.
The strong position held by the President and the Demo6ratic party also contributed to the breakdown of G.O.P. optimism.

By

the time the delegates assembled.in Philadelphia, the

polls had indicated that Roosevelt was the overwhelming choice
of the rank and file Democrats, that the Democratic party held
a commanding 54 per cent to 46 per cent lead over the Republicans in national popularity, that a majority of the nation's
electorate expected F.D.R. to seek a third term and be successful in the attempt, and that the opposition to the third term
had melted away with the deterioration of the international
situation.

By

late June, Roosevelt, whose

~arne

had been entered

in eleven primary contests, had amassed over 700 pledged delagate votes, nearly 200 more than the needed majority.

It was

obvious that the President could either secure the nomination
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for himself or could dictate his successor.

In either event,

the Republicans were sure to face a candidate defending the
New Deal, advocating a strong internationalist foreign poli.cy,
and running under the banner of the majority party.
The Stimson-Knox appointments, coming as they did just
before the opening of the Republican convention, deepened the
anxiety of the delegates.

Roosevelt's maneuver triggered a

revival of isolationist sympathies as G.O.P. leaders read the
two Republicans out of the party and as the platform subcommittee composing the foreign policy plank

s~t

about putting

the party firmly in the isolationist camp with an anti-inter-- natlonalist program.

The increase in conservatism was figured

to hinder vlillkie 's chances for the norriina tion since he was
:generally considered the most internationally-minded G.O.P.
candidate; but after the initial impact of the isolationist
revival, the Willkie boom regained its los£es and continued to
grow.

The final Gallup Poll, published on the same day as the

appointment announcement, showed that Dewey had dropped to 47
per cent, while Willkie had advanced to 29 per cent, demonstrative of the fact that Willkie's support among the ra.nk and file
had continued to increase.

The great question facing the dele-

gates during this wave of isolationist sentiment was whether an
isolationist candidate and program could defeat Roosevelt or
his duplicate during an international crisis.

The question

had to be resolved, and there was not much time in which to
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accomplish it.
The Susceptibility of the Delegates: At the Convention.
The delegates were to get no relief from the frustration surrounding their decision when the convention opened.
During the pre-balloting days, event after event combined to

first days of the convention, the reporters indicated that the
delegates were unruled and unbossed, that they appeared to be
shopping around for a candidate and a program.

It was during

this period that Dewey liberalized his foreign policy stand by
declaring that he favored sending surplus materiel to the
.Allies and that he favored the Stimson-Knox appo:l.ntments,
positions which were near reversals of his earlier stands.
While Dewey's new stands were being evaluated by the
roaming delegates, events were taking shope which were to confound further the delegates' decision-making efforts.

From

the opening of their convention headquarters, Taft and Dewey
supporters confidently issued statements of their candidates'
pledged and promised delegate strength, with Dewey's forces
predicting 400 to 450 votes, and Taft's 300.

These attempts

to effect a bandwagoning movement to elicit support from
favorite son and unpledged delegates represented another factor
which the delegates had to consider.

Further problems resulted

from the internal struggle between the isolationist and internationalist factions of the party; for, on one handJ it had
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been reported that the platform subcommittee construction the
foreign policy plank was leaning toward the isolationist
viewpoint after the Stimson-Knox appointments, and, on the
other hand, Governor Stassen's keynote address·called for
support to the Allies and supported the appointments.

This

basic ideological difference of opinion· threatened to split
the party wide open at a time when unity was absolutely
essential for victory at the polls.

The delegates would have

to take: into account these two philosophies and choose the
candidate and program most likely to be accepted by the
.American poeple.
The pressure began to
days of the convention.

mo~nt

during the second and third

The "Stop-vlillkie" forces issued

statements and presented arguments explaining why, in their
opinionsJ Willkie could not defeat the Democrats at the polls;
off-setting this persuasionJ Willkie's newly established

cam~

paign committee and the amateur organizations attempted to
demonstrate why, in their opinions, Willkie was the only
Republican candidate who could win.

vJillkie 's forces and the

candidate himself made a concerted effort to reach all the
delegates, even those who were pledges to support the others
in the race for the nomination.

By the second day Willkie bad

had personal interviews 1·lith 600 delegates, during 11hich he
presented his views on both foreign and domestic issues and
answered questions and challenges on his stands.

His men
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cornered delegates on the streets, on the convention floor,
and in the hotels and sought to obtain their support with a
variety of arguments, nearly all of which were based on the
strength of the Willkie boom spreading throughout the nation.
They emphasized Willkie's rising percentage in the public
opinion polls, the efforts of the 50,000 volunteer workers in
the hundreds of clubs and the conversion of Governors Stassen
and Baldwin and other Republican leaders to the \'lillkie cause.
Further evidence of Willkie's popularity was presented to the
delegates by using the "sales promotional" technique of t.he
testimonial, supplying the delegates with solicited ana
unsolicited letters, telegrams, postal cards, newspapers, ana
telephone calls from their local areas calling for Willkie's
nomination.

This double-edged campaign of explaining the candi-

date's stand on the issues ana of emphasizing the strength ana
magnitude of his popular support to effect a bandwagon-type
swing to Willkie did not immediately convert large numbers of
delegates; the results of the campaign would be seen in the
actual balloting, with the gradual defection from favorite son
delegations and Dewey-held delegate votes.

After the first

ballot, delegates began to exercise their independence ana join
the Willkie band\'mgon.

This switching \'las so gradual that it

probably caused the professionals to under-estimate the
strength of the Willkie appeal; by the time they realized what
was happening, it was too late.
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On the first ballot Willkie trailed Dewey by 255 votes
and Taft by eighty-four; but, he had received votes from twentyfour delegations, including Connecticut's sixteen, nine from
Indiana, and eight from New York.

On the second ballot Willkie

picked up nine from Maine, e:Lght from Massachusetts, and
thirteen from Missouri and had votes in twenty-six delegations;
however., he trailed Dewey by 167 votes and Taft by thirty-two.
The third ballot results gave Willkie six from New Hampshire,
twenty-eight from Massachusetts, twenty-seven from New York,
fif'teen from Pennsylvania, six from .Arizona, six from DelevJare,
and ten from Maryland; \-Jillkie had votes from thirty-four delegations. , On this ballot

\~ilJ.kie

trailed Devw-y by fifty-six

votes and led Taft by forty-seven.

The fourth ballot saw Taft

pick up t\•Tenty-seven votes from Illinois and Willkie pull in
thirty-five from

Nel'l

York, tvwnty-three from New Jersey, and

fourteen from Maryland; hov,Iever, the results v-1ere about the
same as on the third.

Willkie, possessing votes from thirty-

six delegations, led Dewey by fifty-six votes and Taft by
forty-eight.

.After the fourth ballot

De~·.;ey

's support faded as

the delegates began to line up behind Taft and Willkie; the
fifth ballot demonstrated the effectiveness of the Willkie campaign strategy.

On this ballot Willkie obtained support from

thirty-nine delegations and led Dewey by 372 votes and Taft by
fifty-two; Willkie needed only seventy-two votes to win.

The

anti-Willkie forces' attempt to recess the convention to arrange
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a deal had failed, but Taft was not out of the race by any
means.

The sixth ballot results were never made official

because after the Michigan caucus gave Willkie thirty-five
votes, state after state joined the bandwagon and Governor
Bricker moved that

th~

nomination be made unanimous; the

finger had been removed from the dike, thus releasing an everincreasing amount of support for the candidate who had staged
.an amazing political upset.
Willkie 's nomination resulted from a comb:tnati"on of
events beginning with the dramatic change in the course of the
Etwopean war and concluding with the conversion of the delegates to the Willkie cause.
demanded a

ne~v,.

The rank and file Republicans

exciting, and colorful candidate to bring

"order out of chaos," to return the country to the influence
of the G.O.P. philosophy.

Before the Nazi invasion of April-

May, 1940, Dewey was the candidate selected by these grassroots Republicans because he had successfully met the requirements believed essential.for victory.

The end of the "phony

wai' 11 necessitated a re-assessment of the criteria for the
selection of the 1940 nominee; and under the new circumstances,
many members of the rank and file came to the conclusion
that Dewey's isolationist tendencies represented a handicap
to the party's chances, rather than an asset.

The search for

a candidate to meet the new criteria, a candidate who opposed
the New Deal domestic program and who possessed a sound foreign
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policy stand, led many of the rank and file to the liberalconservatism of Wendell Willkie.
Willkie's liberalism manifested itself in his rather
vocal support of much of the New Deal's reform legislation and
his endorsement of the President's policy of aid to the Allies
as the nation's first line of defense against totalitarianism.
These liberal stands did not make Willkie a spokesman for
American liberalism, for in his political philosophy existsd
a belief in the laissez-faire approach to the relationship
of government to businessJ of government to the individual.
Willkie opposed government regulation of business and of a
citizen's total life; he condemned the adminstration's severe
taxation and vast spending programsJ

decla~ing

that they had

the effect of restricting America•s·industrial capacity.

This

liberal-conservatism attracted the rank and file because it
represented a logical and reasonable apprdach to the problems
facing the nation in the Spring of 1940; such an approach was
needed to attract the independent voteJ needed to capture the
White House.
The conversion of the rank and file was only one step
in the nomination of Wendell Willkie; for the nomination rested
not with the rank and fileJ but with the delegates to the convention.

The defection of this Republican body to the HilJ.kie

cause resulted from frustration over the state of the international situation} the fear of facing Roosevelt during a
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crisis 1 ana the indecision resulting from the change in the
requirements of a winning candidate.

The Willkie strategy of

exposing the delegates to his program and of demonstrating the
strength of the \'lillkie appeal among the rank ana file effected
the gradual defection from the dynamic Dewey and the tactical
TaftJ promulgating a race to get on the Willkie bandwagon.
A:fter the nomination, a check of delegates from five

states made by The Editorial Research Reports indicated that
fifty per cent of the delegates switched to Willkie because of
personal conversations with the candidate, while twenty per
cent indicated that they had been swayed by discussions with
,,

fellow aelegates.6

'I'he delegates had come to the convention

with confus-ed, but open, minds.

Exposure to vlillkie 1 s philo-

sophy and popula.r appeal forced the delegates to recognize the
fact that the peculiar c:J.rcumstances of 1940 called for the
nomination of a special type of candidate, a candidate who
could generate popular enthusiasm.

Only the conversion of the

remainder of the nation's electorate separated the Repu.bli.can
party from regaining the reins of the national government.

~rnes, £2.· cit., pp. 185-86.

EPILOGUE
Willkie's political philosophy of liberal-conservatism
had spawned a great new movement among the rank and file of
the Republican party.

Enthusiastic amateurs began to take an

increased interest in politics 1 and the Willkie crusade was
born.

The crusade was brougnt-before the delegates

at--th~e~---------~=====

convention 1 and the latter were swept up in the whirlwind.
Enthusiasm drowned out common sense; amateurism replaced sound
politics.

The philosophy was to be presented to the American

people as it had been to the delegates; amateurism had triumphed over professionalism at the convention 1 and it would
do so again when introduced to the electorate.

Willkie

swallowed his own line, as it were, and became a crusader.
There w:ere two factors vJhich led Willkie to make this
decision.

The first was his victory over the party's pro-

fessiona 1 poll ticians in securing the nomination.

1tlil1kie was

cognizant of the power generated by the combination of his
political stands and the intense enthusiasm of his supporters 1
the power of persuasion which had compelled the delegates to
jump on his bandwagon.

To Willkie this combination signified

an untapped source of political strength to which he had the
only key.

His political philosophy in the hands of these

zealots would sweep the entire nation, and all the people would
see the logic and the reason of his ideas and would join his
crusade.

The second factor which led Willkie to his decision
was the national popularity which he had achieved immediately
after his nomination.

Time reported that at this critical

point in the campaign Willkie had 47.1 per cent of the popular

vote 1 and a Democrat other than Roosevelt had only 25.9 per
cent. 1 After Roosevelt had been nominated by the Democratic
party, Willkie led the President in six of the nine geographic
sections of the country.

In the South Atlantic States F.D.R.

led 66.5 per cent to 16.4 per cent; in the East South Central
States he led 64.8 per cent to 11.1 per cent; and in the West
South Central States he led Willkie 62.8 pe.r cent to 15.9 per
cent.

In the Mountain States Willkie led Roosevelt 45.1 per

cent to 39.3 per cent; in the East North Central States he led
45.1 per cent to 38.8 per cent; in New England he led 47.2 per
cent to 40.6 per cent; on the Pacific Coast he· led 51.1 per
cent to 37.0 per cent; in the Middle Atlantic States he led
by an even greater margin of 52.6 per cent to 35.9 per cent;
and in the West North Central States Willkie led the President
57.6 per cent to 33.1 per cent.3
The Gallup Poll indicated that as of July,
election were to

~e

19L10,

if the

held in August, Willkie would win with a

majority in the electoral college, although he would lose to
1 "Polls," ~e, 36:12, August 5, 1940.
2ibid.
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Roosevelt in the popular vote. 3
Willkie's decision to embark upon a crusade to save the
country from what he considered the evils of the New Deal was
the fatal error of the 1940 Republican campaign.

It was ironic

that the very instrument which had given Willkle the nomination
would ·also prove to be the political millstone around the neck
of the candidate of his party.

Willkie was a loner; he had

.drive and determination, but not the understanding of practical
politics.

He believed that the professional politicians were

tainted individuals who had lost the confidence of the American
people.

Willkie's attempt to reform the party and to change

its policies and aims during the campaign caused the party
leaders to lose confidence in the candidate and contributed to
the lack of unity within the party. 4
Willkie was also suspicious of the Republican party
political organization, the backbone of the party.

He allowed

his contempt. for the party professionals to deprive his crusade
of the knowledge and experience of the modern political organization.5
Willkie had been built up as a potential candidate by
those who had been inspired by his liberal-conservatism.

He

3 11 \'Jill.kie in the. Gallup Poll," The Ne\'l Republic, 103:204,
August 12, 1940.
4nillon, op. cit., p. 2211-.
5Henry o. Evjen, "The Willkie Campaign: An Unfortunate
Chapter in Republican Leadership," The Journal of Politics,
Volume 14, p. 245, 1953.
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had come to the convention with little delegate strength and
had been considered only a possible dark horse candidate in
the event of a deadlocked convention.
emerged as the leader of his party.

~rom

this low point he

In achieving this position

he had not relied on a large initial amount of pledged support,
and he had not formed a political organization to promote his
candidacy until after the convention had convened.
~andidacy

Willkie's

had been opposed by the professionals, a factor

which all but killed his chances for the nomination; however,
his amateur supporters had aroused public
candidate's policies and programs.

.and

The

~nthusiasm

over the

crusade grew

Wi~lkie

overwhelmed the professionals at the convention.

It was

at this point that Willkie decided that he did not need the
party, the organization, nor the professionals; he needed
only the party's name and votes.

In his

addre~s

to the con-

vention following the nomination Willkie declared that he
hoped that "you Republicans" would help him achieve victory in
the November election.
Once he had made the decision to initiate a crusade to
preserve the American way of life, Willkie became a messiah,
not an effective political campaigner.

He believed that the

American people would flock to him and that he would again
emerge victorious.

As he carried the crusade to the people,

large crowds came to hear what he had to say.

During the

campaign he declared, "If I can just keep the minds of American
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citizens open so they will listen to argument, keep their
minds free so they won't be slaves to political bosses or to
prejudice, to vague argument or to bunk, I shall be satisfied. rr6
The -conditions which had prevailed at the Philadelphia

convention, the defeatist attitude and the frustration over
the choice of a candidate and program, were no longer present.
Willkie continued to draw crowds, but they would not listen-he had become a dead whale.

,,

The professionals see the signs in the dice,
the signs in the cards ana clouds,
Over their drinks they curse at the candidate,
a renegade enemy whose sudden cause
Was rammed ·down their throats; he is wrecking
their only chance.
The Dream of Business is a failtng image.
Among the predictions, statistics, in the cro\'lds,
The explosive seeds of defeat. Their deadliest f'ears
Run damp ln their bones. More than torches by night,
More than pennons, candy, and speechmaktng,
A campaign is slavery, they say,
The tiring slavery: to plan, to counsel, to control.
Above all: to carry out.
Willkle shows courage. Willkie will shout.
Forthright, alone, he speaks his mind.
But the party needed another kind-A man who will accept support.
No benefit here of party or plan.
Joe Martin sacrificed himself, want1rig a g1ant to f1ght
·a giant.
--He •·s not a giant!
He draws his crowd.
Dead whales on flatcars draw their crowds.
Noboay votes for a dead whale.7

6"Boos and Tumult Muffle the Real Issues as campaign
Enters Its Final Month," Life, 9:23, October 14, 1940.
7Mariel Rukeyser; One Life, pp. 125-26.
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A.

SELECTION OF THE DELEGATES
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STATE
Demo :1091} Rep:lOOO

PRIMARIES
Demo Rep

CONVENTION
Rep
Demo

COMMITTEE
Demo Rep

534

68

20

6
18

12

-. 492
Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Deleware
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
I1linols
Indlana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mtssissippi
Missouri
Montana
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
Ne\'l Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota

448

22

44

13
6
44

12
16
6

14
50

50

8
8
28
22
18
22
10
16

34

532

.

12
16
6
12
14
8
8
28
22
18
22
12
13
16

24

20

34

8
32

8
32

86

84

52

52

10
72

10
72

8

8

38
22
18
30
8
6

38
22
11
30
8
6

6
8
26
8

6
23
8

22

22

8
16

8
10

8
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Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washlngton
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Alaska
District of Columbia
Hawa-ri
Puerto Rico
Philippines
Canal Zone
Virgin Islands

16
24
6

16
24

22
46
8
6
22
16

18
26
8

6
6

6

,.

o·
6

6
2

9

18
16

3
3
::s

2
2

1"2,091~ Delegates to Go to Big Conventions; State Sessions
Will Elect the Most of Them," Nevi_ York :£ime ~' April 3, 19J+0, p. 9.
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B.

ESTIMATES OF PROBABLE FIRST-BALLOT VOTES

Alabama: 13 votes -- 10 claimed for Taft, 7 for Dewey •
.Arizona: 6 votes-- Doubtful. Dewey and Gannett claimed support.
Arkansas: 12 votes-- All claimed for Taft,. though Dewey expected
some.
California: 44 votes-- 18 claimed for. Dewey (opponents concede
only 9); 20 claimed for Taft (regarded as too high). Hoover
had influence on a majority of the delegates.
-----·C0naee-t-i--eu-t-:-1-e-v-o-te-g-----Ea-l-dwirLha-d_the_f_a"Y_Qr_it_e son votes •
Colorado: 12 votes -- 4 claimed for Dewey, but a ~s~o~l~i~d~d~e~l~e~g~a~t~i~o~n--~=====
was figured to follow Governor Carr: uncommitted delegationo
Deleware: 6 votes
All claimed by Taft; 3 claimed for Dewey.
Florida: 12 votes-- To be determined by state convention.
Georgia: 14 votes -- All claimed for Taft, altho~gh some Dewey
support •
. Idaho: 8 votes -- All for Dewey by instruction.
Illinois: 58 votes -- 50 to 52 claimed for Dewey as a result of
prima~y victory; oppo~ition limits Dewey to 40.
Indiana: 28 votes-- 16 to 18 claimed for Dewey; opposition
estimated 16 for Taft, 6 for Dewey, 2 for Vandenberg, 2 for'
Willkie, and 2 uncertain~
Iowa: 22 votes-- MacNider had favorite.son vote on first ballot.
Kansas: 18 votes --~ Senator Capper• had favorite sone vote on first
ballot.
Kentucky: 22 votes -- Over 16 claimed for Dewey; 16 claimed for
Taft; Dewey's opposition gives him no more than 4; state
convention instructed the delegate-at-large to vote for Deweye
Louisiana: 12 votes-- Probably 10 for Taft and 2 for Dewey.
Maine: 13 votes -- Probably be solid for ~ridges on the first
ballot; 1 claimed for Dewey.
r~ryland: 16 votes -- Probably all for Dewey on the first ballot
as a result of his primary victory.
Massachusetts: 34 votes -- Saltonstall or Martin predicted to
receive favorite son vote; Dewey claimed 2, and opponents
give him none.
Michigan: 38 votes -- All for Vandenberg on first ballot.
Minnesota: 22 votes-- Vote divided, with Dewey, Taft, Willkie,
and Vendenberg receiving votes on the first ballot.
Mississippi: 11 votes -- All for Taft, unless National Committeeman Perry Hm·1ard changes his mind.
Missour•i: 30 votes-- 8 to 15 votes estimated for DevJey, although
some support for Taft and Willkie.
~1ontana: 18 votes -~ 7 to 8 for De Hey.
Nebraska: 14 votes -- .All to Dewey as a result of h:ls pr:i.mary
victory.
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Nevada: 6 votes -- Doubtful, l'1ith 3 claimed for Dewey.
New Hampshire: 8 votes -- Ali for Bridges.
New Jersey: 32 votes -- A maximum of 28 claimed for Dewey as a
result of his primary victory; opponents concede no more
than 15; Taft and Willkie support also in the state.
New Mexico: 6 votes -- 4 claimed for Dewey.
New York: 92 votes -- 70-75 claimed for Dewey; opponents give
·
him below 60; impartial estimate of Dewey vote is 62 to 66;
Gannett and Willkie have support in the state.
North Carolina: 23 votes -- ·12 claimed for Dewey, 18 for Taft;
Vewey's opponents concede him 5.
I'------------.-.Nc-o-r--.-t-.--h--'--=Dc-a-.--k-=o--.-t-a-:-8: votes -- All to Ma cNider on first ballot.
Oklahoma.: 22 votes -- State convention backed Dewey; 17 sure
votes claimed by Dewey; opponents concede 10.
Ohio: 52 votes -- All for Taft, with Bricker as second choice.
Oregon: 10 votes -- All to McNary on the first ballot.
Pennsylvania: 72 votes -- All to Governor James on the first
ballot, making a bloc available for trading purposes; Dewey
supporters hope to get 20-25 votes on the second ballot.
Rhode Island: 8 votes-- 2 to 4 claimed for Dewey; opponents concede none; majority expected tQ follow the lead of Governor
Vanderbilt.
South Carolina: 10 votes-- State convention to decide.
Tennessee: 18 votes -- Doubtful. 14 claimed for Dewey; over
majority claimed for Taft; Dewey's opposition concede him
no more than 4 .
. Texas: 26 votes-- Doubtful or uncommitted. Hoover or Taft possibilities.
·
Utah: 18 votes -- All for Dewey.
Vermont: 9 votes -- Doubtful, probably uncommitted. Taft and
DeY.Iey hopeful; Bricker with some support in state.
Virginia: 18 votes ~-· 14 claimed for Taft, lt for Dewey; Dewey's
opponents concede none.
Washington: 16 votes -- 14 claimed for Dewey, with 2 unpledged;
Del1ey 's opponents concede him no more than 8. May go for
McNary on first ballot.
West VirgiDia: 16 votes-- Taft claimed 15 and concede Dewey 1;
Dewey claimed 4.
Wisconsin: 24 votes-- All for De\.,rey as a result of mandatory
primary.
Wyoming: 6 votes -- 4 claimed for Dewey; opponents concede Dewey
none; 4 votes for Dewey likely.
Territories, Territorial ~ossessions, and District of Columbia:
13 votes: Not known.
2 James A. Hagerty, "First-Vote Choice of De\'iey Is Found
Unlikely in Survey," New Yor~ Tim~~, June 3, 1940, · p. 1. .
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C.

Sur<1MARIZATION OF THE 1940 REPUBLICAN PLATFORM1
'

The platform began with the accusations that the New
Deal had deliberately fanned the flames of class hatred;
attempted to place the judiciary under executive domination;
made impossible the normal friehdly relations between employers
and

emplo~ees;

spent billions of dollars, yet left the coun·ry

unprepared to resist foreign attack; doubled the national· debt
and imposed taxes where they did the most harm; and imposed on
the people a regimentation which deprived the individual of
his freedom.
National Defense.

The plank opened with the statement

that the Republican party was firmly opposed to :tnvolving the
United States in foreign vJars and stressed. the losses of the
earlier World War.

The plank then declared that the party

stood for Americanism, preparedness, and peace and charged that
the New Deal had to take full responsibility for the unprepared
state of the nation and consequent danger of our involvement
in war.

The G.O.P. pledged to rebuild national defenses so

that the United States could not only defend its own soil, but
uphold the Monroe Doctrine as well.

The plank stated that the

party would, in the meantime, support the belated efforts of
the New Deal to build up the defense system; however, the party
would continue to condemn all Executive aGts and proceedings

lNew York Times, June 27, 191~0, pp. 1,5.

r----------------·-·-·------·-
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which might lead to war without the authorization of Congress.
The plank also pledged the extension to all peoples fighting
for liberty of such aid as would not be in violation of international law or inconsistent with the requirements of our own
national defense.
~e-employment.

This plank charged that the New Deal

had failed to solve the problem of unemployment and pledged
the Republican party to recreate opportunity for the nation's
youth and to put the millions of unemployed back to work in
private industry 1 business 1 and agriculture.

The plank also

declared that the restriction holding back the wheels of
individual enterprise would be ellm).nated.
Relief ?-n£ Social

§ecur~~l.·

These planks called for the

removal of waste 1 discrimination, and politics from the relief
programs through administration by the States with Federal
grants-in-aid on a fair and non-political basis.

The party

promised the extension of necessary old-age benefits on a payas-you-go basis to the extent that the revenues raised for that
purpose would permit and favored the extension of the unemployment compensation to those groups and classes not presently
included.

The administration of the program, the plank

advocated, should rest with the States.
Labor Relations.

Thi.s plank opened with the statement

that the Republican party had always protected the American
worker and pledged the party to maintain labor's right of free

,-;

-----
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organization and collective bargaining.

The plank also called

for the amending of the National Labor Relations Act in fairness to employers and all groups of employees so as to provide
the freedom

for~

and orderliness in, self-organization and

collective bargaining.
Agriculture.

In this rather lengthy_plank the G.O.P.

promised to effect permanent and temporary government policies
to establish and maintain an equitable balance between labor,
industry, and agriculture by expanding industrial and business
activity, eliminating unemployment, and lowering production
costs--thereby creating increased consumer _buying power for
agr:l.cultural products.

Until the balance was reached the party

would continue to support benefit payments based on a soil
conservation program administered, as far is possible, by the
farmers themselves.

The plank pledged to support incentive

payments to encourage production, a cooperative system of
adequate farm credit supervised by an independent government
agency, a system of government re-financing of the heavy
Federal farm debt load through an agency segregated from
commodity credit, a national land use program for Federal
acquisition of nonproductive farm lands, tariff protection
for farm products, an orderly development of reclamation and
irrigation projects, and stabilization of agricultural income
through intelligent management of accumulated stwpluses.
Tariff and Reciprocal rrrade.

This plank called for
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tariff protection for agriculture, labor, and industry as being
essential to the nation 1 s standard of living and stated

tha~

the measure of protection would be determined by scientific
methods with due regard to the interest of the consumer.

The

plank also condemned the manner in which the Nevl Deal 1 s
reciprocal trade treaties were put into effect without adequate
hearings, with undue haste, without proper consideration of the
nation 1 s domestic producers, and

~ithout

Congressional approval.

The Republicans declared that they would correct the stated
defects.
Mone~ ~'1d

Job~ §_~~ Idl_~

Money.

In these planks the

Republican party declared that the Congress should reclaim its
,·constitutional pOI'lers over money and withdraw the President 1 s
arbitrary authority to manipulate the

currency~

that the 'l'homas

Inflation Amendment of 1933 and the Silver Purchase Act of 1934
should be repealed, that it was possible to keep the securities
market clean without paralyzing it, and that to get the billions
of idle dollars and millions of idle men back to work and to
promote national defense the Secut'ities Act should be revised
and the policies of the commission changed to encourage the
flow of private capital into industry.
Taxation, Public Credit, and Public Spending.

The

platform condemned the Nell! De a 1 tax structure and pledged the
party to revise the tax system and remove those practices which
had impeded recovery and apply policies which would stimulate
enterprise.

The plank added that the. taxing power would not
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be used as an instrument of punishment.or to secure objectives
not otherwise obtainable

unde~

existing law.

The platform

cr1ticized the twenty-riine billion dollar increase in the
national debt resulting from the New Deal's borrowing and
promised to conserve the public credit for all-essential purposes by levying taxation sufficient to cover all necessary
civil expenditures, a substantial part of the defense cost, and
the interest and retirement of the national debt.

The plank

on public spending condemned the New Deal's deficit spending
policies and declared that private enterprise, if allowed to
go to work, could rapidly increase the wealth, income, and
standard of living of all the people.
Equal Rights, Negro, Un-American Activities,
Speech.

an~

Free

In these related planks the Republican party pledged

itself to support a Congressional amendment providing for equal
rights for men and women; to work to give the Negro a square
deal in the economic and political life of the nation and to
promote legislation to curb mob violence; to get rid of "Fifthcolumnists" who were appointed to positions of trust in the
National Government by the New Deal; and to support the application o£ free press and free speech principles to the radio
and to re·voke licences only

~>Ihen,

after public hearings, due

cause for cancellation was shown.
Immigration, Veterans, Indians, and Hawaii.

In These

four planks the Republican party promised to enforce all lavl's
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controlling immigration, in addition to recommending that all
aliens who sought to change the American form of govel'nment
by force and violence be deported; to support adequate compensation and care for veterans disabled in the service of the
country~

and for their widows, orphans, and dependents; and to

ef:fect an immediate and final settlement of all Indian claims
between the government and the Indian citizenship of the nation.
The platform declared that Hawaii was entitled to the fullest
measure of home rule and to equalit-y with the States in the
rights of her citizens and in the application of the nation's

_eeti~_loE...

In these three related planks the pla t.f'o.rm pledged

the party to rEgulate business only so as to protect the consumer, employee, and investor and without restricting the production of more .and better goods at low prices; to enforce antitrust legislation without prejudice of discrimination and without the use or threatened use of criminal indictments to obtain
through co,nsent decrees objectives not contemplated by la\'r; and
to reduce to the minimum Federal competition with business,
continuing only those enterprises whose maintenance is clearly
in the public interest.
S~ll Busi~,

Insurance.

_§toe~

and Commodi t~

Exch<:J.E.f~,

and

The Republican platform condemned the Nev1 Deal's

policy o.f interference and arbitrary regulati.on of business and
promised to encourage the small businessman by removing unnec-
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essary bureaucratic regulations and interference.

The platform

also stated that the party favored regulation of stock and commodity exchanges, but that they should be accorded the fullest
measure o£ self-control consistent \'lith the discharge of their
public trust.and the prevention of abuse.

The insurance plank

condemned the New Deal for its attempt to destroy the confidence
of the people in private insurance companies and declared that
the regul:ation of insurance should continue to fall to the
states.
Government

Reorganizatio~

and the Third Term.

The plat-

form pledged the G.O.P. to extend the merit system to all nonpolicy-f'orming positions, to enact legislation to standardize
,

and simpli.fy quasi-judicial and administrative agencies, and
to insure that the balance of powers principle guide the
policies affecting the organization and operation of our form
of goyernment.

The platform also declared that the Republican

party, to i:nsure against the overthrow of the American form of
government, favored an amendment to the Constitution providing
that no person could serve more than two terms as President.
The platform closed with the statement that the nominee,
by accepting the nomination, was honor bound to be true to the
principles and program set do1m in the platform.

